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icial District Court - Bonneville 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2006-0004332 Current Judge: Jon J. Shindurling 
Marvin F Morgan vs. Michael Alexander Demos MD, etal. 
User: LMESSICK 
Marvin F Morgan vs. Michael Alexander Demos MD, John D. JR. Chambers MD, Idaho Heart Institute, P.C. 
)ate Code User 
l/3/2006 NCOT WILLIAMS New Case Filed-All Other Gregory S. Anderson 
SMIS WILLIAMS Summons Issued - 3 Gregory S. Anderson 
NOAP WILLIAMS Plaintiff: Morgan, Marvin F Notice Of Appearance Gregory S. Anderson 
Lowell N. Hawkes 
WILLIAMS Filing: Ai - Civil Complaint, More Than $1000 No Gregory S. Anderson 
Prior Appearance Paid by: Hawkes, Lowell N. 
(attorney for Morgan, Marvin F) Receipt number: 
0033151 Dated: 8/3/2006 Amount: $88.00 
(Combination) 
COMP WILLIAMS Complaint Filed Gregory S. Anderson 
:/9/2006 MOTN DOOLITTL Motion to Disqualify Gregory S. Anderson 
/14/2006 DISA LMESSICK Order of Disqualification Gregory S. Anderson 
116/2006 JUDGE HUNTSMAN ~Judge Change_ Jon J. Shindurling 
OOAJ HUNTSMAN Order of Assignment to Judge Shindurling Jon J. Shindurling 
0/23/2006 DOOLITTL Filing: 11A Civil Answer Or Appear. More Than Jon J. Shindurling 
$1000 No Prior Appearance Paid by: Quane 
Smith LLP Receipt number: 0044749 Dated: 
10/23/2006 Amount: $58.00 (Check) 
NOAP DOOLITTL Defendant: Idaho Heart Institute, P.C. Notice Of Jon J. Shindurling 
Appearance Jeremiah A. Quane 
NTOS DOOLITTL Notice Of Service (Defendant Idaho Heart Jon J. Shindurling 
Institute P.C.'s 1st Set of Interrogatories to 
Plaintiff 
1/30/2006 NTOS DOOLITTL Notice Of Service (plaintiffs Response to Jon J. Shindurling 
Defendant Idaho Heart Institute, P.C.'s 1st Set of 
Interrogatories) 
15/2007 NOAP PHILLIPS Defendant: Demos, Michael Alexander MD Notice Jon J. Shindurling 
Of Appearance Jeremiah A. Quane 
NOAP PHILLIPS Defendant: Chambers, John D. JR. MD Notice Of Jon J. Shindurling 
Appearance Jeremiah A. Quane 
NTOS PHILLIPS Notice Of Service (2) 1/3/07 (1 st set of interrog Jon J. Shindurling 
to pi on Michael Demos & John Chambers) 
PHILLIPS Filing: 11A - Civil Answer Or Appear. More Than Jon J. Shindurling 
$1000 No Prior Appearance Paid by: Quane, 
Jeremiah A. (attorney for Chambers, John D. JR. 
MD) Receipt number: 0000874 Dated: 1/5/2007 
Amount: $58.00 (Check) 
8/2007 NTOS DOOLITTL Notice Of Service (Plaintiffs Response to Jon J. Shindurling 
Defendant Demos and Chambers' 1 st Set of 
Interrogatories) 
27/2007 NTOS PHILLIPS Notice Of Service 3/23/07 Jon J. Shindurling 
10/2007 NTOS DOOLITTL Notice Of Service (Defendants' Answers and Jon J. Shindurling 
Objections to Plaintiff's Requests for Admission) 
11/2007 COMP DOOLITTL Amended Complaint Filed and Jury Demand Jon J. Shindurling 0 0 1 
Date: 11/30/2012 
Time: 11: 17 AM 
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Seve icial District Court - Bonneville 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2006-0004332 Current Judge: Jon J. Shindurling 
Marvin F Morgan vs. Michael Alexander Demos MD, etal. 
User: LMESSICK 
Marvin F Morgan vs. Michael Alexander Demos MD, John D. JR Chambers MD, Idaho Heart Institute, P.C. 
Date 
5/23/2007 
5/31/2007 
11/23/2007 
12/21/2007 
128/2008 
1612008 
125/2008 
126/2008 
'28/2008 
'312008 
14/2008 
18/2008 
Code 
NTOS 
NTOS 
AFFD 
AFFD 
MOTN 
MEMO 
AFFD 
NDDT 
NDDT 
NDDT 
NDDT 
NDDT 
NDDT 
NDDT 
NDDT 
NOTC 
HRSC 
ANSW 
MOTN 
AFFD 
NDDT 
MEMO 
AFFD 
User 
WILLIAMS 
DOOLITTL 
DOOLITTL 
DOOLITTL 
DOOLITTL 
DOOLITTL 
DOOLITTL 
PHILLIPS 
PHILLIPS 
PHILLIPS 
DOOLITTL 
DOOLITTL 
DOOLITTL 
WILLIAMS 
Judge 
Notice Of Service (Answers and Objections to Jon J. Shindurling 
Plaintiffs Interrogatories of Defendants John D. 
Chambers, Jr., M.D. and Idaho Heart Institute 
P.C.) 
Notice Of Service (Answers and Objections to Jon J. Shindurling 
Plaintiffs Interrogatories of Defendant Michael 
Alexander Demos, M.D.) 
Affidavit of Michael Alexander Demos, M.D. Jon J. Shindurling 
Affidavit of Counsel Jon J. Shindurling 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Jon J. Shindurling 
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion Jon J. Shindurling 
for Summary Judgment 
Affidavit of John D. Chambers, Jr., M.D. JonJ. Shindurling 
Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of Idaho Jon J. Shindurling 
Heart Institute 1/4/08 @ 9:00 a.m. 
Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of John D. Jon J. Shindurling 
Chambers Jr., MD 1/4/08 @ 9:30 a.m. 
Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of Michael Jon J. Shindurling 
Demos, MD 1/8/08 @ 10:00 a.m. 
Amended Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of Jon J. Shindurling 
Idaho Heart Institute, P.C. Pursuant to Rule 
30(b )(6) 
Amended Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of Jon J. Shindurling 
Michael A. Demos, M.D. 
Amended Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of Jon J. Shindurling 
John D. Chambers, Jr., M.D. 
Second Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition of Jon J. Shindurling 
John D. Chambers Jr., M.D. Duces Tecum 
WILLIAMS Second Amended Notice of Deposition of Idaho Jon J. Shindurling 
Heart Institute, P.C. Pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) 
Duces Tecum 
TAWILLIAMS Second Amended Notice of Taking Deposition of Jon J. Shindurling 
Michael A. Demos, M.D. Duces Tecum 
QUINTANA Hearing Scheduled (Motion 03/24/200810:30 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM) Plaintiffs Motion for Original Documents 
DOOLITTL 
ANDERSEN 
ANDERSEN 
DOOLITTL 
WILLIAMS 
WILLIAMS 
Answer Jon J. Shindurling 
Motion and Notice of Hearing (3/24/08 @ 10:30) Jon J. Shindurling 
Affidavit of Counsel Jon J. Shindurling 
3rd Amended Notice Of Deposition Duces 
Tecum of Michael A. Demos, M.D. 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion Jon J. Shindurling 
(Re: Document Review) 
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Memorandum in Jon J. Shindurling 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motin (Re: Document 
Review) 
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Marvin F Morgan vs. 
)ate Code 
lI25/2008 HRHD 
MINE 
HRSC 
:128/2008 NOTH 
./4/2008 NDDT 
NTOS 
1712008 NTOS 
18/2008 AFFD 
NDDT 
115/2008 ORDR 
116/2008 NOTH 
117/2008 MOTN 
AFFD 
118/2008 NDDT 
121/2008 NOTH 
MOTN 
125/2008 MEMO 
AFFD 
129/2008 CO NT 
HRSC 
AFFD 
NDDT 
NDDT 
30/2008 NTOS 
Seven icial District Court - Bonneville Cou User: LMESSICK 
ROAReport 
Case: CV-2006-0004332 Current Judge: Jon J. Shindurling 
Marvin F Morgan vs. Michael Alexander Demos MD, etal. 
Michael Alexander Demos MD, John D. JR. Chambers MD, Idaho Heart Institute, P.C. 
User Judge 
QUINTANA Hearing result for Motion held on 03/24/2008 Jon J. Shindurling 
10:30 AM: Hearing Held Plaintiffs Motion for 
Original Documents 
QUINTANA Minute Entry Jon J. Shindurling 
QUINTANA Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/12/2008 11 :00 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM) Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
DOOLITTL Amended Notice Of Hearing 5-5-08 @ 11 :00 Jon J. Shindurling 
a.m. 
DOOLITTL Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of Bruce Jon J. Shindurling 
Crawford 
DOOLITTL Notice Of Service (Plaintiffs 2nd Discovery to Jon J. Shindurling 
Defendants) 
DOOLITTL Notice Of Service (Defendants' Responses to Jon J. Shindurling 
.. Plaintiffs 1 st Set of Requests for Production) 
DOOLITTL Affidavit of William J. Flynn Jon J. Shindurling 
DOOLITTL Amended Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of Jon J. Shindurling 
Bruce Crawford 
QUINTANA Order Re: Original Documents Jon J. Shindurling 
WILLIAMS Second Amended Notice Of Hearing - 5/12/08 @ Jon J. Shindurling 
11:00 a.m. 
DOOLITTL Motion for Order Pursuant to Rule 56 (f) Jon J. Shindurling 
DOOLITTL Affidavit of Counsel Jon J. Shindurling 
DOOLITTL Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of Sandi Jon J. Shindurling 
Christiansen 
WILLIAMS Notice Of Hearing on Motion for ORder Pursuant Jon J. Shindurling 
to Rule 56(f) 
WILLIAMS Motion to Shorten Time Re: Motion for Order Jon J. Shindurling 
Pursuant to Rule 56(f) 
ANDERSEN Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motino Jon J. Shindurling 
for Order Pursuant to Rule 56(f) 
ANDERSEN Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Memorandum in Jon J. Shindurling 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motino for Order Pursuant 
to Rule 56 (f) 
QUINTANA Hearing result for Motion held on 05/12/2008 Jon J. Shindurling 
11:00 AM: Continued Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
QUINTANA Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/09/2008 09:00 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM) Motion for Summary Judgment 
DOOLITTL Supplemental Affidavit of Counsel RE: Rule 56(f) Jon J. Shindurling 
Motion 
DOOLITTL Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of Lori Brown Jon J. Shindurling 
DOOLITTL Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of Idaho Jon J. Shindurling 
Heart Institute, P.C. Pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) 
DOOLITTL Notice Of Service (Defendant Idaho Heart Jon J. Shindurling 
Institute P.C.'s Answers to Plaintiffs 2nd Set of 
Requests for Admission) 
003 
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Marvin F Morgan vs. Michael Alexander Demos MD, John D. JR. Chambers MD, Idaho Heart Institute, P.C. 
Jate 
5/2/2008 
3/12/2008 
5/27/2008 
5/28/2008 
19/2008 
111/2008 
'18/2008 
2312008 
28/2008 
15/2008 
Code 
NTOS 
TRAN 
NTOS 
AFFD 
AFFD 
AFFD 
AFFD 
AFFD 
AFFD 
AFFD 
HRHD 
ORDR 
OR DR 
MINE 
MINE 
ORDR 
ORPT 
HRSC 
HRSC 
NTOS 
ORDR 
NTOS 
User 
ROBBINS 
WILLIAMS 
DOOLITTL 
DOOLITTL 
DOOLITTL 
DOOLITTL 
DOOLITTL 
DOOLITTL 
DOOLITTL 
DOOLITTL 
DOOLITTL 
KER 
KER 
KER 
KER 
KER 
KER 
KER 
KER 
KER 
DOOLITTL 
GWALTERS 
DOOLITTL 
Notice Of Service Defendant Idaho Heart Jon J. Shindurling 
Institutes Responses to P's Second Discovery to 
Defs. 
Transcript Filed (Plaintiffs Motion to Shorten Jon J. Shindurling 
Time/Motion for Relief Pursuant to Rule 56(f) -
April 28, 2008) 
Notice Of Service (Plaintiffs 3rd Discovery to Jon J. Shindurling 
Defendant) 
Plaintiffs Summary Judgment Memorandum 
Affidavit of Marvin F. Morgan (Summary 
Judgment 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Affidavit of Bradley K. Morgan (Summary Jon J. Shindurling 
Judgment) 
Affidavit of Barbara Ella Spencer (Summary Jon J.Shindurling 
Judgment) 
Affidavit of Gary E. Ellwein, M.D. (Autopsy Jon J. Shindurling 
Pathologist) 
Affidavit of Jay N. Schapira, M.D. (Summary Jon J. Shindurling 
Judgment) 
2nd Affidavit of William J. Flynn (Summary Jon J. Shindurling 
Judgment) 
Affidavit of Counsel Ryan S. Lewis (Summary Jon J. Shindurling 
Judgment) 
Hearing result for Motion held on 06/09/2008 Jon J. Shindurling 
09:00 AM: Hearing Held Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
Order Setting Pre-Trial Conference and Trial Jon J. Shindurling 
Order Appointing Mediator Jon J. Shindurling 
Minute Entry Jon J. Shindurling 
Minute Entry Jon J. Shindurling 
Order Appointing Mediator Jon J. Shindurling 
Order Setting Pretrial Conference and Trial Jon J. Shindurling 
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference Jon J. Shindurling 
02/09/2009 10:00 AM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 02/23/200901 :30 Jon J. Shindurling 
PM) 
Notice Of Service (Defendant Idaho Heart 
Institute, P.C's Responses to Plaintiffs 3rd 
Discovery to Defendants and Defendant Idaho 
Heart Institute's Supplemental Responses to 
Plaintiffs 2nd Discovery to Defendants) 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Order, Opinion, Decision on Parties Motions for Jon J. Shindurling 
Summary Judgment: Plaintiffs request for 
Summary Judgment is DENIED. Defendants' 004 
Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. 
Notice Of Service of Discovery Requests Jon J. Shindurling 
Date: 11/30/2012 
Time: 11 :17 AM 
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Marvin F Morgan vs. Michael Alexander Demos MD, John D. JR. Chambers MD, Idaho Heart Institute, P.C. 
Date 
10/17/2008 
11/17/2008 
11/20/2008 
11/24/2008 
11/25/2008 
11/28/2008 
12/112008 
21212008 
2/8/2008 
Code 
NTOS 
HRSC 
AFFD 
MEMO 
MOTN 
NOTH 
MOTN 
AFFD 
HRSC 
NOTH 
NOTC 
NOTH 
AFFD 
RESP 
RESP 
DCHH 
CONT 
CONT 
User 
WILLIAMS 
GWALTERS 
DOOLITTL 
DOOLITTL 
DOOLITTL 
DOOLITTL 
DOOLITTL 
DOOLITTL 
GWALTERS 
DOOLITTL 
WOOLF 
DOOLITTL 
DOOLITIL 
DOOLITTL 
DOOLITTL 
DOOLITTL 
DOOLITTL 
DOOLITIL 
DOOLITTL 
GWALTERS 
GWALTERS 
GWALTERS 
Judge 
Notice Of Service (Plainitffs Response to Jon J. Shindurling 
Defendants' First Requests for Production of 
Documents and a CD containing Ipdf documents 
lableded MM101508 - 1 thorugh 232) 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 12/08/200809:00 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM) Mtn to Continue Trial - Quane Smith to ntc -
appear telephoncially 
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendants' 
Motion to Compel 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Jon J. Shindurling 
Compel 
Defendants' Motion to Compel Jon J. Shindurling 
Notice Of Hearing on Motion to Continue Trial Jon J. Shindurling 
Setting 12-8-08 @ 9:00 a.m. (fax). 
Motion to Continue Trial Setting (fax) Jon J. Shindurling 
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion to Jon J. Shindurling 
Continue Trial Setting (fax) 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 01/12/200910:30 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM) Mtn to Compel -Quane to ntc 
Notice Of Hearing on Defendants' Motion to Jon J. Shindurling 
Compel 1-12-09 @ 10:30 a.m. 
Notice of Deposition Duces Tecum of Plaintiff Jon J. Shindurling 
Marvin Morgan 
Defendant's Identification of Expert Witnesses 
Plaintiffs Expert Witness Disclosure 
Plaintiffs Supplemental Expert Witness 
Disclosure 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Plaintiffs 2nd Supplemental Expert Witness Jon J. Shindurling 
Disclosure 
Notice Of Hearing 12-8-08 Jon J. Shindurling 
Affidavit of Counsel Opposing Trial Continuance Jon J. Shindurling 
and Lifelong Medical Records 
Plaintiffs Response Opposing Defendants' 
Motion to Compel 
Plaintiffs Response Opposing Defendants' 
Motion to COntinue Trial Setting 
Hearing result for Motion held on 12/08/2008 
09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Nancy Marlow 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearirig 
estimated: under 100 Mtn to Continue Trial -
Quane Smith to ntc - appear telephoncially 
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on 
02/09/2009 10:00 AM: Continued 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 02/23/2009 Jon J. Shindurling 
01:30 PM: Continued 
005 
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User: LMESSICK 
Marvin F Morgan VS. Michael Alexander Demos MD, John D. JR. Chambers MD, Idaho Heart Institute, P.C. 
Jate 
12/8/2008 
12/9/2008 
2110/2008 
2/12/2008 
2/17/2008 
17/2009 
19/2009 
112/2009 
'13/2009 
'14/2009 
1512009 
16/2009 
Code 
HRSC 
HRSC 
MINE 
NTOS 
NTOS 
NTOS 
NTOS 
AFFD 
NDDT 
DCHH 
MINE 
NDDT 
HRSC 
HRVC 
NOTC 
NTOS 
NDDT 
User 
GWALTERS 
GWALTERS 
GWALTERS 
GWALTERS 
WILLIAMS 
DOOLITTL 
DOOLITTL 
WILLIAMS 
WOOLF 
DOOLITTL 
GWALTERS 
GWALTERS 
WILLIAMS 
GWALTERS 
GWALTERS 
GWALTERS 
WILLIAMS 
DOOLITTL 
DOOLITTL 
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 
03/09/2009 10: 15 AM) 
Judge 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 03/30/2009 01 :30 Jon J. Shindurling 
PM) 2 week trial 
Notice of Hearings - PTC set on 3/9/09 at 10: 15 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM; JT set on 3/30109 at 1:30 PM 
Minute Entry re Mtn hrg held on 12/8/08 at 9 AM: Jon J. Shindurling 
The Mtn to cont trial was GRANTED. PTC is cant 
to 2/9/09 at 10: 15 AM. JT is reset to 3/30109 at 
1 :30 PM. The Mtn to Compel hrg is set for hrg as 
scheduled on 1/12/09 at 10:30 AM. (see doc for 
details) 
Notice Of Service of Offer of Settlement (12-9-08) Jon J. Shindurling 
Notice Of Service (Plaintiff's 4th Discovery to Jon J. Shindurling 
Defendant) 
Notice Of Service of Supplemental Discovery Jon J. Shindurling 
Response 
Notice Of Service of Discovery Responses Jon J. Shindurling 
Supplemental Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Jon J. Shindurling 
Defendants' Motion to Compel 
Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of Brad Jon J. Shindurling 
Morgan (fax) 
Hearing result for Motion held on 01/12/2009 Jon J. Shindurling 
10:30 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Nancy Marlow 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: under 100 Mtn to Compel -Quane to 
ntc 
Minute Entry re Mtn Hrg held on 1/12/09 at 10:30 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM: Mtn to Compel is DENIED. Mr. Hawkes 
requested a new Pretrial date. Court advised that 
2/23/09 is available and some time is available on 
3/2109. Mr. Hawkes was advised to call the office 
to arrange a new PTC date. (see doc for details) 
Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of Barbara Jon J. Shindurling 
Spencer 
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 
02/23/2009 10:00 AM) 
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on 
03/09/2009 10:15 AM: Hearing Vacated 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Notice of Hearing - PTC reset to 2/23109 at 10 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM 
Notice of Rescheduled Pretrial Conference -
2/23/09 @ 10:00 a.m. 
Notice Of Service of Supplemental Discovery 
Responses 
Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of The 
Records Custodian of Vicki Lee Macy, M.D. 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling DOG 
Date: 11/30/2012 
Time: 11: 17 AM 
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Date 
1/20/2009 
'/22/2009 
12612009 
128/2009 
3012009 
212009 
Code 
NDDT 
NDDT 
NDDT 
NDDT 
ASRV 
SUBR 
ASRV 
SUBR 
ASRV 
SUBR 
ASRV 
SUBR 
ASRV 
SUBR 
ASRV 
SUBR 
NOTC 
MOTN 
MEMO 
NOTC 
AFFD 
User 
DOOLITTL 
DOOLITTL 
DOOLITTL 
DOOLITTL 
WILLIAMS 
WILLIAMS 
WILLIAMS 
WILLIAMS 
WILLIAMS 
WILLIAMS 
WILLIAMS 
WILLIAMS 
WILLIAMS 
WILLIAMS 
WILLIAMS 
WILLIAMS 
WOOLF 
WOOLF 
WOOLF 
DOOLITTL 
DOOLITTL 
DOOLITTL 
Judge 
Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of Records Jon J. Shindurling 
Custodian of Regence Blue Shield of Idaho 
Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of the Jon J. Shindurling 
Records Custodian of Mountain View Hospital 
Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of Records Jon J. Shindurling 
Custodian of Rocky Mountain Diabetes and 
Osteoporosis Center 
Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of the 
Records Custodian of Eastern Idaho Regional 
Medical Center 
Affidavit of Service - 1/9/09 (Brad Morgan -
Subpoena and Notice of Depo) 
Subpoena Returned - Brad Morgan 
Affidavit of Service" - 1/16/09 (Sandy Martin -
Subpoena and Notice of Depo) 
Subpoena Returned (Records Custodian of 
Regence Blue Shield of Idaho) 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Affidavit of Service - - 1/8/09 (Barbara Spencer) Jon J. Shindurling 
Subpoena Returned - (Barbara Spencer) 
Affidavit of Service - 1/19/09 (Vicky Poole for 
Rocky Mt. Diabetes & Osteoporosis Center) 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Subpoena Returned (Rocky Mountain Diabetes Jon J. Shindurling 
and Osteoporosis Center - Records Custodian) 
Affidavit of Service - no date on return - served Jon J. Shindurling 
Chalise Taylor for EIRMC 
Subpoena Returned (Eastern Idaho Regional Jon J. Shindurling 
Medical Center Records Custodian) 
Affidavit of Service - 1/19/09 (Suzy for Mountain Jon J. Shindurling 
View Hospital) 
Subpoena Returned (Mountain View Hospital Jon J. Shindurling 
Records Custodian) 
Notice of Vacating Deposition Duces Tecum of Jon J. Shindurling 
the Records Custodian of Mountain View Hospital 
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Jon J. Shindurling 
and to Shorten Time and Notice of Hearing 
2/23/2009 @ 10:00 AM 
Memorandum Supporting Plaintiffs Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment RE: Causation 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Notice of Vacating Deposition Duces Teecum of Jon J. Shindurling 
Records Custodian of Regence Blue Shield of 
Idaho (fax) 
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Objection to Jon J. Shindurling 
Plaintiaffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
(fax) 
Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Jon J. Shindurling 
Judgment (fax) 
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Date 
2/5/2009 
2/6/2009 
2/9/2009 
2/10/2009 
~/11/2009 
~/18/2009 
~/19/2009 
Code 
AFFD 
MOTN 
MOTN 
MEMO 
AFFD 
NOTC 
NOTC 
AFFD 
RESP 
SUBR 
MINE 
NOTC 
NDDT 
NDDT 
NDDT 
NTOS 
User 
WOOLF 
ROBBINS 
ROBBINS 
ROBBINS 
ROBBINS 
ROBBINS 
ROBBINS 
WILLIAMS 
WOOLF 
DOOLITTL 
DOOLITTL 
GWALTERS 
DOOLITTL 
DOOLITTL 
DOOLITTL 
DOOLITTL 
DOOLITTL 
DOOLITTL 
DOOLITTL 
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Alternative 
Motion for Order Pursuant to Rule 56(f) 
Motion to Shorten time for Hearing Defs 
Objection to PIt's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment andlor Alertnative Motion for Order 
Alernative Motion for Order 
Judge 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Memorandum in Support of Alernative Motion for Jon J. Shindurling 
Order 
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Alternative Jon J. Shindurling 
Motion for Order 
Notice of Deposition Duces Tecum of the Jon J. Shindurling 
Records Custodian of Margaret Wagner, M.D. 
Notice of Deposition Duces Tecum of the Jon J. Shindurling 
Records Custiodian of David Chamberlain, D.O. 
Supplemental Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Jon J. Shindurling 
Alternative Motion for Order Pursuant to Ruel 
56(f) **fax** 
Plaintiffs Response Opposing Defendants' Jon J. Shindurling 
Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Alternate Motion Pursuant to Rule 
56(f) and Motion for Reconsideration 
Subpoena Returned (Records Custodian of 
Utah Heart Clinic) 
Proof of Service 2-6-09 Utah Heart Clinic 
(fax) 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Minute Entry on Mtn hrg held on 2/10109 at 2:30 Jon J. Shindurling 
PM: OIA on Mtn for 56(f) was heard, Mtn for Part 
S/J was withdrawn. PTC will be held on 2/23/09 at 
10 AM as scheduled (see doc for details). 
Notice of Vacating Deposition Duced Tecum of Jon J. Shindurling 
The Records Custodian of Margaret Wagner, 
M.D. (fax) 
Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of the Jon J. Shindurling 
Records Custodian of Mountain States 
Cardiovascular & Thoracic Surgery, PLLC (fax) 
Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of the Jon J. Shindurling 
Records Custodian of P. Jeffrey P. Thompson, 
M.D. (fax) 
Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of the Jon J. Shindurling 
Records Custodian of B. Shields Stutts, M.D. 
(fax) 
Defendants' Exhibit List (fax) 
Notice Of Service of Supplemental Discovery 
Responses (fax) 
Defendants' Witness List (fax) 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 008 
Date: 11/30/2012 
Time: 11:17 AM 
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Date Code User 
2/23/2009 DCHH GWALTERS 
GWAlTERS 
MISC WOOLF 
MISC WOOLF 
MISC WOOLF 
MISC MCGARY 
U24/2009 RTOS DOOL/TTl 
SUBR DOOL/TTl 
RTOS DOOL/TTl 
SUBR DOOL/TTl 
MINE GWAlTERS 
~/25/2009 NOAP GWALTERS 
,/5/2009 SUBR DOOL/TTl 
RTOS DOOL/TTl 
SUBR DOOL/TTl 
RTOS DOOL/TTl 
SUBR DOOL/TTl 
RTOS DOOL/TTl 
NOTC DOOL/TTl 
NOTC DOOL/TTl 
DOOL/TTl 
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on Jon J. Shindurling 
02/23/2009 10:00 AM: District Court Hearing Helc 
Court Reporter: Nancy Marlow 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: under 100 
Request for Jury 
Plaintiff's Rule 16(c) Pretrial Statement (Pretrial 
2/2312009) (Trial 3-30-09) 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Plaintiff's Trial Exhibit List Jon J. Shindurling 
Plaintiff's Trial Witness List Jon J. Shindurling 
Defendants' Requested Jury Instructions and Jon J. Shindurling 
Proposed Special Verdict 
Return Of Service 2-6-09 Margaret Wagner Jon J. Shindurling 
m.d. Records Custodian (Fax) 
Subpoena Returned Margaret Wagner, MD. Jon J. Shindurling 
Records Custodian (fax) 
Return Of Service 2-6-09 David Chamberlain Jon J. Shindurling 
(fax) 
Subpoena Returned David Chamberlain, D.O. Jon J. Shindurling 
Records Custodian (fax) 
Minute Entry re PTC held on 2/23/09 at 10 AM: Ct Jon J. Shindurling 
discussed jury details w/parties (see doc for 
details). 
Defendant: Demos, Michael Alexander MD Notice Jon J. Shindurling 
Of Appearance Matthew F McColl 
Subpoena Returned Mountain States Jon J. Shindurling 
Cardiovascular & Thoracic Surgery, PPl 
Records Custodian (fax) 
Return Of Service 2-19-09 Mountain States Jon J. Shindurling 
Cardiovascular by serving Amy Plume (fax) 
Subpoena Returned P. Jeffrey Thompson, Jon J. Shindurling 
M.D. Records Custodian (fax) 
Return Of Service 2-19-09 P. Jeffrey Jon J. Shindurling 
Thompson by serving Lisa Alcof (fax) 
Subpoena Returned B. Shields Stutts, MD. Jon J. Shindurling 
Records Custodian (fax) 
Return Of Service NON- Service B. Shields Jon J. Shindurling 
Stutts RETIRED AND MOVES AWAY 
(fax) 
Notice of Vacating Deposition Duces Tecum of Jon J. Shindurling 
The Records Custodian of Mountain States 
Cardiovascular & Thoracic Surgery, PllC 
(fax) 
Notice of Vacating Deposition Duces Tecum of Jon J. Shindurling 
The Records Custodian of P. Jeffrey Thompson, 
MD. (fax) 
Defendants' 1 st Supplemental Witness List (fax) Jon J. Shindurling 
Date: 11/30/2012 
Time: 11:17AM 
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Date 
3/11/2009 
3/12/2009 
3/13/2009 
3/16/2009 
11712009 
'18/2009 
'20/2009 
Code 
SUBR 
SUBR 
NOTC 
NDDT 
AFFD 
AFFD 
AFFD 
ASRV 
NOTH 
MOTN 
AFFD 
MEMO 
MOTN 
RESP 
MOTN 
NOTC 
AFFD 
MOTN 
MEMO 
NOTH 
User 
DOOLITTL 
DOOLlTTl 
WOOLF 
KBAIRD 
DOOLITTL 
DOOLITTL 
DOOLlTTl 
DOOLlTTl 
DOOLITTl 
DOOLITTL 
DOOLITTl 
DOOLlTTl 
DOOLlTTl 
ROBBINS 
ROBBINS 
DOOLlTTl 
DOOLlTTl 
DOOLlTTl 
WilLIAMS 
WilLIAMS 
DOOLITTL 
WILLIAMS 
WILLIAMS 
WILLIAMS 
WILLIAMS 
Judge 
Trial Subpoena Returned (Jeffrey E. Keller, Jon J. Shindurling 
MD.) (fax) 
Trial Subpoena Returned (Gregory Hodson, Jon J. Shindurling 
M.D.) (fax) 
Notice of Vacating Disposition Duces Tecum of Jon J. Shindurling 
the Records Custodian of B. Shields Stutts, MD 
Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of the records Jon J. Shindurling 
custodian of eastern idaho cardiology associates 
Defendant's Objections to Plaintiffs Proposed Jon J. Shindurling 
Jury Instructions 
Defendant's 2nd Supplemental Witness List Jon J. Shindurling 
Defendants' 1 st Amended Exhibit List 
Defendants' Trial Brief 
Affidavit of Counsel RE: Trial Brief 
2nd Affidavit of counsel RE: Trial Brief 
Affidavit of Counsel RE: Mediation 
Defendants' 1 st Supplemental Requested Jury 
Instructions 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Affidavit of Service - 3-12-09 Jeffrey E. Keller Jon J. Shindurling 
M.D. (Trial Subpoena) 
Notice Of Hearing on Defs Motion in Limine 
3/24/09 at 2:00 pm 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Motion to Shorten Time for Hearing Defs Motions Jon J. Shindurling 
in Limine 
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendants' 
Motions In Limine 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motions Jon J. Shindurling 
In Limine 
Defendants' Motions In Limine Jon J. Shindurling 
Plaintiffs Response Opposing Defendants' 
Motion to Shorten Time Re: Motions in Limine 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Plaintiffs Motion for Protective Order Re: March Jon J. Shindurling 
27,2009 Depositon of Eastern Idaho Cardiology 
Associates 
Notice Vacating the Deposition Duces Tecum of Jon J. Shindurling 
The Records Custodian of Eastern Idaho 
Cardiology Associates (fax) 
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion to Jon J. Shindurling 
Exclude Jay Schapira, MD. **fax** 
Defendants' Motion to Exclude Jay Schapaira, 
M. D. **fax** 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Jon J. Shindurling 
Exclude Jay Schapira, M.D.) 010 
Notice Of Hearing - 4/2/09 @ 2 p.m. Jon J. Shindurling 
Date: 11/30/2012 
Time: 11: 17 AM 
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Date Code 
3/20/2009 MOTN 
MOTN 
MOTN 
3/23/2009 
NOTC 
MISC 
3/24/2009 AFFD 
HRSC 
HRHD 
HRHD 
HRSC 
ASRV 
112512009 HRSC 
ORDR 
OR DR 
MOTN 
NOTH 
AFFD 
MOTN 
User 
WILLIAMS 
WILLIAMS 
WILLIAMS 
DOOLITTL 
DOOL/TTL 
WOOLF 
WOOLF 
ROBBINS 
ROBBINS 
WILLIAMS 
QUINTANA 
QUINTANA 
QUINTANA 
QUINTANA 
WILLIAMS 
GWALTERS 
GWALTERS 
GWALTERS 
GWALTERS 
GWALTERS 
GWALTERS 
GWALTERS 
Plaintiffs Motion in Limine Re: Defendants' 
Decedent Ella Morgan's Medical Conditions 
Which are Not in Issue 
Judge 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Plaintiffs Motion in Limine Re: Defendants' Jon J. Shindurling 
Cumulative Experts 
Motion to Shorten Time for Hearing Defendants' Jon J. Shindurling 
Motion to Exclude Jay Schapira, M.D. 
Defendants' Exhibits Volume 1 A & B Jon J. Shindurling 
Defendants' Exhibits Volume 2 C-GG Jon J. Shindurling 
Notice of Hearing on Defendants' Motion to Jon J. Shindurling 
Exclude Jay Schapira, MD.cy 
Defendants' Second Amended Exhibit List Jon J. Shindurling 
Plaintiff's Trial Exhibits 3 ring Binder 
Plaintiffs Objections to Defs Requested jury 
Instructions 
Affidavit of Counsel Opposing Late-Filed, 
Post-Pretrail Motions 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 03/24/2009 02:00 Jon J. Shindurling 
PM) Defendant's Motion in Limine 
Defendant's Motion to Exclude 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 03/30/2009 Jon J. Shindurling 
01 :30 PM: Hearing Held 2 week trial 
Hearing result for Motion held on 03/24/2009 Jon J. Shindurling 
02:00 PM: Hearing Held Defendant's Motion in 
Limine 
Defendant's Motion to Exclude 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 03/30/2009 01 :30 Jon J. Shindurling 
PM) 
Affidavit of Service - 3/16/09 (Subpoena - Eastern Jon J. Shindurling 
idaho Cardiology Records Custodian) 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 03/30/200910:00 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM) Mtn to Exclude - McColl to ntc 
Order Shortening Time for Hrg Defs Mtns in Jon J. Shindurling 
Limine (see doc for details). 
Order Shortening Time for Hrg Defs' mtn to Jon J. Shindurling 
Exclude Jay Schapira, M.D. (see doc for details). 
Renewed Motion to exclude P's expert witness Jon J. Shindurling 
abo Os. 
Notice Of Hearing on Mtn to exclude set on Jon J. Shindurling 
3/30109 at 10 AM 
Affidavit of Counsel in Spt of Renewed Mtn to Jon J. Shindurling 
exclude P's expert witness obo Os. 
Motion to Short time for hrg on Os' renewed mtn Jon J. Shindurling 
to exclude P's expert witness obo Ds. 011 
Date: 11/30/2012 
Time: 11:17 AM 
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Date Code 
3/25/2009 ORDR 
AFFD 
3/26/2009 MEMO 
MEMO 
AFFD 
1/27/2009 AFFD 
,/30/2009 DCHH 
HRSC 
HRSC 
CONT 
MINE 
ORPT 
20/2009 ORDR 
28/2009 HRSC 
User 
GWALTERS 
WOOLF 
GWALTERS 
DOOLITTL 
GWALTERS 
GWALTERS 
WOOLF 
GWALTERS 
GWALTERS 
GWALTERS 
GWALTERS 
GWALTERS 
GWALTERS 
GWALTERS 
GWALTERS 
Judge 
Order Shortening time for hrg Os' renewed mtn to Jon J. Shindurling 
exclude P's expert witness: Hrg is set on 3/30/09 
at 10 AM (see doc for details). 
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Renewed Jon J. Shindurling 
Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs Expert Witness Jay 
N. Schapira, MD 
Memorandum in spt of renewed mtn to exclude Jon J. Shindurling 
P's expert witness obo Os. (fax) 
Plaintiff's Notice of Compliance (Schapira) Jon J. Shindurling 
Memorandum in Opposition to P's Mtn in Limine Jon J. Shindurling 
Re: Medical Conditions which are not in issue obo 
Os. (fax) 
Supplemental Affidavit in Supt of Os' Renewed Jon J. Shindurling 
Mtn toExclude P'sExpert Witness obo Os. (fax) 
Affidavit of Jay N. Schapira, MD in Opposition to Jon J. Shindurling 
Os' Renewed Motion to Exclude 
Hearing result for Motion held on 03/30/2009 Jon J. Shindurling 
10:00 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Sandra Terrill (T& T) 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: under 100 Mtn to Exclude - McColl to 
ntc 
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference Jon J. Shindurling 
09/14/2009 10:30 AM) 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 10/06/200909:00 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM) 
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 03/30/2009 Jon J. Shindurling 
01 :30 PM: Continued 2 Week Jury Trial 
Minute Entry re Mtn hrg held on 3/30/09 at 10 AM: Jon J. Shindurling 
Defs' mtn to exclude expert witness was partially 
granted. The Ct advised the defs to submit a mtn 
for sanctions re costs. Trial is continued to 
10/6/09 at 9 AM. Each side will have 4 trial days 
for their case. Mr. McColl will prepare order for 
the Court's signature. (see doc for details). 
Order Setting Pretrial Conference/trial: PTC is set Jon J. Shindurling 
on 9/14/09 at 10:30 AM. JT is reset to 10/6/09 at 
9 AM. (see doc for details). 
Order Re: Defendants' Renewed Mtn to Exclude Jon J. Shindurling 
Expert Schapira: D's Mtn to exclude is 
PARTIALLY GRANTED, and the trial is continued 
to allow Os time and latitude to inquire into P's 
expert, Schapira's prior testimonial history. This 
order incorporates the oral findings of this Ct at 
the hrg of this mtn as if fully set forth herein. (see 
doc for details). 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/09/2009 11.00 Jon J. Shindurling 012 
AM) Mtn for Sanctions - Quane to ntc 
)ate: 11/30/2012 Seven al District Court - Bonneville User: LMESSICK 
rime: 11 :17 AM ROA Report 
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)ate Code User Judge 
WS/2009 HRSC GWALTERS Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/15/200909:30 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM) Mtn for Sanctions - Quane to ntc 
HRVC GWALTERS Hearing result for Motion held on 06/09/2009 Jon J. Shindurling 
11:00 AM: Hearing Vacated Mtn for Sanctions -
Quane to ntc 
;/1/2009 MOTN WOOLF Motion for Sanctions Jon J. Shindurling 
MEMO WOOLF Memorandum in Support of Motion for Sanctions Jon J. Shindurling 
AFFD WOOLF Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion for Jon J. Shindurling 
Sanctions 
NOTC WOOLF Notice of Hearing on Defendants' Motion for Jon J. Shindurling 
Sanctions 6/15/2009 @ 9:30 
MEMO WOOLF Memorandum of Expenses Costs and Fees Jon J. Shindurling 
WOOLF **~NoE:nlJeJopeProvidedto Mail Back Affidavit of Jon J. Shindurling 
Counsel in Support of Motion for Sanctions. 
Document is in fi/e**** 
/4/2009 AFFD WILLIAMS Supplemental Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Jon J. Shindurling 
Motion for Sanctions 
/20/2009 HRSC GWALTERS Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/22/2009 09:30 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM) Mtn for Sanctions 
CO NT GWALTERS Hearing result for Motion held on 06/15/2009 Jon J. Shindurling 
09:30 AM: Continued Mtn for Sanctions -
Quane to ntc 
GWALTERS Notice of Hearing - Mtn hrg reset to 6/22/09 at Jon J. Shindurling 
9:30 AM 
'19/2009 BRIF GWALTERS Responsive Brief in Support of Mtn for Sanctions Jon J. Shindurling 
obo Defendants (fax) 
'22/2009 RESP ROBBINS Plfs Response Opposing Defs Motion for Jon J. Shindurling 
Sanctions 
DCHH GWALTERS Hearing result for Motion held on 06/22/2009 Jon J. Shindurling 
09:30 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Nancy Marlow 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: under 100 Mtn for Sanctions 
23/2009 MINE GWALTERS Minute Entry on Mtn hrg held on 6/22/09 at 9:30 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM: Ct GRANTED Mtn for Sanctions as to some 
costs/DENIED as to some costs/fees. Mr. McColl 
will prepare/submit order for signature. (see doc 
for details). 
3/2009 TRAN WOOLF Transcript Filed of the June 22, 2009 Trial Jon J. Shindurling 
(Defendants' Motion for Sanctions) 
TRAN WOOLF Transcript Filed of the 3/24/2009 Hearing Jon J. Shindurling 
(Motions Hearing) 
TRAN WOOLF Transcript Filed of the 2/23/2009 Hearing Jon J. Shindurling 
(Pretrial Conference) 013 
10/2009 HRSC GWALTERS Hearing Scheduled (Motion 09/08/2009 11 :00 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM) Mtn for S/J - Hawkes to ntc 
Date: 11/30/2012 
Time: 11,17 AM 
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Date Code User 
7/10/2009 ORDR GWALTERS 
8/12/2009 HRSC GWALTERS 
8/17/2009 NOTH DOOLITTL 
MOTN DOOLITTL 
MEMO DOOLITTL 
AFFD DOOLITTL 
8/26/2009 AFFD DOOLITTL 
NTOS DOOLITTL 
MEMO DOOLITTL 
3/1/2009 HRVC GWALTERS 
MINE GWALTERS 
DCHH GWALTERS 
1/312009 TRAN GWALTERS 
'1412009 HRSC GWALTERS 
HRVC GWALTERS 
Judge 
Order Regarding Os' Mtn for Sanctions: Os' Mtn Jon J. Shindurling 
for Sanctions is GRANTED (see doc for details). 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 09/01/200901 :30 Jon J. Shindurling 
PM) Mtn to exclude - McColl to ntc 
Notice Of Hearing on Defendants' 2nd Renewed Jon J. Shindurling 
Motion to Exclude Plaintiff's Expert Witness Jay 
Schapira, M.D. 9-1-09 @ 1:30 p.m. 
2nd Renewed Motion to Exclude Plaintiff's Expert Jon J. Shindurling 
Witness Jay N. Schapira, M.D., or Alternative 
Motion to Dismiss 
Memorandum in Support of 2nd Renewed Motion Jon J. Shindurling 
to Exclude Plaintiff's Expert Witness Jay N. 
Schapira, M.D., or Alternative Motion to Dismiss 
~ffidavAof Counsel irLSupportot2ndRenewed Jon J. Shindurling 
Motion to Exclude Plaintiff's Expert Wintess Jay 
N. Schapira, M.D., or Algernative Motion to 
Dismiss 
Affidavit of Counsel RE: Defendants' 2nd 
Renewed Motion to Exclude Plaintiff's Expert 
Witness Jay N. Schapira, M.D. 
Notice Of Service (Plaintiff's Supplemental 
Response to Interrogatory #8 of Defendant's 
Chambers and Demos) 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Plaintiff's Memorandum Opposing Defendants' Jon J. Shindurling 
2nd Renewed Motion to Exclude Plaintiff's Expert 
Witness Jay Schapira, M.D. 
Hearing result for Motion held on 09/08/2009 Jon J. Shindurling 
11 :00 AM: Hearing Vacated Mtn for S/J -
Hawkes to ntc -
Minute Entry Jon J. Shindurling 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 9/1/2009 
Time: 1:45 pm 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Nancy Marlow 
Minutes Clerk: Grace Walters 
Tape Number: 
Hearing result for Motion held on 09/01/2009 Jon J. Shindurling 
01 :30 PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Nancy Marlow 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: under 75 Mtn to exclude - McColl to 
ntc 
Transcript Filed: Mtn to exclude/mtn to dismiss Jon J. Shindurling 
heard 9/1/09 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 09/08/200910:00 
AM) Mtn to exclude - McColl to ntc 
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on 
09/14/2009 10:30 AM: Hearing Vacated 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
014 
Jate: 11/30/2012 
rime: 11 :17 AM 
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1/4/2009 HRSC GWALTERS Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference Jon J. Shindurling 
09/14/200909:00 AM) 
GWALTERS Notice of Hearing - PTC reset to 9/14/09 at 9 AM Jon J. Shindurling 
MEMO WOOLF Memorandum in Support of Third Renewed Jon J. Shindurling 
Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs Expert Witness Jay 
N. Schapira, MD 
MOTN WOOLF Thrid Renewed Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs Jon J. Shindurling 
Expert Witness Jay N. Schapira, MD 
NOTH WOOLF Notice of Hearing on Defendants' Third Renewed Jon J. Shindurling 
Motion to Exluce Plaintiffs Expert Witness Jay 
Schapira, MD 3/30/2009 @ 10:00 AM 
MOTN WOOLF Motion to Shorten Time for Hearing Defendants' Jon J. Shindurling 
Third Renewed Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs 
ExpertWitoessJay Schapira, MD. 
AFFD WOOLF Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Third Renewed Jon J. Shindurling 
Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs Expert Witness Jay 
N. Schapira, MD 
18/2009 LYKE Amended Motion to Shorten Time for Hearing Jon J. Shindurling 
Defendants' Third Renewed Motion to Exclude 
Plaintiffs Expert Witness Jay Schapira, M.D. 
NOTH LYKE Notice Of Hearing on Defendants' Third Renewed Jon J. Shindurling 
Motion (09/14/09@9:00AM) 
110/2009 ORDR GWALTERS Order Denying Ds' 2nd Renewed Mtn to exclude Jon J. Shindurling 
and Mtn to Dismiss: (see doc for details). 
111/2009 MEMO WOOLF Plaintiffs Memorandum Opposing Defendants' Jon J. Shindurling 
Third Renewed Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs 
Expert Witness Jay Schapira, MD 
AFFD WOOLF Affidavit of Counsel Opposing Third Renewed Jon J. Shindurling 
Motion to Exclude (9-11-09) 
'15/2009 MINE GWALTERS Minute Entry Jon J. Shindurling 
Hearing type: Pretrial Conference 
Hearing date: 9/14/2009 
Time: 9:00 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Nancy Marlow 
Minutes Clerk: Grace Walters 
Tape Number: 
DCHH GWALTERS Hearing result for Pretrial Conference held on Jon J. Shindurling 
09/14/200909:00 AM: District Court Hearing Hel( 
Court Reporter: Nancy Marlow 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: under 100 
MINE GWALTERS Minute Entry Jon J. Shindurling 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 9/14/2009 
Time: 9:00 am 015 Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Nancy Marlow 
Minutes Clerk: Grace Walters 
Tape Number: 
Date: 11/30/2012 
Time: 11: 17 AM 
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9/15/2009 DCHH GWALTERS Hearing result for Motion held on 09/14/2009 Jon J. Shindurling 
09:00AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Nancy Marlow 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: under 100 Mtn to exclude - McColl to 
ntc 
HRVC GWALTERS Hearing resu It for Jury Trial held on 10106/2009 Jon J. Shindurling 
09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 
3/16/2009 ORDR GWALTERS Order Granting Ds 3rd Renewed Mtn to Exclude Jon J. Shindurling 
P's expert witness Jay N. Schapira M.D. (see doc 
for details). 
10/23/2009 NOTC WOOLF Notice of Firm Name Change Quane Smith LLP Jon J. Shindurling 
is now known as Carey Perkins LLP 
1/15/2010 HRSC GWALTERS Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference Jon J. Shindurling 
03/08/2010 11 :00 AM) stat of case 
GWALTERS Notice of Hearing - Stat conf set 3/8/10 at 11 AM Jon J. Shindurling 
3/8/2010 MINE GWALTERS Minute Entry Jon J. Shindurling 
Hearing type: Status Conference 
Hearing date: 3/8/2010 
Time: 11 :08 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Digital Record 
Minutes Clerk: Grace Walters 
Tape Number: 
Lowell Hawkes 
Matt McColl 
DCHH GWALTERS Hearing result for Status Conference held on Jon J. Shindurling 
03/08/2010 11 :00 AM: District Court Hearing He/< 
Court Reporter: digital recorder 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: under 50 stat of case 
ORDR GWALTERS Order Granting Permission to Appeal (Rule 12(c), Jon J. Shindurling 
IAR: This case is appropriate for and meets 
criteria of Rule 12(a), IAR (see doc for details). 
STATUS GWALTERS Case Status Changed: inactive Jon J. Shindurling 
122/2012 NOTC DOOLITTL Notice of Substitution of Counsel for Plaintiff Jon J. Shindurling 
(fax) 
NOAP DOOLITTL Plaintiff: Morgan, Marvin F Notice Of Appearance Jon J. Shindurling 
M. Brent Morgan 
121/2012 MOTN SOLIS Plaintiff - Motion To Reopen And To Reconsider Jon J. Shindurling 
Order Granting Defendants' Third Renewed 
Motion To Exclude Plaintiff's Expert Witness Jay 
N. Schapira MD 
AFFD SOLIS Affidavit In Support Of Motion To Reopen And To Jon J. Shindurling 
Reconsider Order Granting Defendants' Third 
Renewed Motion To Exclude Plaintiff's Expert 016; Witness Jay N. Schapira MD 
'22/2012 HRSC GWALTERS Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/09/2012 11 :30 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM) Mtn to reopen case - Morgan to ntc 
Date: 11/30/2012 
Time: 11 :17 AM 
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Date Code User 
3/23/2012 NOTH lYKE 
4/312012 MOTN GWAlTERS 
AFFD GWAlTERS 
MEMO GWAlTERS 
MOTN GWAlTERS 
NOTH GWAlTERS 
ORDR GWAlTERS 
4/6/2012 MEMO DOOL/TTl 
AFFD DOOL/TTl 
RESP DOOL/TTl 
4/9/2012 RESP GWAlTERS 
AFFD GWAlTERS 
MEMO GWAlTERS 
MOTN GWAlTERS 
MINE GWAlTERS 
Judge 
Notice Of Hearing on Motion to Reopen and to Jon J. Shindurling 
Reconsider Order Granting Defendants's Third 
Renewed Motion to Exclude Plaintiff's Expert 
Witness Jay N. Schapira, M.D. 
(04/09/12@11:30AM) 
Motion in Supt of Oppo to P's Mtn to Reopen & Jon J. Shindurling 
for Reconsideration & in Spt of Alternative Mtns to 
Dismiss abo Os (fax) 
Affidavit of Matthew McColl in Spt of Mtn in Supt Jon J. Shindurling 
of our Opposition to P's Mtn to Reopen & for 
Reconsideration & in Spt of Alternative Mtns to 
Dismiss abo Os (fax). 
Memorandum in Spt of Mtn in Spt of our Jon J. Shindurling 
Opposition to P's Mtn to Reopen & for 
Reconsideration &jn Spt of Alternative Mtns to 
Dismiss abo Os. (fax) 
Motion for Order Shortening Time abo Defs (fax) Jon J. Shindurling 
Notice Of Hearing abo Os (fax) Jon J. Shindurling 
Order on Motion to Shorten Time Jon J. Shindurling 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Response & Jon J. Shindurling 
Objection to Defendants' Alternative Motions to 
Dismiss (fax) 
Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff's Response & Jon J. Shindurling 
Objection to Defendants' Alternative Motions to 
Dismiss (fax) 
Plaintiffs Response & Objection to Defendants' Jon J. Shindurling 
Alternative Motions to Dismiss (fax) 
Response & Objection to Defs' Alternative Mts to Jon J. Shindurling 
Dismiss abo P (fax) 
Affidavit in Support of P's Response & Objection Jon J. Shindurling 
to Defs' Alternative Mtns to Dismiss abo P (fax) 
Memorandum in Supt of P's Response & Jon J. Shindurling 
Objection to Ds' Alternative Mtns to Dismiss abo 
P (fax). 
AMENDED Motion to Reopen & to Reconsider Jon J. Shindurling 
Order Granting Ds' 3rd Renewed Mtn to Exclude 
P's Expert Witness Jay N. Schapirs, M.D. abo P. 
(fax) 
Minute Entry 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 4/9/2012 
Time: 11 :30 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Nancy Marlow 
Minutes Clerk: Grace Walters 
Tape Number: 
Brent Morgan 
Matt McColl 
Jon J. Shindurling 
017 
)ate: 11/30/2012 
-ime: 11.17 AM 
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)ate 
·/9/2012 
124/2012 
1112012 
14/2012 
'6/2012 
812012 
20/2012 
21/2012 
Code 
DCHH 
ORDR 
CDIS 
STATUS 
MOTN 
JDMT 
CDIS 
HRSC 
STATUS 
NOTH 
HRSC 
CONT 
MEMO 
User 
GWALTERS 
LMESSICK 
LMESSICK 
LMESSICK 
HUMPHREY 
GWALTERS 
GWALTERS 
GWALTERS 
GWALTERS 
SOLIS 
GWALTERS 
GWALTERS 
GWALTERS 
GWALTERS 
HUMPHREY 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Jon J. Shindurling 
04/09/2012 11 :30 AM: District Court Hearing Hel( 
Court Reporter: Nancy Marlow 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: under 50 Mtn to reopen case -
Morgan to ntc; Mtn & oppo re reopening case -
Carey Perkins to ntc 
Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs Motion to Reopen Jon J. Shindurling 
Case 
Civil Disposition entered for: Chambers, John D. Jon J. Shindurling 
JR. MD, Defendant; Demos, Michael Alexander 
MD, Defendant; Idaho Heart Institute, P.C., 
Defendant; Morgan, Marvin F, Plaintiff. Filing 
date: 5/24/2012 
Case Status Changed: Closed Jon J. Shindurling 
Plaintiff - Motion To Reconsider And To Alter Or Jon J. Shindurling 
Amend Opinion And Order On Plaintiffs Motion 
To Reopen Case 
Judgment: P shall take nothing, this actn is Jon J. Shindurling 
DISMISSED wlo prej. Costs, if any to Defs 
Michael Alexander Demos, M.C., John D. 
Chambers, Jr., M.D., and Idaho Heart Institute, 
P.C., to be determined later. 
Civil Disposition entered for: Chambers, John D. Jon J. Shindurling 
JR. MD, Defendant; Demos, Michael Alexander 
MD, Defendant; Idaho Heart Institute, P.C., 
Defendant; Morgan, Marvin F, Plaintiff. Filing 
date: 6/4/2012 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/03/201209:30 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM) Reconsideration - Morgan to ntc -
Permission by phone? 
Case Status Changed: Closed pending clerk Jon J. Shindurling 
action 
Notice Of Hearing On Motion To Reconsider Jon J. Shindurling 
07/3/2012 @9:30 AM 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/02/2012 11 :00 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM) Reconsideration - cont'd by Ct Morgan to 
appear by phone 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Jon J. Shindurling 
07/03/201209:30 AM: Continued 
Reconsideration - Morgan to ntc - Permission by 
phone? 
Notice of Resetting Hearing - Mtn hrg reset to Jon J. Shindurling 
7/2/12 at 11 AM 
Notice of Resetting Hearing - Mtn hrg reset to Jon J. Shindurling 
7/2/12 at 11 AM 
Memorandum In Support Of Defendants' 
Opposition To Plaintiffs Motion To Reconsider 
And To Alter Or Amend Opinion And Order On 
Plaintiffs Motion To Reopen Case (Fax) 
Jon J. Shindurling 018 
Date: 11/30/2012 
Time: 11,17 AM 
Page 19 of 20 
icial District Court - Bonneville Cou 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2006-0004332 Current Judge: Jon J, Shindurling 
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Marvin F Morgan VS, Michael Alexander Demos MD, John D, JR Chambers MD, Idaho Heart Institute, P,C, 
Date 
3/26/2012 
5/27/2012 
'/2/2012 
'/12/2012 
119/2012 
124/2012 
125/2012 
'6/2012 
Code 
HRSC 
CO NT 
TRAN 
HRSC 
CONT 
NOTH 
NOTC 
APSC 
CERTAP 
BNDC 
MINE 
DCHH 
User 
GWALTERS 
GWALTERS 
GWALTERS 
GWALTERS 
GWALTERS 
GWALTERS 
CEARLY 
CEARLY 
CEARLY 
LMESSICK 
LMESSICK 
LMESSICK 
LMESSICK 
GWALTERS 
GWALTERS 
GWALTERS 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/30/2012 11 :00 Jon J, Shindurling 
AM) Reconsideration - cont'd by Morgan 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Jon J. Shindurling 
07/02/201211:00 AM: Continued 
Reconsideration - cont'd by Ct Morgan to appear 
by phone 
Notice of Hearing - Mtn hrg RESET to 7/30112 at Jon J. Shindurling 
11 AM 
Transcript Filed - Hrg on Mtn to Reopen & Jon J. Shindurling 
Reconsider held 4/9/11 bfr Judge Jon J. 
Shindurling 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/06/2012 11 :30 Jon J, Shindurling 
AM) Mtn to reconsider - cont'd by Morgan 
IJearing re~ult for Motion scheduled on Jon J. Shindurling 
07/30/2012 11 :00 AM: Continued 
Reconsideration - cont'd by Morgan 
Notice Of Hearing RE: Plaintiff's Motion To Jon J. Shindurling 
Reconsider 8-6-12 @ 11 :30 AM 
Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Jon J. Shindurling 
Supreme Court Paid by: Morgan, M. Brent 
(attorney for Morgan, Marvin F) Receipt number: 
0034280 Dated: 7/16/2012 Amount: $109.00 
(Check) For: Morgan, Marvin F (plaintiff) 
Notice Of Appeal 
Appealed To The Supreme Court 
Clerk's Certificate of Appeal 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 35075 Dated 
7/19/2012 for 100.00) 
(SC) Notice of Appeal Filed - Record Due: 
October 30, 2012 
Request for Additional Transcripts & Records 
Pursuant to IAR 19 abo Defs (Fax). 
Minute Entry 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 8/6/2012 
Time: 11 :37 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Nancy Marlow 
Minutes Clerk: Grace Walters 
Tape Number: 
Brent Morgan 
Matt McColl 
Jon J, Shindurling 
Jon J, Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J, Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J. Shindurling 
Jon J, Shindurling 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Jon J, Shindurling 
08/06/2012 11 :30 AM: District Court Hearing Heh 
Court Reporter: Nancy Marlow 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: under 50 Mtn to reconsider - cont'd by 0 18 
Morgan 
Date: 11/30/2012 
Time: 11:17 AM 
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Marvin F Morgan vs. Michael Alexander Demos MD, etal. 
User: LMESSICK 
Marvin F Morgan VS. Michael Alexander Demos MD, John D. JR. Chambers MD, Idaho Heart Institute, P.C. 
Date 
9/20/2012 
9/27/2012 
10/1/2012 
10/17/2012 
10/26/2012 
10/31/2012 
1/212012 
Code 
OR DR 
NOTC 
HRSC 
STATUS 
STIP 
HRVC 
ORDR 
User 
GWALTERS 
HUMPHREY 
HUMPHREY 
GWALTERS 
GWALTERS 
GWALTERS 
DOOLITTL 
LMESSICK 
GWALTERS 
LMESSICK 
Judge 
Opinion & Order on P's Mtn to Reconsider & to Jon J. Shindurling 
Alter or Amend Opinion & Order on P'S Mtn to 
Reopen Case: P'S mtn to reconsider and to Alter 
or Amend Opinion & Order on P'S Mtn to Reopen 
Case is DENIED. 
Defendant's Objection To The Record (Fax) Jon J. Shindurling 
Defendants Notice Of Change Of Address Jon J. Shindurling 
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing 11/19/2012 10:00 Jon J. Shindurling 
AM) Objectn to the record by McColl 
Case Status Changed: Reopened Jon J. Shindurling 
Notice of Hearing Objctn to rcrd hrg set 11/19/12 Jon J. Shindurling 
at 10 AM 
Plaintiffs Stipulation to Request to Augment the Jon J. Shindurling 
Record (fax) 
Hearing result for Hearing scheduled on Jon J. Shindurling 
11/19/2012 10:00 AM: Hearing Vacated Objectn 
to the record by McColl 
Order Granting Objection to the Record: Defs Jon J. Shindurling 
Objection to the Record is GRANTED and record 
shall be augmented. 
Appellate Record Due 1/4/13 Jon J. Shindurling 
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Lowell N. Hawkes (ISB #1852) 
Ryan S. Lewis (ISB #6775) 
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHARTERED 
1322 East Center 
Pocatello, Idaho 83201 
Telephone: (208) 235-1600 
FAX: (208) 235-4200 
Attorneys for P laintif.! 
TIS -3 P ~ :45 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY, IDAHO 
MARVIN F. MORGAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
MICHAEL ALEXANDER DEMOS, ) 
M.D.; JOHN D. CHAMBERS, JR. M.D.; ~ 
AND IDAHO HEART INSTITUTE, P.C.; ) 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
Case No. tJ ·00-~33~ 
COMPLAINT 
AND 
JURY DEMAND 
Count One - District Court Jurisdiction/The Parties 
1. The District Court has jurisdiction because the amount at issue herein is 
in excess of$10,000.00. 
2. Plaintiff Marvin F. Morgan is the husband of Greba Ella Morgan, 
Deceased. Mrs. Morgan was also sometimes known as G. Ella Morgan and Ella G. 
Morgan. Mrs. Morgan died on February 23,2004 as a result of the medical negligence 
and wrongs set forth herein. At all times material, Plaintiff and Mrs. Morgan were 
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husband and wife and residents of Idaho Falls, Bonneville County, Idaho, having been 
married over 50 years. 
3. Defendants Michael A. Demos, M.D. and John D. Chambers, Jr., M.D. 
were, at all times material, residents of Bonneville County, Idaho and employees and 
agents of The Idaho Heart Institute in Idaho Falls, Bonneville County, Idaho. At all times 
material, Defendants Demos and Chambers held themselves out to the public as providing 
quality healthcare in a state-of-the-art facility. 
4. The "Idaho Heart Institute P.C." is the corporate entity through with 
Defendants Demos and Chambers practiced medicine as herein material and the ultimate 
successor to an original Idaho professional corporation created on December 28, 1994 as 
"Robert W. Cameron, M.D. P.A." later changed on December 15, 1997 to "Snake River 
Cardiology Associates, P.C." and on July 16, 1998 to "Idaho Heart Institute P.C.". On 
March 8, 2004 the Idaho Heart Institute P.C. was "administratively dissolved" by the 
Idaho Secretary of State for failure to file the required Annual Report. It was reinstated 
by the Idaho Secretary of State on March 29,2004. 
Medical Facts I Wrongful Death 
5. Prior to February 4,2004 Ella G. Morgan had established a physician-
patient relationship with Defendant Chambers who ultimately recommended she subject 
herself to a diagnostic angiogram. 
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6. Prior to February 4,2004 Mrs. Morgan had undergone some preliminary 
testing ordered by Defendant Chambers that was the represented basis of Defendant 
Chambers recommending the diagnostic angiogram at issue herein. 
7. On February 4,2004 Ella G. Morgan went to the Idaho Heart Institute 
for purposes of having the diagnostic angiogram performed by Defendant Chambers. 
8. Prior to February 4,2004 Defendant Chambers had given assurances that 
he would personally perform the diagnostic angiogram ultimately scheduled for February 
4,2004. 
9. Prior to February 4,2004 Defendant Demos was unknown to Mrs. 
Morgan or her husband, Plaintiff herein; she had not at any time established any 
physician-patient relationship with Defendant Demos nor consented to any care or 
treatment of her by Defendant Demos nor been informed in any mailing or other 
document that Defendant Demos was even at the Idaho Heart Institute .. 
10. Prior to February 4,2004 Defendants Chambers and the Idaho Heart 
Institute knew that Defendant Demos had medical practice issues that would be material 
to any person considering selecting him as a physician; he had been subjected to medical 
disciplinary procedures in at least three states prior to practicing medicine in Idaho Falls 
with the Idaho Heart Institute and the prior medical disciplinary actions against Defendant 
Demos even included discipline for his concealment from the Colorado Board of 
Medicine of medical practice violations in another state. 
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11. On February 4,2004 Defendant Demos - not Defendant Chambers as 
previously agreed and scheduled - negligently performed the diagnostic angiogram on 
Mrs. Morgan causing a dissection and damage to her heart and right coronary artery and 
creating a medical emergency. 
12. As a direct result of the negligence of Defendant Demos, Mrs. Morgan 
was transported by ambulance on an emergency basis to the Eastern Idaho Regional 
Medical Center and subjected to further high-risk medical procedures and complications 
that ultimately resulted in her death on February 23,2005. 
13. Those further emergency procedures established that, with the 
exception of the damage done by Defendant Demos, Mrs. Morgan had no significant 
heart or cardiac health issues. 
14. Defendant Chambers was negligent in his care and treatment of Mrs. 
Morgan, both prior to and following the diagnostic angiogram and complications 
resulting from the negligence of Defendant Demos in performing the diagnostic 
angIOgram. 
15. Defendants were professionally and grossly negligent and breached the 
standard of care proximately resulting in the death ofElIa G. Morgan. 
16. The death ofElIa G. Morgan was avoidable through the exercise of 
non-negligent medical care. 
17. Plaintiff Marvin F. Morgan has been specially and generally damaged 
in, among other things, the loss of society, companionship and support of his wife. 
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Count Two 
18. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 17. 
19. Defendants' acts, omissions, and gross negligence constitute lack of 
informed consent which proximately resulted in the death ofElIa G. Morgan and 
Plaintiffs special and general damages. 
20. Defendants' actions described above violated Idaho Code §39-4304 
through §39-4306. 
Count Three 
21. Plaintiffrealleges paragraphs 1 through 20. 
22. At all times material, Defendants had a fiduciary duty to Ella G. 
Morgan. 
23. Incidental to the negligence and wrongdoing set forth above, 
Defendants provided false, incomplete, and misleading information to Plaintiff and 
sought to misrepresent the true facts and alter the medical records ofElIa G. Morgan in 
order to conceal their negligence, gross negligence, and wrongdoing 
24. The Plaintiff has been additionally damaged by the foregoing. 
Count Four 
25. Plaintiffrealleges paragraphs 1 through 24. 
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26. As a direct and proximate result of the wrongdoing set forth above, it 
has been necessary for Plaintiffs to hire legal counsel to prosecute this action because of 
Defendants' wrongdoing and unwillingness to acknowledge responsibility in any degree. 
27. Plaintiffis entitled to reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 12-120 and/or §12-121 and the applicable rules of the Idaho Rules o/Civil Procedure. 
19. Plaintiffs were damaged by the foregoing and are entitled to an award 
of damages, both special and general, in an amount to be proven at trial. 
Count Five 
20. Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 19. 
21. It has been necessary for Plaintiffs to hire legal counsel to prosecute 
this action because of Defendants' unwillingness to acknowledge responsibility in any 
degree. 
22. Plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Idaho 
Code §12-120 and/or §12-121 and the applicable rules of the Idaho Rules o/Civil 
Procedure. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants jointly 
and severally on all Counts, for his special and general damages, without limit, in such 
amount as shown by the evidence, plus costs and attorneys' fees incurred herein, and 
such other and further relief as the Court deems proper. 
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.JURY DEMAND 
Plaintiff demands trial by jury on all issues. 
DATED this 3rd day of August, 2006. 
COMPLAINT & JURY DEMAND - Page 7 
Morgan v, Demos, Chambers, The Heart Institute 
... 
027 
Lowell N. Hawkes (ISB #1852) 
Ryan S. Lewis (ISB #6775) 
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHARTERED 
1322 East Center 
Pocatello, Idaho 83201 
Telephone: (208) 235-1600 
FAX: (208) 235-4200 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY, IDAHO 
MARVIN F. MORGAN, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
The Honorable Jon J. Shindurling 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV-06-4332 
) 
MICHAEL ALEXANDER DEMOS, ) 
AMENDED COMPLAINT 
AND 
M.D.; JOHND. CHAMBERS, JR. M.D.; ~ 
AND IDAHO HEART INSTITUTE, P.c.; ) 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
JURY DEMAND 
Count One - District Court JurisdictionlThe Parties 
1. The District Court has jurisdiction because the amount at issue herein is 
in excess of$10,000.00. 
2. Plaintiff Marvin F. Morgan is the husband of Greba Ella Morgan, 
Deceased. Mrs. Morgan was also sometimes known as G. Ella Morgan and Ella G. 
Morgan. Mrs. Morgan died on February 23,2004 as a result of the medical negligence 
and wrongs set forth herein. At all times material, Plaintiff and Mrs. Morgan were 
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husband and wife and residents of Idaho Falls, Bonneville County, Idaho, having been 
married over 50 years. 
3. Defendants Michael A. Demos, M.D. and John D. Chambers, Jr., M.D. 
were, at all times material, residents of Bonneville County, Idaho and employees and 
agents of The Idaho Heart Institute in Idaho Falls, Bonneville County, Idaho. At all times 
material, Defendants Demos and Chambers held themselves out to the public as providing 
quality healthcare in a state-of-the-art facility. 
4. The "Idaho Heart Institute P.C." is the corporate entity through with 
Defendants Demos and Chambers practiced medicine as herein material and the ultimate 
successor to an original Idaho professional corporation created on December 28, 1994 as 
"Robert W. Cameron, M.D. P.A." later changed on December 15, 1997 to "Snake River 
Cardiology Associates, P.C." and on July 16, 1998 to "Idaho Heart Institute P.C.". On 
March 8, 2004 the Idaho Heart Institute P.C. was "administratively dissolved" by the 
Idaho Secretary of State for failure to file the required Annual Report. It was reinstated 
by the Idaho Secretary of State on March 29,2004. 
Medical Facts I Wrongful Death 
5. Prior to February 3,2004 Ella G. Morgan had established a physician-
patient relationship with Defendant Chambers who ultimately recommended she subject 
herself to a diagnostic angiogram. 
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6. Prior to February 3,2004 Mrs. Morgan had undergone some preliminary 
testing ordered by Defendant Chambers that was the represented basis of Defendant 
Chambers recommending the diagnostic angiogram at issue herein. 
7. On February 3,2004 Ella O. Morgan went to the Idaho Heart Institute 
for purposes of having the diagnostic angiogram performed by Defendant Chambers. 
8. Prior to February 3,2004 Defendant Chambers had given assurances that 
he would personally perform the diagnostic angiogram ultimately scheduled for February 
3,2004. 
9. Prior to February 3,2004 Defendant Demos was unknown to Mrs. 
Morgan or her husband, Plaintiff herein; she had not at any time established any 
physician-patient relationship with Defendant Demos nor consented to any care or 
treatment of her by Defendant Demos nor been informed in any mailing or other 
document that Defendant Demos was even at the Idaho Heart Institute. 
10. Prior to February 3, 2004 Defendants Chambers and the Idaho Heart 
Institute knew that Defendant Demos had medical practice issues that would be material 
to any person considering selecting him as a physician; he had been subjected to medical 
disciplinary procedures in at least three states prior to practicing medicine in Idaho Falls 
with the Idaho Heart Institute and the prior medical disciplinary actions against Defendant 
Demos even included discipline for his concealment from the Colorado Board of 
Medicine of medical practice violations in another state. 
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11. On February 3,2004 Defendant Demos - not Defendant Chambers as 
previously agreed and scheduled - negligently performed a diagnostic angiogram on 
Mrs. Morgan causing a dissection and damage to her heart and right coronary artery and 
creating a medical emergency. 
12. As a direct result of the negligence of Defendant Demos, Mrs. Morgan 
was transported by ambulance on an emergency basis to the Eastern Idaho Regional 
Medical Center and SUbjected to further high-risk medical procedures and complications 
that ultimately resulted in her death on February 23,2004. 
13. Those further emergency procedures established that, with the 
exception of the damage done by Defendant Demos, Mrs. Morgan had no significant 
heart or cardiac health issues. 
14. Defendant Chambers was negligent in his care and treatment of Mrs. 
Morgan, both prior to and following the diagnostic angiogram and complications 
resulting from the negligence of Defendant Demos in performing the diagnostic 
angiogram. 
15. Defendants were professionally and grossly negligent and breached the 
standard of care proximately resulting in the death ofElIa G. Morgan. 
16. The death ofElIa G. Morgan was avoidable through the exercise of 
non-negligent medical care. 
17. Plaintiff Marvin F. Morgan has been specially and generally damaged 
in, among other things, the loss of society, companionship and support of his wife. 
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Count Two 
18. Plaintiff realleges paragraphs 1 through 17. 
19. Defendants' acts, omissions, and gross negligence constitute lack of 
informed consent which proximately resulted in the death ofElIa G. Morgan and 
Plaintiff's special and general damages. 
20. Defendants' actions described above violated Idaho Code §39-4304 
through §39-4306. 
Count Three 
21. Plaintiffrealleges paragraphs 1 through 20. 
22. At all times material, Defendants had a fiduciary duty to Ella G. 
Morgan. 
23. Incidental to the negligence and wrongdoing set forth above, 
Defendants provided false, incomplete, and misleading information to Plaintiff and 
sought to misrepresent the true facts and alter the medical records ofElIa G. Morgan in 
order to conceal their negligence, gross negligence, and wrongdoing 
24. The Plaintiff has been additionally damaged by the foregoing. 
Count Four 
25. Plaintiffrealleges paragraphs 1 through 24. 
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26. All of the foregoing constitute reckless misconduct pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 6-1603 (4 )( a) on the part of Defendants removing the limitation on non-economic 
damages. 
27. As a direct and proximate result of the wrongdoing set forth above, it 
has been necessary for Plaintiffs to hire legal counsel to prosecute this action because of 
Defendants' wrongdoing and unwillingness to acknowledge responsibility in any degree. 
28. Plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code 
§12-120 and/or §12-121 and the applicable rules of the Idaho Rules o/Civil Procedure. 
29. Plaintiffs were damaged by the foregoing and are entitled to an award 
of damages, both special and general, in an amount to be proven at trial. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants jointly 
and severally on all Counts, for his special and general damages, without limit, in such 
amount as shown by the evidence, plus costs and attorneys' fees incurred herein, and 
such other and further relief as the Court deems proper. 
JURY DEMAND 
Plaintiff demands trial by jury on all issues. 
DATED this 10th day of May, 2007. 
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHARTERED 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifY that on this 10th day of May, 2007 I faxed a copy of the 
foregoing to Jeremiah A. Quane of Quane Smith, LLP, Sixteenth Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza, 
101 South Capitol Boulevard, P.O. Box 519, Boise, Idaho 83701, FAX 208-345-8660. 
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Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Matthew F. McColl, ISB No. 6005 
QUANE SMITH LLP 
Sixteenth Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P. O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 345-8600 
Facsimile: (208) 345-8660 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF_TIjE ST_A}E OF IJ?~HQ/IN~r'tD 
FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
MARVIN F. MORGAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL ALEXANDER DEMOS, M.D.; 
JOHN D. CHAMBERS, JR. M.D.; AND 
IDAHO HEART INSTITUTE P.C., 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-06-4332 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Come Now, Defendants Michael Alexander Demos, M.D., John D. 
Chambers, Jr., M.D. and Idaho Heart Institute {"Defendants"} and move this Court for 
entry of Summary Judgment dismissing this action on the ground there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and that Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 
This Motion is based upon Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, 
the Affidavits of Counsel, Michael Alexander Demos, M.D. and John D. Chambers, Jr., 
M.D.; the Memorandum in Support thereof, filed contemporaneously herewith; and the 
files and records in the above-entitled action. 
DATED this 20th day of November, 2007. 
QUANE SMITH LLP 
-'- Mc_CoU, Of the Eirm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20th day of November, 2007, I served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT by delivering the same to each of the following, by the method indicated 
below, addressed as follows: 
Lowell N. Hawkes 
Ryan S. Lewis 
Lowell N. Hawkes, Chartered 
1322 East Center 
Pocatello, Idaho 83201 
[Xl U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[l Hand-Delivered 
[] Overnight Mail 
[ . ] Facsimile (208) 235-4200 
Matthew F. McColl 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 
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ORIGINAL 
Jeremiah A Quane 
QUANE SMITH LLP 
Sixteenth Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P. O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 345-8600 
Facsimile: (208) 345-8660 
ISB No. 977 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
MARVIN F. MORGAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL ALEXANDER DEMOS, M.D.; 
JOHN D. CHAMBERS, JR. M.D.; AND 
IDAHO HEART INSTITUTE P.C., 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-06-4332 
ANSWER 
COME NOW the above-entitled Defendants and answer the Amended 
Complaint as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
The Amended Complaint fails to state claims upon which relief can be 
granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
ANSWER -1 
I. 
Defendants deny each and every allegation of the Amended Complaint not 
herein specifically and expressly admitted. 
II. 
Admit that Defendants Michael Demos, M.D. and John D. Chambers, M.D. 
were licensed physicians who rendered medical services to Greba E"a Morgan, the demise 
of Greba Ella Morgan and that the Plaintiff is the surviving spouse of Greba Ella Morgan. 
III. 
Admit that Defendant Idaho Heart Institute, P.C. is the corporate entity that 
employedOefendants Michael Demos, M.D.-and John D. Chambers,-M.D:whenthey 
rendered services to Greba E"a Morgan. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
The claims of the Plaintiff against Defendant Idaho Heart Institute, P.C. are 
barred by § 5-219, Idaho Code. 
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray that Plaintiff take nothing in this action, that 
the Amended Complaint be dismissed and Defendants be awarded their costs of suit and 
such other and further relief as the Court deems just. 
DATED this 2 ({; day of February, 2008. 
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ANSWER - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2 (0 day of February, 2008, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER by delivering the same to each of the 
following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
Lowell N. Hawkes 
Ryan S. Lewis 
Lowell N. Hawkes, Chartered 
1322 East Center 
Pocatello, Idaho 83201 
ANSWER- 3 
[X] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[] Hand-Delivered 
[] Overnight Mail 
[] Facsimile (208) 235-4200 
O ~C vJ 
Lowell N. Hawkes (ISB #1852) 
Ryan S. Lewis (ISB #6775) 
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHARTERED 
1322 East Center 
Pocatello, Idaho 83201 
Telephone: (208) 235-1600 
FAX: (208) 235-4200 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY, IDAHO 
The Honorable Jon J. Shindurling 
MARVINF.MORGAN, 
Plaintiff, Case No. CV-06-4332 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
MICHAEL ALEXANDER DEMOS, ) 
M.D.; JOHN D. CHAMBERS, JR. M.D.; ) 
MOTION FOR ORDER 
PURSUANT TO RULE 56(f) 
AND IDAHO HEART INSTITUTE, P.C.; ~ 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
Plaintiff moves the Court for its Order pursuant to Rule 56(f), Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure, for a one month extension within which time to respond to the 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment presently scheduled for hearing on Monday, 
May 12,2008. This Motion is made upon the grounds that such additional time is 
minimally necessary and needed by Plaintiff in order to provide to the court the facts and 
opinions essential to justifY the Plaintiff s opposition to the motion for summary 
judgment as more fully set forth in the Affidavit of Counsel filed herewith. 
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The extension requested by this Motion has been informally requested of 
Defense counsel who have declined to allow the additional time. 
Plaintiff further moves the Court for its order shortening the time for 
hearing of this motion so as to enable Plaintiff to have a ruling from the Court prior to the 
existing deadlines. 
DATED this 16th day of April, 2008. 
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHARTERED 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on 16th day of April, 2008 I faxed a copy of the 
foregoing to Jeremiah A. Quane and Matthew F. McColl of Quane Smith, LLP, Sixteenth 
Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza, 101 South Capitol Boulevard, P.O. Box 519, Boise, Idaho 83701, 
FAX 208-345-8660. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
MARVIN MORGAN, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
-vs.- ) 
) 
MICHAEL ALEXANDER DEMOS, M.D.; ) 
JOHN D. CHAMBERS, JR. M.D.; AND ) 
IDAHO HEART INSTITUTE, P.C. ) 
) 
Defendailts; ) 
Case No. CV -2006-4332 
MINUTE ENTRY 
April 28, 2008, a Plaintiffs Motion to Shorten Time and Rule 56fMotion came on for 
hearing before the Honorable Jon J. Shindurling, District Judge, sitting in open court at Idaho 
Falls, Idaho. 
Ms. Nancy Marlow, Court Reporter, and Ms. Rhonda Quintana, Deputy Court Clerk, 
were present. 
Mr. Lowell Hawkes appeared on behalf of plaintiff. 
Mr. Matthew F. McColl appeared on behalf of the defendant. 
The Court granted the Motion to Shorten Time to allow this proceeding. 
Mr. Hawkes offered argument in support of the motion. 
Mr. McColl responded in opposition and indicated all ofthis delay is for nothing. He 
further argued that nothing in the motion has been supported. 
MINUTE ENTRY - 1 042 
Mr. Hawkes responded and offered rebuttal argument in support. He further requested 
that the Court allow time to provide affidavits. 
The Court granted continuance and reset the Motion for Summary Judgment for June 9, 
2008 at 9:00 a.m. 
Court was thus adjourned. 
c: Lowell Hawkes 
Matthew McColl 
042808AMShindurl #5 
MINUTE ENTRY - 2 
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Lowell N. Hawkes (ISB #1852) 
Ryan S. Lewis (ISB #6775) 
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHARTERED 
1322 East Center 
Pocatello, Idaho 83201 
Telephone: (208) 235-1600 
FAX: (208) 235-4200 
A ttorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURtr 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY, IDAHO I 
The Honorable "'on .... Shlndurllng I 
Plaintiff, ~~ jl Case No. CV-06-4332 MARVIN F. MORGAN, 
VS. AFFIDAVIT 
.' 'l7T 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
JAY N. SCHAPI , M.D. 
MICHAEL ALEXANDER DEMOS, 
M.D.; JOHN D. CHAMBERS, JR. M.D.; 
AND IDAHO HEART INSTITUTE, P.C.; 
Defendants. 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) 
:ss 
LOS ANGELES COUNTY ) 
(Summary Judg ent) 
) 
) 
) 
JAY N. SCHAPlRA, M.D., being first duly sworn, deposes rur states as 
follows: 
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1. I make this Affidavit on personal and professional knOWled~e and the 
opinions stated herein are based on reasonable medical probability and the 4d of 
information cardiologists rely upon in formulating opinions. I j 
2. I am a board-certified cardiologist having been licensed to ~actice 
medicine since 1973 with offices at Cedars Sinai Medical Center in Los Ang~les, 
California. I am experienced in invasive cardiology and, specifically, with, akong others, 
I 
I 
the invasive cardiac procedure commonly called an "angiogram" or "heart I 
j 
catheterization" as was perfonned on Ella G. Morgan on February 3, 2004 atllhe Idaho 
Heart Institute in Idaho Falls, Idaho. My CV is attached. I 
! 
3. As pertains to this case, I am familiar with the standard of crre 
applicable to board-certified cardiologists and the standard of care to which rna G. 
Morgan was entitled in Idaho Falls, Idaho in February of 2004. Both defencljants Demos 
and Chambers acknowledged in their depositions that Mrs. Morgan was entifled to the 
benefit of their cardiology board certification training and were unable to st1te any 
deviations from that board-certified standard in Idaho Falls, Idaho. Dr. Ch~bers further 
acknowledged that it was not accepted "as to any specialty" in Idaho Falls 4at '"a 
1 
physician practice at a standard that was lower than his National Board Cert~fication 
I 
training" received. Chambers Depo, 121:10-20'; Demos Depo 116'1.5"10se 
. 1 Q. At any time incidental to your coming to Idaho Falls did anybodJ ten you that the 
standards in Idaho Falls were lower than what you bad been trained at? "j 
MR. McCOLL: I object to the form. I 
A. Not that I am aware of. I think we practice very good cardiology. 
Q. Have you ever heard in the entire time you have been in Idaho Falls that, as to anylspecialty, it was 
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deposition admissions have been continned to me by an Idaho physician fampiar with the 
standard of care in Idaho Falls in February of2004. I 
4. For the reasons stated herein, it is my opinion that the deathlofElla G. 
I 
Morgan on February 23,2004 was unnecessary and avoidable and the result rf 
substandard and negligent medical care she received as a patient of the Defefdants herein 
and the dissection of her right coronary artery incidental to the February 3, 2?04 
angiogram perfonned by Defendant Demos. I 
An~ioKtam Dissection was Cause of Death 1 
5. The Pos;"'ortem Examination ("~utopsy") of Mrs. Morgan rerfonned by 
Idaho FallslEIRMC pathologist Gary El1wein detennined that the death of Epa G. 
Morgan on February 23, 2004 was the result of damage to her heart sustainek on February 
3,2004 when an angiogram perfonned on her by Defendant Demos at the IJahO Heart 
Institute resulted in a dissection of her right coronary artery. Dr. Ellwein's JutoPSY report 
1 
explained that the pathological aging of scar tissue made it possible to detetine that the 
heart damage that lead to her cardiac arrest on February 23,2004 had occuded 
1 
approximately three weeks earlier at the time of the February 3, 2004 angiokram. Both 
accepted in Idaho Falls that a physician practice at a standard that was lower than hiS/ National Board 
Certification training? ! 
I A. Not that I'm aware of. - Chambers Depo. 121:10-20 I 
2 Q Would it be fair to say that, at the time Ella Morgan was under you~ care at the Idaho 
Heart Institute, that she as a patient was entitled to the fun benefit of aU of your training, experience, and 
board certification? I 
A Yeah, of course. - Demos Depo 116:1-5 I 
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Defendants Chambers and Demos acknowledged in their depositions that the had no 
basis to disagree with pathologist Gary EUwein's findings and opinions nor h d even 
talked with him about them. Chambers Depo 86:11-18; 87:19-25; Demos De 0110:6-
11. 
1 
N e2li~ence in Performin&: Angiolaam I 
6. An angiogram is an invasive procedure wherein a very fine 1atheter is 
inserted tlrrough a vein in the thigh and theu channeled into the heart for the tlease of a 
radiopaque dye that enables the cardiologist to view the arterial anatomy and ~ny 
, 
obstructions. Because it is an invasive procedure insidethe coronaryarterieJ, it is 
I 
absolutely essential that the cardiologist pay careful attention to the images ttat are 
available for hlm to view on the hlgh resolution screen as the catheter is inse~ed and 
advanced. The cardiologist must be sure that the catheter is "coaxial" - a!ired parallel 
so that the mean axis of the catheter (the long axis of the tip of the catheter) is parallel in 
1 
all three dimensions - with the mean long axis of the vessel so that the tip tfthe 
catheter will be in the opening of the artery in an aligned fashion instead of ~ misaligned 
fashion. The failure to do that is negligence. I 
I 
1 
7. A "dissection" of an artery is a breaking-away of the innertrtion of the 
lining of the artery. When that lining is tom away it creates a "flap'7 that ob cts blood 
I 
flow diverting blood behind the artery lining where it is trapped and/or allov}ing the 
I 
i 
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slower-moving or blocked blood to coagulate and create a clotting blockage ~d creating 
a bursting of the blockage and the dissection flap over time. I 
8. In his deposition Dr. Demos was asked why the dissection t9 Mrs. 
i 
Morgan happened and he stated "1 have no idea, because two injections wer made into 
the vessel prior to this, and that was just fme." Demos Depo 54:20. That to al-lack-of-
knowledge answer of Dr. Demos reflects a negligent and most-basic lack of edical 
understanding of what causes a dissection and a negligent inattentiveness to ~. Morgan 
on February 3, 2004 incidental to the angiogram. 
! 
j 
9. The #4 French catheter used by Dr. Demos on Mrs. Morg I IS, among 
other things, essentially an instrument capable, when misused, of injuring e artery and 
causing a dissection. A #4 French catheter is only 1.33 rum in diameter an has 
I 
significant stiffuess which makes it capable of dissecting a coronary artery i~ it is not 
1 
handled properly and not positioned "coaxially." It is absolutely essential ~at the #4 
French catheter not be advanced nor injected through unless it is fully visu1ized to be 
positioned properly and in a coaxial position within the lumen of the artery.j Otherwise 
there is a risk that when the catheter is advanced it will be pushed into the a~ery sidewall 
and start a dissection; it must be properly positioned and coaxial with the ~ery. 
10. The angiogram equipment, whenproperly used by a care}ully 
observant cardiologist. allows the cardiologist to safely advance the cathett without 
causing a dissection. 1 
I 
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11, It is also essential that the cardiologist never advance or 4ect througb 
tbe catheter against resistance or wben the catheter is malpositioned or non-1",dal in a 
significant fashion, such as occurred with Mrs. Morgan. Ruslllng or inattentteness 
I 
when performing an angiogram, or advancing or inj ecting the catheter into tHe wall can 
I 
J 
cause a dissection such as occurred in Mrs. Morgan. I I 
12, A cilIeful, non-negligent cardiologist is aware of resistancl with the 
catheter and visually aware of the location of the catbeter with relation to thel"rtery, The 
medical evidence in Mrs. Morgan's case demonstrates that Dr. Demos was nft 
l 
sufficiently attentive to p';sition the ~atheter coaxially and avoid a dissectionj 
13. Because Dr. Demos has stated in his deposition that he ha4 "no idea" 
I 
what caused the dissection (Demos Depo 54:19-21), it is my opinion that he trobablY was 
I 
unaware of the unsafe positioning of the catheter and injected contrast into t,e coronary 
I 
wall causing the dissection and propogation of the dissection. 1 
J 
14. The deposition of Bruce Crawford explains that only afterlElla Morgan 
was in distress did he and Dr. Demos go back and review the angiogram fil+ and saw 
the arterial dissection for the first time after contrast had been injected three times. 
Crawford Depo 28,11·22, I 
15. A dissection during an angiogram is easily recognized wi~ careful 
observation and is avoidable with cautious and watchful care, But Dr, Dem~s did rot 
I 
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I 
observe the first dissection when he caused it to Mrs. Morgan. It was negligtce and 
substandard to not have been aware of the dissection at the time it occurred. I 
16. Dr. Demos further testified in his deposition that there waslno 
dissection problem incidental to the first two contrast injections. Demos D&10 54:20·21. 
, 
In fact, prior to the first contrast injection it can be seen on the angiogram fiUns that Dr. 
I 
Demos did not maintain the catheter coaxial to the artery but has impacted ~ catheter 
into the artery wall evidencing "tenting" of the otherwise smooth artery wauJ Dissection 
I 
i 
of the artery waIl at that point can also be observed in those same Idaho Hei Institute 
filrrtS. j 
! 
17. What is seen on Mrs. Morgan's angiogram films, on the lasr injection, 
J 
(which was 9 of9) is that towards the second half of the injection there was f staining 
along the aortic wall representing the dissection. This should have been seeJ by Dr. 
Demos and diagnosed as a dissection at that point in time, as sequence 9 of ~ in the Idaho 
Heart Institute angiogram films. 
I 8. The dissection of the aortic root implies that there bas beet di ssecti on 
at the point of "'tenting" where the dye entered the coronary artery at the POir of 
dissection by the tip of the catheter and the stream of contrast and the retrOgrade 
I 
dissection back in to the aortic root from the point of dissection in the right toronary 
artery. This should have been immediately recognized by Dr. Demos and tr~ated 
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appropriately, in which case Mrs. Morgan would have suffered no Significanj injury or 
damage - and certainly would not have lost her life. I 
19. The standard of care in perfonning an angiogram is that wtenever one 
sees this persistence of dye, one must immediately suspect an acute dissectio with 
1 
subintimal dye collection and further investigate and treat the complication. That is 
exactly the case here and the earlier timely recognition would have penmtte, earlier 
intervention and prevented Mrs. Morgan's death. I 
J 
20. The appearance of dye in the aortic root is a clear diagnoslic sign of a 
dissection and that dissection c~e from. the right coronary artery where thejdissection 
I 
started and dye fIrst entered and caused the problem that we see in Mrs. Mo gan. 
21. It is my opinion that Dr. Demos probablY fIrst positioned e catheter 
and inj ected the dye without fIrst determining that it was safe to do so and I us advanced 
the dye into the artery wall, causing a dissection. 
22. Thus, the dissection caused by Dr. Demos was visible in tie initial 
views oftbe right coronary artery. It was negligence and substandard to haVj not been 
sufficiently observant to have seen what was there "on-screen" to be seen jd to have 
seen that it was unsafe to proceed further with the catheter in that position. Jfhe had 
caught the dissection at that point he could have - and should have - stofPed the 
1 
procedure. In high probability it would have responded to an angioplasty 1d stent and 
been resolved without any pennanent damage to Mrs. Morgan's heart.. I 
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23. A dissection is a serious, potentially life-threatening medic 
emergency.3 It is a consideration of every angiogram that must be discussed ith every 
angiogram patient and considerations of a physician's ethical/fiduciary duty4 0 a patient 
require disclosure and documentation of the risks of perfonning an angiOgraj in a facility 
without the capacity promptly respond to a dissection emergency. That was ot done 
I 
here. 
3 
I 
I 
Q. Is the dissection of the kind that occurred to her potentially u1. "'natening? 
A. Yes. I 
Q. Is it a serious emergency? I 
A. Yes. 
Q. Was there ever a discussion with Ella Morgan about the aspeCj of a dissection 
and if it occurred. it was a life-threatening emergency? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And is it your testimony that that also occurred on January 217 
A. Yes. j 
Q. Is that documented anywhere? 
A. No, sir. i 
Q. Did you ever explain to Ella that if there was a dissection at ihe Idaho Heart 
Institute, if the procedure were done there, that there were no eme~gency facilities 
to treat it? I 
A. I don't kn(}w that it waS' explained in that manner. What we r~utinelY explain 
to patients is that we are a diagnostic testing facility. If there wa4 an emergency, 
we have a transfer agreement that's in place with Eastern Idaho R~gional Medical 
Center and the patients would have to be emergently transferred 4ver to have that 
done. ! 
Q. As happened. in Ella's case. I 
A. Yes. I 
- Cham bers Depo 52:3-53:4 I 
1 
4 I am advised that the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that the relationship between 
a patient and a physician is "consensual, highly fiduciary and particularly depe~dent upon the 
patients or client's trust and confidence." Intermountain Eye v. Marie MiIIsr,1r2ldaho 218, 
228,127 P3d 121 (12-20-05) 1 
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24. It is my further opinion that it was negligence and a breac of the 
Defendants' ethical/fiduciary duties to Mrs. Morgan to not have clearly prov ded Mrs. 
Morgan with the "reasonable medical alternative" of having the angiogram the Eastern 
Idaho Regional Medical Center ("EIRMC") where emergency operative car was readily 
available to her in the event of any serious complication. Both Defendants 
and Demos admitted in their depositions Mrs. Morgan was entitled to be ad ised of that 
"reasonable medical alternative." Chambers Depo 53:5-54:6; Demos Depo 19:6-12. 
Dr. Chambers claimed that Mrs. Morgan "was given the option" of having e angiogram 
performed at EIRMC but nowhere is any such conversation documented; itls noticeably 
absent from the January 27, 2004 chart note made for the visit with Mrs. M rgan during 
which he contends the reasonable medical alternative or performing the an 'ogram at 
EIRMC was covered. With Dr. Chambers being assigned by IBI/or the w k to EIRMC 
on February 3,2004, and he being the only physician with whom Mrs. Morr.an had had a 
physician-patient relationship as between he and Dr. Demos, it is highly prlbable that 
Mrs. Morgan would have elected to have the angiogram at EIRMC to asstu1e her of 
having the advantage of her existing cardiologist physician relationship an4 the extra 
measure of safety the EIRMC hospital environment provided.s And Dr. DJmos admitted 
I 
5 Essentially, the only reason Dr. Chambers gave for not doing the angi gram was that he 
was at EIRMC on the every-other-week rotation between he and Dr. Demos; he test' ed he had "every 
intention of doing her angiogram" and yet Dr. Demos was the only one scheduled the y before to do it. 
Chambers Depo. 45:2-19. 
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that he did not discuss with Ella Morgan the medical option/alternative of pe)fOnning the 
angiogram at EIRMC. Demos Depo 120'2-4. i 
25. While Dr. Chambers readily acknowledged that a dissectior of the 
right coronary artery like :Mrs. Morgan had is a "serious emergency" that is "f0tentiaiIY 
life-threatening" he admitted he did not explain the absence of emergency selices at the 
Idaho Heart Institute. Chambers Depo 52:3-53:4. 1 
I 
26. The record at this point leads to the conclusion that there 1as a 
negligent indifference on the part of the Defendants' to both the physician's I 
ethicallficuciary duties to a pati";"t:rod to Mrs. Morgan's rights to a full explf,nation of 
this "reasonable medical alternatives" consideration. 1 
I 
27. Mr. Crawford, the apparent IHI Cath Lab Manager/Opera~or on 
! 
February 3, 2004, testified that 20-25 minutes to get Mrs. Morgan to EIRMcj; and 
I 
emergency care was "exceptionally fast." Crawford Depo 24:16·25:10. Ho ! ever, that 
was more than sufficient time for permanent heart damage to occur as in fac happened to 
Mrs. Morgan, and, as detennined by pathologist Ellwein causing a damaged1heart that 
. j 
would thereafter arrest, as. it did on Mrs. Morgan one day short of three weep later, on 
I 
February 23,2004 causing her death. 
Medical Record - EthicalfFiduciary Duties 
28. The Idaho Heart Institute medical record on Ella Morgan ~s very 
troubling and substandard. There are many irreconcilable inconsistencies inithat medical 
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record as well as things that are just not true. For example, on an overall basi~, it clearly 
I 
appears that Ella Morgan's physician-patient relationship had been solely wi~ Dr. 
Chambers and that he had promised to perfonn the February 3, 2004 angio~. She was 
entitled to rely upon those assurances. However, despite Dr. Chambers contehtions that 
1 
he intended to, and told her, he would do Mrs. Morgan's angiogram he did n1t. His 
deposition contention that he was "planning on doing the case" even while at EIRMC the 
morning of February 3, 2004 is at odds with the deposition testimony of Dr. em os that 
he solely was scheduled the day before to do the angiogram. Chambers Dep 49:8-15 cf. 
Demos Depo 55:6.11; 61:2,11·12. 
29. There are other aspects of the medical record that are trou ling and at 
odds with the physicians' ethical/fiduciary duties to Mrs. Morgan. Among thers, these 
I 
include lHI documents generated at 12:45 and 3:58 p.m. on February 3, 200f reciting 
incorrectly that it was Dr. Chambers who perfonned the angiogram (MR 75, J44, 51, 66; 
I 
Chambers Dapo. 13:4-8; 71:21·72:3; 74:22-23), Dr. Demos contending in h+ angiogram 
report dictated tvvo days later when he absolutely knew otherwise that Mrs. *organ'S 
problems on February 3, 2004 may have been caused by an "arterial spasm"j and had told 
I 
Dr. Chambers at the time that "the right coronary artery was probably disseted" (MR 63-
64; Demos Depo 52:7-18; 99:7-13) and that her death on February 23,2004 1 as a result 
I 
ofa "gastrointestinal bleed." Demos Depo 73,2.11; MR 30 cf. Chambers DtpO' 85:22· 
86:10. Those entries were without a reasonable medical basis in fact to hav~ included in 
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Mrs. Morgan's medical record and reflect an unwillingness to take responsib lity for what 
had happened. In addition, Dr. Demos is not even shown as performing the giogram on 
the Idaho Heart Institute "Invasive Procedure Report" until a report generate on 
February 25,2004 at 10:10 a.m.- two days after Mrs. Morgan died. MR 3 
Chambers Depo. 94:16·96:9. 
30. The evidence in this case, as con finned by Dr. Gary Ellwe' 's autopsy, 
is unequivocal that on February 3,2004 Ella Morgan did not have any signi lcant 
coronary artery disease or other compromising heart condition. Her death wlI .. .... av~idable and her death was a direct result ofthe combined negligence of the Defend ts. 
DATED this 20th day of May, 2008 I 
-
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this 20th day of Ma 2008 
(SEAL) NOTAR PUBLIC 
Residing at: ~ fR3<;;" W i),...u, 
Commission expires: r7 .(Lf.. / 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
MARVINF. MORGAN, ) 
) Case No. CV-2006-4332 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
-vs.- ) 
ORDER SETTING PRE-TRIAL 
CONFERENCE AND TRIAL 
) 
MICHAEL ALEXANDER DEMOS, M.D., JOHN ) 
D. CHAMBERS, JR., M.D., and IDAHO HEART ) 
INSTITUTE, P.c., ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
Pursuant to Rule 16 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the following pre-trial 
schedule shall govern all proceedings in this case: 
I. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Formal pre-trial conference pursuant to Rule 16, LR.C.P., will be held on 
February 9, 2009, at 10:00 a.m., at which time witness lists, exhibit lists and any 
proposed jury instructions must be filed. 
2. Jury Trial shall commence at 1 :30 p.m., on February 23, 2009. 
No later than ninety (90) days before the date set for trial, counsel shall disclose 
the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of expert witnesses that may be 
called to testifY at trial. 
4. All discovery shall be completed seventy (70) days prior to trial. l 
5. All Motions for Summary Judgment must be filed sixty (60) days prior to trial in 
conformance with Rule 56(a), LR.C.P. 
6. All Motions for Summary Judgment must be heard at least twenty-eight (28) days 
prior to trial. 
1 Discovery requests must be served so that timely responses will be due prior to the discovery cutoff date. 
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II. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each attorney shall, no later than fourteen (14) 
days before trial: 
L Submit a list of names to the court of persons who may be called to testify. 
2. Submit a descriptive list of all exhibits proposed to be offered into evidence to the 
court indicating which exhibits counsel have agreed will be received in evidence 
without objection and those to which objections will be made, including the basis 
upon which each objection will be made. 
3. Submit a brief to the court citing legal authorities upon which the party relies as to 
each issue of law to be litigated. 
4. If this isajurytrial, counsel shall submit proposed jury instructions to all par"1:ies 
to the action and the court. All requested instructions submitted to the court shall 
be in duplicate form as set out in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 51(a)(1). 
5. Submit that counsel have in good faith tried to settle this action. 
6. State whether liability is disputed. 
III. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that each attorney shall no later than seven (7) days 
before trial: 
1. Submit any objections to the jury instructions requested by an opponent specifying 
the instruction and the grounds for the objection. 
2. Deposit with the clerk of the court all exhibits to be introduced, except those for 
impeachment. The clerk shall mark plaintiffs exhibits in numerical sequence as 
requested by plaintiff and shall mark all defendant's exhibits in alphabetical 
sequence as requested by defendant. 
3. A duplicate set of all exhibits to be introduced, except those for impeachment, 
shall be placed in binders, indexed, and deposited with the clerk of the court. 
IV. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that: 
1. Any exhibits or witnesses discovered after the last required disclosure shall 
immediately be disclosed to the court and opposing counsel by filing and service 
stating the date upon which the same was discovered. 
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2. No exhibits shall be admitted into evidence at trial other than those disclosed, 
listed and submitted to the clerk ofthe court in accordance with this order, except 
when offered for impeachment purposes or unless they were discovered after the 
last required disclosure. 
3. This order shall control the course of this action unless modified for good cause 
shown to prevent manifest injustice. 
4. The court may imrose appropriate sancfons for violation of this order. 
DATED this l day of June, 2008. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
MARVIN F. MORGAN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MICHAEL ALEXANDER DEMOS, 
M.D., JOHN D. CHAMBERS, JR., M.D., 
AND IDAHO HEART INSTITUTE P.C., 
Defendants. 
I. 
Case No. CV -06-4332 
OPINION, DECISION, AND ORDER 
ON PARTIES' MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Ella Morgan underwent treadmill and stress testing in January 2004 at the Idaho Heart 
Institute. As a result of the tests, Dr. Chambers recommended an angiogram for further testing. 
Mrs. Morgan scheduled an angiogram for February 3, 2004, which Dr. Chambers said he would 
perform. Instead, Dr. Demos performed the procedure. 
On February 23,2005 Mrs. Morgan died. 
On August 3,2006 Plaintiff, Mrs. Morgan's widower, filed a Complaint in Bonneville 
County, seeking damages against Defendants for Mrs. Morgan's wrongful death, arguing that 
Defendants' negligence in treating Mrs. Morgan proximately caused her death. 
On November 23, 2007 Defendants filed this Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing 
that Plaintiff did not timely file the complaint and that Plaintiff did not produce necessary expert 
OPINION, DECISION, AND ORDER ON PARTIES' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
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testimony. 
On May 28, 2008 Plaintiff filed a Summary Motion Memorandum, arguing against 
Defendants' motion and requesting summary judgment, arguing that Defendants did not present 
facts in their affidavits. 
On June 9, 2008 this matter came before the court. Both sides presented argument and 
the court took this motion under advisement at that time. 
After considering the Court's file, pleadings, depositions, admissions, affidavits, and the 
argument of counsel, the Court renders the following opinion. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Rule 56( c), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that "summary judgment shall be 
granted forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." DBSIITRI V v. Bender, 130 Idaho 796, 801, 
948 P.2d 151, 156 (1997) (citing Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 128 Idaho 232, 234, 
912 P.2d 119, 121 (1996». 
When assessing the motion for summary judgment, all controverted facts are to be 
liberally construed in favor of the nonmoving party. Furthennore, the trial court must draw all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the party resisting the motion. Litz v. Robinson, 131 Idaho 282, 
283, 955 P.2d 113, 114 (Ct.App.l998) citing G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 
514,517,808 P.2d 851, 854 (1991) and Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 8n, 874, 
876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct.App.1994). If reasonable people could reach different conclusions based 
on the evidence, the motion must be denied. Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 
Idaho 270, 272, 869 P.2d 1365, 1367 (1994); Olsen v. JA. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, no, 
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791 P.2d 1285, 1299 (1990). 
The nonmoving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's 
pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided ... , must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." I.R.C.P. 56(e). In attempting to 
establish such facts, "a mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts" is 
insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & 
Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, 87, 996 P.2d 303, 306 (2000). In other words, "the party opposing 
the motion must present more than a conclusory assertion that an issue of fact exists." Coghlan 
v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 401, 987 P.2d 300,313 (1999). 
A. Statute of Limitations 
IIL~~~_ 
ANALYSIS 
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claim against the Idaho Heart Institute must fail because 
it violates the Statute of Limitations. I.C. § 5-219(4) requires that actions based on professional 
malpractice for wrongful death must be brought within two years. 
Additionally, Defendants argue that filing an application for pre-litigation screening by 
the Board of Medicine could not toll the statute oflimitations because the Idaho Heart Institute is 
a professional corporation and is not subject to the provisions of the pre-litigation statute. 
Plaintiff argues that the statute of limitations was tolled when he filed an application for 
pre-litigation screening because under the law of professional corporations, the corporation is 
liable for the acts of its employees. I.C. § 30-1304. 
I.C. § 6-1001 states: 
The Idaho state board of medicine, in alleged malpractice cases involving 
claims for damages against physicians and surgeons practicing in the state 
ofIdaho or against licensed acute care general hospitals operating in the 
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state of Idaho, is directed to cooperate in providing a hearing panel in the 
nature of a special civil grand jury and procedure for prelitigation 
consideration of personal injury and wrongful death claims for damages 
arising out of the provision of or alleged failure to provide hospital or 
medical care in the state of Idaho, which proceedings shall be informal 
and nonbinding, but nonetheless compulsory as a condition precedent to 
litigation. . 
The statute oflimitations is tolled for any claim subject to I.C. § 6-1001 "during the time 
that such a claim is pending before such a panel and for thirty (30) days thereafter." I.C. § 6-
1005. 
Defendant would argue that the Idaho Heart Institute is not a physician, surgeon, or acute 
care general hospital, and that I.C. § 6-1001, and thus § 6-1005, does not apply. 
Plaintiffurg~s this cQurtJQ_adQpt the reasouingJQundjn Eoster_v. Traul,_Bannock County 
Case CVPI-O 1-00070-B. In Foster, Judge Smith determined that under the doctrine of 
respondeat superior a physician's employer is also a physician for the purposes ofLC. § 30-
1304 and that the tolling provision of I.e. § 6-1005 applies. 
Though this court is not bound by the decisions of other district courts, it may consider 
such opinions persuasive authority. Respondeat superior requires that "a master, or employer, is 
responsible for the torts of his servant, or employee, when they are committed within the scope 
of the servant's employment." Smith v. Thompson, 103 Idaho 909, 911 (Ct. App. 1982)(citing 
Scrivner v. Boise Payette Lumber Co., 46 Idaho 334 (1928»). 
Here Drs. Chambers and Demos have acknowledged that they are employees of the Idaho 
Heart Institute. The advantages of a professional corporation require the law to view the 
corporation as a single legal entity; it would be incongruous to treat the professional liability of 
the employees separately from the liability of the employer. 
Defendants Chambers and Demos are physicians, anfthe Idaho Heart Institute is, for the 
OPINION, DECISION, AND ORDER ON PARTIES' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
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purposes of the statute, a "physician" and the statute of limitation was tolled for the time the 
claim was before a pre-litigation panel and for 30 days thereafter. 
Mrs. Morgan died February 23,2004; Plaintiff filed the pre-litigation request on January 
21,2005. On January 21,2005 Plaintiff had 14 months and 2 days to file the claim under the 
statute of limitations. The pre-litigation panel filed its report and recommendation on June 24, 
2005. Plaintiff had until September 26, 2006 to file his complaint against Defendants and filed 
the complaint on August 3, 2006. The statute of limitations does not bar Plaintiffs claim against 
Defendant Idaho Heart Institute. 
B. Community Standard of Health Care 
Defendants next argue for summary judgment on the groundsihatPlaintiffhas not 
produced expert testimony showing a breach of the applicable standard of care. 
I.e. § 6-1012 states: 
In any case, claim or action for damages due to injury to or death of any 
person, brought against any physician and surgeon or other provider of 
health care, including, without limitation, any dentist, physicians' assistant, 
nurse practitioner, registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, nurse 
anesthetist, medical technologist, physical therapist, hospital or nursing 
home, or any person vicariously liable for the negligence of them or any of 
them, on account of the provision of or failure to provide health care or on 
account of any matter incidental or related thereto, such claimant or 
plaintiff must, as an essential part of his or her case in chief affirmatively 
prove by direct expert testimony and by a preponderance of all the 
competent evidence, that such defendant then and there negligently failed 
to meet the applicable standard ofhealth care practice of the community 
in which such care allegedly was or should have been provided, as such 
standard existed at the time and place of the alleged negligence of such 
physician and surgeon, hospital or other such health care provider and as 
such standard then and there existed with respect to the class of health care 
provider that such defendant then and there belonged to and in which 
capacity he, she or it was functioning. 
Defendants correctly read I.e. § 6-1012 to require Plaintiff to prove that Defendants 
failed to meet the local standard of care through expert opinion testimony. 
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Plaintiff has presented an affidavit of Dr. Jay Schapira, a cardiologist practicing in Los 
Angeles. Idaho law requires expert witnesses from outside the state to "possess actual knowledge 
of the local community standard. Ifhe is board certified in the same specialty, he must, at a 
minimum, inquire of a local specialist to determine wl1ether the community standard varies from 
the national standard for that board-certified specialty." Strode v. Lenzi, 116 Idaho 214, 216 
(1989)(citing Buck v. St. Clair, 108 Idaho 743 (1985)). The Idaho Supreme Court has also said 
an out-of-state physician may become familiar with the local community standard of care by "a 
review of a deposition stating that the local standard does not vary from the national standard, 
coupled with the expert's personal knowledge of the national standard." Grover v. Smith 137 
Idaho 24 7, 25J _(2002)(qUQtingJ)el"r)! v. Magic Valley Reg'l Med Ctr.,! 34 IdahoA6,51.,52 
(2000)). 
Dr. Schapira is a board certified cardiologist, and he has inquired of a local physician to 
determine that the local standard does not vary from the national standard. Additionally, Dr. 
Schapira has reviewed the Defendant physicians' depositions where they stated that the local 
standard does not very from the national standard. Dr. Schapira's affidavit meets the 
requirements of I.e. § 6-1012 and Strode and Grover. 
Dr. Schapira's affidavit is based on his personal knowledge and sets forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. 
C. Informed Consent 
-, 
Defendants seek Summary Judgment of Plaintiff's claim for lack of informed consent, 
contending that Idaho law requires expert testimony on the community standard for consent. 
Plaintiff seeks to recover on a theory of lack of informed consent, arguing that Mrs. Morgan was 
not informed of the risks associated with an angiogram or ofreasonable medical alternatives to 
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the procedure. 
To establish a claim for lack of informed consent, the plaintiff must prove three elements: 
nondisclosure, causation, and injury. Sherwoodv. Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 257 (1991). 
Defendants argue that without expert testimony Plaintiff has not established the nondisclosure 
element of the claim. 
Under I.e. § 39-4506, consent is valid if: 
[T]he physician or dentist to whom it is given or by whom it is secured has made 
such disclosures and given such advice respecting pertinent facts and 
considerations as would ordinarily be made and given under the same or similar 
circumstances, by a like physician or dentist of good standing practicing in the 
same community. 
Defendants argue Jhat I.e. § 3 9-4506 requires plaintiffsin aTI.-informed consentcase to 
present expert testimony to establish a violation of the local community standard of disclosure. 
Defendants contend that I.e. § 39-4506 is akin to the local community standard of care 
requirements for I.e. §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013. However, with I.e. § 6-1012 the legislature 
explicitly requires plaintiffs to present expert testimony in order to pursue a medical malpractice 
claim. No such limitation exists in statute for a claim for lack of informed consent. 
Additionally, Defendants are unable to cite any Idaho cases that would support the notion 
that every informed consent claim must be accompanied by expert testimony. 
Defendants cite several cases from other jurisdictions to support their argument. Even 
among the cases cited by Defendants, courts are split in their requirements for expert testimony 
to pursue a claim for informed consent. In Illinois, expert testimony is required unless the matter 
is one of common knowledge or within the experience of the layman. Weekley v. Solomon, 510 
N.E.2d 152 (Ill. Ct. App. 1987). In Pennsylvania, expert testimony is only "required to establish 
the existence of risks in a specific medical procedure, the existence of alternative methods of 
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treatment and the existence of risks attendant with such alternatives. " Festa v. Greenburg, 511 
A.2d 1371, 1376 (Pa. Supp. 1986)( emphasis in original). In some jurisdictions, expert testimony 
is never required to establish the scope of the physician's duty to disclose. Festa, 511 A.2d at 
1376 (citing Cross v. Trapp, 294 S.E.2d 446 (W.Va. 1982); Gerety v. Demers, 92 N.M. 396, 589 
P.2d 180 (1978); Sardv. Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977». In Florida and Arizona 
expert testimony is apparently always required. ld. (citing Thomas v. Berrios, 348 So.2d 905 
(Fla.App.1979); Rodriquez v. Jackson, 118 Ariz. 13,574 P.2d 481 (1977». 
Here, the question of when Idaho law requires expert testimony is moot, because Plaintiff 
has presented expert testimony on the issue of informed consent. In his affidavit, Dr. Schapira 
concludes, after having reviewed their depositions, thatDefendants failed to properly inform 
Mrs. Morgan ofthe dangers of the angiogram and of viable alternatives to the procedure. It is not 
necessary for the purposes of this case to determine whether Idaho law requires expert testimony 
to establish the scope of a physician's duty to disclose, as Plaintiff has met any possible 
requirement to do so. Dr. Schapira's affidavit satisfies the undoubtedly more stringent criteria for 
out-of-state expert testimony set forth both in Idaho statute and case law for expert witnesses in a 
medical malpractice case; there is no indication that some other limitation prevents his testimony 
on this issue. 
D. Plaintiff's Request for Summary Judgment 
Plaintiff urges the court to grant summary judgment on the issue of community standard 
of care, arguing that Defendants failed to set forth specific facts in their depositions. Courts "may 
grant summary judgment to a non-moving party even if the party has not filed its own motion 
with the court. A motion for summary judgment allows the court to rule on the issues placed 
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before it as a matter of law; the moving party runs the risk that the court will find against it." 
Harwood v. Talbert, 136 Idaho 672, 677 (2001). 
Reviewing the affidavits of Defendants shows that they have sworn to specific facts 
regarding their training and treatment of Mrs. Morgan sufficient to establish a genuine issue of 
fact for trial. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff's request for summary judgment is DENIED. 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORD~JlliD. 
Dated this ~ day of August, 2008. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this d.-t:> day of August, 2008, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing OPINION, DECISION, AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct postage 
thereon, or by causing the same to be delivered to their courthouse boxes. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Lowell N. Hawkes 
1322 East Center 
Pocatello, Idaho 83201 
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Matthew F. McColl 
Quane Smith 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83}Ql 
Ronald Longmore 
Clerk of the District Court 
Bonneville County, Idaho 
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Deputy Clerk 
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BONNEVILLE COUNTY, IDAHO 
The Honorable Jon J. Shindurling 
MARVIN F. MORGAN, 
Plaintiff, Case No. CV-06-4332 
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) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
MICHAEL ALEXANDER DEMOS, ) 
PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT 
WITNESS DISCLOSURE 
M.D.; JOHN D. CHAMBERS, JR. M.D.; ) 
AND IDAHO HEART INSTITUTE, P.C.; ~ 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
Plaintiff disclose his expert witnesses as follows: 
• Jay N. Schapira, M.D. FACC, FCCP, FACP, JNS Consultants, Cedars 
Sinai Medical Office Towers, 8635 West Third Street, Suite 750W, Los Angeles, CA 
90048; Phone: (310) 659-2030; and 
• William J. Flynn, B.S., D-ABFDE, Affiliated Forensic Laboratories, 
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DATED this 25th day of November, 2008. 
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHARTERED 
CERTifiCATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifY that on 25th day of November, 2008 I faxed a copy of the 
foregoing to Jeremiah A. Quane and Matthew F. McColl of Quane Smith, LLP, Sixteenth 
Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza, 101 South Capitol Boulevard, P.O. Box 519, Boise, Idaho 83701, 
FAX 208-345-8660. 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
BONNEVILLE COUNTY, IDAHO 
The Honorable Jon J. Shindurling 
MARVIN F. MORGAN, 
Plaintiff, Case No. CV-06-4332 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
MICHAEL ALEXANDER DEMOS, ) 
M.D.; JOHN D. CHAMBERS, JR. M.D.; ~ 
AND IDAHO HEART INSTITUTE, P.C.; ) 
PLAINTIFF'S 
SUPPLEMENTAL EXPERT 
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Defendants. 
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) 
Plaintiff disclose his expert witnesses as follows: 
• JayN. Schapira, M.D. FACC, FCCP, FACP, JNS Consultants, Cedars 
Sinai Medical Office Towers, 8635 West Third Street, Suite 750W, Los Angeles, CA 
90048; Phone: (310) 659-2030; 
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• Gary E. Ellwein, M.D., Pathology Associates of Idaho Falls, 3100 
Channing Way, Idaho Falls, Idaho, 83404, Phone: (208) 529-6050. 
DATED this 26th day of November, 2008. 
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BONNEVILLE COUNTY, IDAHO 
The Honorable Jon J. Shindurling 
MARVIN F. MORGAN, 
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vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
MICHAEL ALEXANDER DEMOS, ) 
M.D.; JOHN D. CHAMBERS, JR. M.D.; ~ 
AND IDAHO HEART INSTITUTE, P.C.; ) 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
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• Gary E. Ellwein, M.D., Pathology Associates ofIdaho Falls, 3100 
Channing Way, Idaho Falls, Idaho, 83404, Phone: (208) 529-6050, and 
• Michael Denyer, M.D., Mountain States Cardiovascular, 2860 Channing 
Way, Idaho Falls, Idaho, 83404, Phone: (208) 535-4600. 
DATED this 26th day of November, 2008. 
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHARTERED 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on 26th day of November, 2008 I faxed a copy of the 
foregoing to Jeremiah A. Quane and Matthew F. McColl of Quane Smith, LLP, Sixteenth 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
MARVINF. MORGAN, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
MICHAEL ALEXANDER DEMOS, MD, ) 
et aI, ) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
Case No. CV -2006-4332 
MINUTE ENTRY ON 
MOTION HEARING 
OJ 
! 
\0 
On December 8, 2008, at 9:00 A.M., a Motion to Continue Trial came on for hearing 
beforeJhe Honor_a.bleJonJ.Shilldllfling, Pistrict Jlldge,si1tingil1 open court at Idaho Falls, 
Idaho. 
Ms. Nancy Marlow, Court Reporter, and Ms. Grace Walters, Deputy Court Clerk, were 
present. 
Mr. Lowell Hawkes was present on behalf of the plaintiff. Mr. Matthew McColl was 
present telephonically on behalf of the defendants. 
Mr. McColl presented argument on the Motion to continue trial. 
Mr. Hawkes argued in aggravation and only wished to continue to the trial ifthe defense 
stipulated to an unfair advantage if the plainti ff died in the interim before trial. 
The Court offered a date on March 30,2009. The case will take two (2) weeks to try. The 
Court will continue this trial and conditionally set the case for jury trial on March 30, 2009 at 
1:30 PM. Pretrial conference is set on March 9, 2009 at 10:15 AM. The Motion to Continue is 
GRANTED. The Motion to Compel is set for hearing as scheduled on January 12,2009 at 10:30 
AM. 
Court was thus adjourned. 
c: Lowell Hawkes 
Matthew McColl 
MINUTE ENTRY - 1 
J. SHINDURLING 
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03/20/2009 14:08 FAX 
Jeremiah A. Quane, ISB No. 977 
Matthew F. McColl, ISB No. 6005 
Angela K. Hermosillo, ISB No. 7425 
QUANE SMITH LLP 
Sixteenth Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 345-8600 
Facsimile: (208) 345-8660 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
MARVIN F. MORGAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL ALEXANDER DEMOS, M.D.; 
JOHN D. CHAMBERS, JR. M.D.; AND 
IDAHO HEART INSTITUTE P.C., 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-06-4332 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
EXCLUDE JAY SCHAPIRA, M.D. 
I4J 027/045 
COME NOW Defendants the Idaho Heart Institute, P.C., Michael A. Demos, 
M.D. and John D. Chambers M.D. by and through their counsel of record, and move this 
Court for an order excluding the testimony of Jay Schapira, M.D. Defendants soberly move 
for this order, on the grounds and for the reasons that Plaintiff has failed to provide counsel 
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DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO EXCLUDE JAY SCHAPIRA, M.D. - 1 
03/20/200914:08 FAX l4J 028/045 
and this Court with necessary information relating to Dr. Schapira's unparalleled testimonial 
history. 
This motion is based upon and supported by the Memorandum in Support 
thereof, filed contemporaneously herewith; the Affidavit of Counsel in Support thereof, filed 
contemporaneously herewith; the pleadings and files on record; as well as the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure, including but not limited to, Rule 26 and 37 and the Idaho Rules of 
Evidence, including but not limited to, Rule 701 through 705. 
The Court has previously set a hearing on Defendants' Motions in Limine and 
Defendants are ready, willing and prepared to have this motion heard at that time, as it is 
a proper pre-trial matter. Defendants so move pursuant to I.Re.p. Rule 6 that this Motion 
be heard at that 2:00 p.m. March 24, 2009. 
DATED this 20th day of March, 2009. 
QUANE SMITH LLP 
By~~ ____________________ __ 
tthew F. McColl, Of the Firm 
orneys for Defendants 
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03/20/2009 14:08 FAX 141029/045 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20th day of March, 2009, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO EXCLUDE JAY SCHAPIRA, 
M.D. by delivering the same to each of the following, by the method indicated below, 
addressed as follows: 
Lowell N. Hawkes 
Ryan S, Lewis 
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHTD. 
1322 East Center 
Pocatello, Idaho 
Telephone (208) 235-1600 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[ J U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ J Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (208) 235-4200 
r 
ij Matthew F. McColl 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO EXCLUDE JAY SCHAPIRA, M.D. - 3 
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Jeremiah A. Quane, ISS No. 977 
Matthew F. McColl, ISS No. 6005 
QUANE SMITH LLP 
Sixteenth Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P.O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 345-8600 
Facsimile: (208) 345-8660 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
MARVIN F. MORGAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL ALEXANDER DEMOS, MD.; 
JOHN D. CHAMBERS, JR. M.D.; AND 
IDAHO HEART INSTITUTE P.C., 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
: SS. 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV-06-4332 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
EXCLUDE JAY SCHAPIRA, MD. 
l@030/045 
COMES NOW Matthew F. McColl, having been first duly sworn upon oath 
and deposes: 
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AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO EXCLUDE JAY SCHAPIRA, 
M.D. -1 
i4J 031/045 
1. I am an attorney with the law firm Quane Smith LLP! counsel of record 
for Defendants John A. Chambers, Michael D. Demos and the Idaho Heart Institute, P.A. 
The information and facts testified herein are based upon your Affiant's own first-hand and 
personal knowledge. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Court 
transcript for Plaintiffs Motion to Shorten Time/Motion for Relief Pursuant to Rule 56(f) 
April 28, 2008, which was ordered by Plaintiffs counsel. 
3. Your Affiant has endeavored to learn some of the testimonial history 
of Plaintiffs expert witness, Dr. Jay Schapira. 
4. Your Affiant has securecltweLve (12) depositionLtriaitranscripts from 
the year 2004 forward. 
5. A careful review of the twelve (12) transcripts from 2004 forward 
reveals that none of them relate to allegations relating to breach of the standard of practice 
in an angiogram or catheter procedure. 
6. Additionally, your Affiant has secured additional information relating 
to Dr. Schapira's past testimonial history, which reflects that in at least twenty one (21) 
other cases, Dr. Schapira has been retained relating to allegations that a physician 
breached the standard of practice relative to the performance of an angiogram or the use 
of a catheter. Your Affiant does not have copies of the depositions of those twenty one 
(21) cases. 
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FURTHER your Affiant saith naught. 
Matthew 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 20th day of March, 2009. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20lh day of March, 2009, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
EXCLUDE JAY SCHAPIRA, M.D. by delivering the same to each of the following, by the 
method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
Lowell N. Hawkes 
Ryan S. Lewis 
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHTD. 
1322 East Center 
Pocatello, Idaho 83201 
Telephone (208) 235-1600 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[ J U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[Xl Facsimile (208) 235-4200 
Matthew F. McColl 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO EXCLUDE JAY SCHA~Ia.Q, 
M.D. - 3 
~ 033/045 
Exhibit A 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
MARVIN F. MORGAN, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) Case No. CV-06-4332 
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MICHAEL ALEXANDER DEMOS, M. D . " ) 
JOHN D. CHAMBERS, JR., M.D.; ) 
AND IDAHO HEART INSTITUTE, P.C.,) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
-------------------------------------------) 
COpy 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME/ 
MOTION FOR RELIEF PURSUANT TO RULE 56(f) 
APRIL 28, 2008 
IDAHO FALLS, BONNEVILLE COUNTY, IDAHO 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE JON J. SHINDURLING 
NANCY MARLOW, CSR 
Official Court Reporter 
605 North Capital Avenue 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402 
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2 
APRIL 28, 2 
3 THE COURT: All right. We'll go on the record 
4 in Bonneville County Case No. CV-06-4332, Morgan 
5 versus Michael Alexander Demos, et a!. Present on 
6 behalf of the plaintiff is Lowell Hawkes. Present on 
1 behalf of the defendant is Matthew McColl. This is 
8 the time set for hearing with regard to the 
9 plaintiff's motion to shorten time and motion for 
10 relief pursuant to Rule 56(f). 
11 
12 
13 
MR. HAWKES: Thank you, Your Honor. 
The impetus of this involves a summary judgment 
motion that was filed basically on the basis of two 
14 affidavits that were conc/usory, saying, we know the 
standard and we didn't do anything wrong. And it was 15 
16 flied in the latter part of November, as I recall. We 
11 had just finished up a malpractice trial here. And 
18 after the posttrial motions we got wound up in 
19 December, we noticed up the depositions of the 
20 defendants. 
21 Jerry Quane wrote me back and said that was 
22 kind of short for him under all the circumstances, 
23 could r work with him on it? And I said, sure. 1 
24 told him just to give me some dates that we can both 
25 agree on. My letter said, you know, vacating those 
4 
1 also assumes equal consideration as to your filed but 
2 not noticed motion. We just want adequate time after 
3 the depositions to respond to that motion. Your 
4 confirming letter to that effect will be appreCiated. 
5 And we got through in late February. We had 
6 the depositions of the entity and Dr. Chambers, but 
7 the defense hadn't even filed an answer to the 
8 Complaint until six days after those first two 
9 depositions, and they weren't able to give me 
10 Dr. Demos' deposition in Durango, Colorado, until 
11 March 17th. 
12 As Your Honor knows, each deposition generally 
13 raises new things that have to be pursued, either 
14 through follow-up depositions or discovery. And we 
15 have done both. 
16 For instance, on -- we had the motion relative 
17 to our document expert, and it was in that setting 
18 that a hearing date for the summary judgment came up. 
19 As I came to court that day to argue the motion 
20 relative to getting access to the original documents, 
21 Mr. McColl hadn't mentioned to me that they were going 
22 to seek a hearing date. I didn't have a calendar with 
23 me. I'm kind of amazed that I totally missed it when 
24 we originally got the May 5th date. I had a federal 
25 felony trial scheduled; and jf that went, a backup 
5 
1 
2 of eight depositions 
3 before the end of trial. And that's just a few of the 
4 things I was dealing With. 
5 So what we have done is, as soon as we got that 
6 hearing notice, I called Dr. Shapira, our expert 
7 cardiologist, at Cedars Sinai, talked to his 
8 scheduler. He was gone at the time. My first chance 
9 to talk with him was Saturday afternoon, April 12th. 
10 And so the next week I talked with Matt. And I said, 
11 Matt, I was not able to talk with Dr. Shaplra until 
12 the 12th. He's gone the first two weeks of May. I'm 
13 gOing to be gone to Boston. I'm not coming back until 
14 this last Thursday. That essentIally would give me 
15 one day to get what, at a minimum, is two affidavits. 
16 And I asked if they could accommodate a change of one 
17 month, to the 12th of June. We had previously talked 
18 about just kicking it one week after my federal trial. 
19 And Matt said he would talk with Jerry Quane. And I 
20 got a response back that they wouldn't agree to it, so 
21 we filed this Rule 56(f) motion. 
22 I'd ask to be given a month extension. I'm in 
23 no position to file responsive affidavits today. I've 
24 got an expert in Phoenix and an expert in Los Angeles, 
25 and they need more time. r need more time. I would 
6 
1 like to give Your Honor a Quality product. They 
2 haven't claImed any prejudice here. But I would also 
3 like a chance, if necessary, after the meet and confer 
4 requirement with counsel, to come before Your Honor, 
5 because there's some pretty hostility to discovery 
6 that we're seeking, hostilities to some pretty basic 
7 things. We may be able to work that out. But just 
8 like I mentioned, depositions seem to yield new 
9 things. 
10 When I took Dr. Chambers' deposition, on 
11 February 20th, we talked about a lady by the name of 
12 Lori Brown. And in that depOSition, Dr. Chambers told 
13 me, well, she, Lori Brown, was just probably helping 
14 in the recovery area after work. That's after 
15 somebody has had an angiogram, and they go to a 
16 separate area of that facility. 
17 Well, what was learned Friday, when Ryan took 
18 the deposition of Sandi Christensen -- and that 
19 deposition resulted from when I took Bruce Crawford's 
20 deposition. You may remember, Your Honor, that 
21 Bruce Crawford was a wItness to the consent document 
22 that we have a question on. And when I took 
23 Bruce Crawford's deposition in Salt Lake, I learned 
24 that the time that's written on there, even though he 
25 was a witness, he didn't write it in. But he thought 
7 
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1 that was Sandi Christensen. 
2 taken last Friday. She 
deposition was 
that she signed 
3 it. But just like the other depositions, what came up 
4 there is that Lori Brown wasn't just back in the 
5 recovery area. She was apparently right there at the 
6 time of the emergency, and so I want to take her 
7 deposition. And to the extent that the 
8 Bruce Crawford's deposition also showed us on their 
9 log, the timeline in this case becomes very relevant 
10 and very important. And we're finding changes, 
11 inconsistency in documents. 
12 Bruce Crawford, even though it appeared that he 
13 was the manager of the cath lab, on the cath lab log, 
14 there's an entry that is supposed to show in minutes 
15 and seconds how much radiation Mrs. Morgan got. And 
16 there's, as I recall, a five or a six digit number, 
17 but he has no idea whose handwriting it is, what the 
18 number means or anything. And so I don't see myself 
19 avoiding another 30(b)(6) to have the Heart Institute 
20 tell me, on that log, What's that number mean? Who 
21 put it in there? Because nobody can tell me. 
22 Now, what I would prefer in this case, 
23 Your Honor, is that we not be put, as the plaintiffs, 
24 in a position of a double standard as to discovery. 
25 The deposItion of Dr. Demos disclosed that literally 
8 
1 the month after Mrs. Morgan's angiogram, the insurance 
2 company retained the defense, and they were involved 
3 in the case. So they've had four years of discovery 
4 free reign to look at things, and I don't want to 
5 waive discovery. I would prefer, in this case, that 
6 we have a trial date with discovery cutoff and a full 
7 opportunity before we have to deal with summary 
B judgment motions. We don't have any sort of a 
9 scheduling order in this case yet, and I would really 
10 request that we try to do that. But my specific 
11 motion said the time I minimally need, given 
12 Dr. Shaplra being gone the first two weeks of May, is 
13 a month on the May 12th date to June 12th. And I ask 
14 for that, Your Honor. There's nothing that they have 
15 responded to that suggests any prejudice on their 
16 part. 
17 THE COURT: Rhonda, can I have the calendar? 
18 All right. Mr. McColl? 
19 MR. MCCOLL: Thank you, Your Honor. 
20 There's not one thing that Mr. Hawkes 
21 mentioned, with all of those things contained in his 
22 affidavit, not one of those things Is remotely 
23 relevant. The only thing relevant that was mentioned 
24 was that Dr. Shapira was just contacted about two 
25 weeks ago. Mr. Hawkes filed his complaint in August 
9 
Ll<:J U,)O/ Uti;) 
1 of 2006. 
2 
ing contained in the rules or 
suggests he gets to run after every 
3 single fox to try and figure out whether there's some 
4 question of fact. 
5 The affidavits are not conclusory. He knows 
6 that, becaUSE! the Idaho Supreme Court has told him 
7 that emphatically in Foster v. Traul. Those 
8 affidavits are affidavits that every Single medical 
9 malpractice lawyer in the state sees every single 
10 time. If it was not Mr. Hawkes' burden to have an 
11 expert witness in his camp when he filed this 
12 complaint, it was his burden to have an expert witness 
13 when he started prosecuting this matter per 6-1012. 
14 If it wasn't his burden to do it then, it was his 
15 burden to do it when r filed my motion for summary 
16 judgment on November 20th of 2007. 
17 All of this delay is for nothing. My clients 
18 are ready to go. Dr. Shapira should have come forward 
19 with an affidavit. And that's only on the Issue as to 
20 the standard of health care practice and informed 
21 consent with respect to Dr. Demos and Dr. Chambers. 
22 There is not one single element in all of this 
23 surplusage that Mr. Hawkes is mentioning that has 
24 anything to do with whether or not the plaintiff filed 
25 his complaint against the Idaho Heart Institute on 
10 
time. That's an issue that we can address two weeks 
2 from today. Under the standard, under the statute, 
3 there was a two-year limIt to file the complaint 
4 against the Idaho Heart Institute, and they didn't do 
5 it. 
S There's -- the rules are here for a reason, 
7 Your Honor. You know, it's my position that I don't 
8 have to show prejudice in order to get a motion that 1 
9 filed on Thanksgiving heard before Mother's Day. The 
10 motion for summary judgment has a 28-day limit. He 
11 got six weeks after we set the hearing. He's going to 
12 have six months after we set the motion. There's 
13 nothing in his affidavit that supports that any of 
14 this information that he is seeking Is relevant, and I 
15 think, Your Honor, you should deny the motion. 
16 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
17 Anything else, Mr. Hawkes? 
18 MR. HAWKES: Yes, Your Honor. 
19 Lest the Court be misled, counsel has misstated 
20 the truth here. I did not just go looking for 
21 Dr. Shapira after they filed the hearing notice. I, 
22 In fact, did have a relationship with him prior to 
23 filing this case, and so I notified his office, 
24 Susan Anderson, as soon as they sought this date. And 
25 what I told you in my affidavit was true. I was not 
11 
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1 able to talk to him. These people. Both of 
2 our experts are people that ny things going on, 
3 and I was not able to talk to him until Saturday, 
4 Aprit 12th. But the things that in meeting with an 
5 expert they want you to find out and that are things 
6 that are still coming. It's not his job to define 
7 what may be relevant for us to prove our case. 
S Now, I don't have a problem if we want to just 
9 argue the motion relative to the statute of limitation 
10 on the entity. The essence of that motion is that the 
11 entity is not subject to the pre-litigation process, 
12 so there's no tol/ing. And I dealt with that before, 
13 and they had a chance to appeal that, and they didn't. 
14 The way I see it shaking down is, if doctors 
15 choose to practice medicine only in an entity named, 
16 and that's the evidence in this case, they're 
17 employees. They do nothing except in the entity name. 
18 Their entity is subject to the pre-lit, and there's 
19 tolling there. I'm sure if we filed a complaint 
20 against the entity, we would get hit with a tolling 
21 deal, if we did it before pre-lit. I don't mind doing 
22 that before. But what I don't want to do is to be in 
23 a position where, as is happening here, they are 
24 essentially dictating my discovery rights in the face 
25 of us not having a discovery scheduling cutoff. And I 
12 
1 just want a full chance. 
2 THE COURT: Well, thank you. I appreciate 
3 that. 
4 First of all, I'll grant the motion to shorten 
5 time as to this hearing today, Since we're here. 
6 Now, as to the continuance, it seems to me that 
7 the motion for summary judgment, as is presented, is a 
8 limited one; that is, this is a standard of care. And 
9 r think you've got in there the consent issue. 
10 MR. MCCOLL: Correct, Your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: And then the entity issue, which is 
12 not terribly complicated. But the standard of care 
13 is, to some extent. It requires the digesting of some 
14 of the material. 
15 Frankly, I'm not going to hold off. And I get 
16 counsel all the time saying, hold off on allowing 
17 summary judgment until the discovery is closed. Well, 
1B that's not going to happen. Summary judgment can be 
19 filed at any time that there is a -- that it's 
20 propitious, under the circumstances of the case, to 
21 raise the issue of whether or not there's an issue of 
22 law which is determinative in the case. And in 
23 medical malpractice cases, you always have this 
24 threshold of standard of care. Frankly, it's fairly 
25 easy for the defendants to come in and say, we met the 
13 
1 standard of 
2 plaintiff has 
amen, and we're done. And the 
up or shut up. 
3 I'm willing -- usually willing to give 
4 plaintiff a little bit of latitude in getting that 
5 done, because it does take some time to take these 
6 depositions and then get the expert to digest that 
7 material and make a presentation. 
S I don't think there's been any undue delay here 
9 that I have seen, but I'm not going to let you go, 
10 Mr. Hawkes, until the discovery is closed before we 
11 address these issues. Standard of care is something 
12 that can be fairly easily addressed up front, if 
13 you've got the goods. But I will grant a continuance 
14 on this for -- can we hear it on the 9th of June? 
15 That's my hearing date. 
16 MR. HAWKES: I could do that if we could give 
17 me the same filing dates as if it were the 12th. 
18 Could you live with that, Matt? 
19 MR. MCCOLL: No. 
20 MR. HAWKES: Okay. 
21 THE COURT: Well, I've got to hear it early in 
22 the month. Otherwise, we're going to have to go to 
23 July. 
24 MR. MCCOLL: The 9th is perfect for me, 
25 Your Honor. I start a two-week trial -- Jerry and I 
14 
1 start a two-week trial the next day. So we should 
2 hear it on the 9th. That would be six months. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. Let's hear it. 
4 And what's your problem with the time? 
5 MR. HAWKES: Well, could you look on your 
6 calendar and tell me what two weeks back from that 
7 would be? Your eyes are good enough, Your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: The 9th of June would be the 
9 27th of -- no, excuse me. 
10 MR. MCCOLL: The 26th of May, Your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: 26th of May. 
12 MR. MCCOLL: It's a month from now. 
13 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
14 MR. HAWKES: 1 know I'm in Michigan --
15 THE COURT: So it would be -- the 27th would be 
16 your deadline. 
17 MR. HAWKES: I'll make it work, Your Honor, you 
18 know. 
19 THE COURT: Let's do that. That's three days 
20 early. But as I say, if I get later in the week, I'm 
21 going to be into my criminal calendar, and that makes 
22 it difficult. 
23 MR. HAWKES: That's fine. 
24 THE COURT: So the 9th at -- let's do it at 
25 9;00. r may have another medical malpractice trial 
15 
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1 going at that time. We'll try 
2 in the day. 
it in earlier 
3 MR. HAWKES: Could we have a scheduling 
4 conference, Your Honor, and set a trial date? Courd 
5 we do that? 
6 THE COURT: Do you have a calendar with you 
7 today, Mr. McColl? 
8 MR. HAWKES: Why don't we do that on the 9th? 
9 That would be fine. You could bring your calendar, 
10 Matt, and I'll bring mine. 
11 MR. MCCOLL: Let's do it on the 9th, 
12 Your Honor. 1 don't have Jerry Quane's calendar. 
13 He's in trial. 
14 THE COURT: All right. Let's do it the 9th, 
15 then. 
16 Set it for status conference that day, as well, 
17 Madam Clerk. 
18 Bring calendars. All right. 
19 MR. MCCOLL: Thank you, Your Honor. 
20 THE COURT: Thank you. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
MARVIN F. MORGAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL ALEXANDER DEMOS, M.D.; 
JOHN D. CHAMBERS, JR. M.D.; AND 
IDAHO HEART INSTITUTE P.C .. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-06-4332 
DEFENDANTS'MEMORANDUMIN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
EXCLUDE JAY SCHAPIRA, M.D. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
19J UU2/U45 
Plaintiff has failed to comply with requests for the testimonial history of Jay 
Schapira, M.D. Given Dr. Schapira's status as a professional witness, that failure has is 
not justifiable, is prejudicial and Defendants request that he be excluded from testifying. 
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II. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY 
On October 19, 2006 Plaintiff was served, by U.S. Mail with Defendant Idaho 
Heart Institute's First Set of Interrogatories. See Affidavit of Counsel RE: Trial Brief, filed 
March 13,2009. Those Interrogatories clearly asked for the name and address of each 
person Plaintiff intended to call as an expert witness in the trial of this matter, as well as 
"the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify ... the substance of the facts 
and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify ... [and] the underlying facts and 
data upon which the expert opinions are based, in conformity with Rule 705, Idaho Rules 
of Evidence." See Interrogatory No.8, Exhibit A, Supra. 
Plaintiff responded within three days, by saying he did not know yet who he 
would cal! but that the "Answer will be supplemented upon determination of those experts 
which Plaintiff intends to call as an expert witness at the triaL" See Exhibit B, supra. 
Then, on January 3, 2007, both Dr. Demos and Dr. Chambers served, by 
mail interrogatories, which mirror the new Rule 26. Both of those requests read: 
INTERROGATORY NO.8: Please state the 
name and address of each person whom you 
intend to call as an expert witness at the trial, 
and for each such person set forth a complete 
statement of all opinions to be expressed and 
the basis and reasons therefore, the data or 
other information considered by the witness in 
forming the opinions, any exhibits to be used as 
a summary of or support for the opinions, a list of 
all publications authored by the witness within 
the preceding ten years, the compensation to be 
paid for the testimony and a listing of any other 
cases in which the witness has testified as an 
expert at trial or by deposition within the 
preceding four years. 
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See Interrogatories No.8, to Exhibits C and 0 to the Trial Brief Affidavit, 
supra. 
The extent of Plaintiffs response has been limited to answering Drs. Demos 
and Chambers interrogatories by saying he'd not decided on witnesses, but would 
supplement later; the Affidavits of Flynn and Schapira and the Plaintiffs identification of 
witnesses. See Exhibits E-J, Supra, 
In addition to not providing a proper statement of Dr. Schapira's opinions, 
with bases, and the data considered; importantly, Plaintiff has not set forth Dr. Schapira's 
four years of testimonial history, nor the rate of his compensation. 
Jay Schapira, M.D. is a professional expert witness from California. It may 
not be known, ever, how many times he has been retained to give expert opinions in 
medical malpractice matters or give depositions or testify at trial or arbitration. He appears 
to have made a rather healthy living saying all manner of things about doctors throughout 
the country, while keeping close to the vest the true extent of the scope of his testimonial 
industry. 
Plaintiffs Counsel has had a relationship with Dr. Schapira, that predated this 
case: "I did not just go looking for Dr. Schapira after they filed the hearing notice. I, in fact, 
did have a relationship with him prior to filing this case, .. ," See Transcript of Hearing on 
Plaintiffs Motion to Shorten Time/Motion for Relief Pursuant to Rule 56(f) , p.11, II 20-22, 
Appended as Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion to Exclude, filed 
contemporaneously herewith. 
Though Plaintiff refused to supply Counsel and the Court with information 
relating to his testimonial history, Defense counsel, at Defendants' expense, has 
106 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO EXCLUDE JAY 
SCHAPIRA, M.D. - 3 , 
4ZJ UU5/U45 
endeavored to learn some of that information. See Affidavit of Counsel, supra. In fact, 
Defendants' counsel have 12 depositions/trial transcripts from 2004 forward. Id. Not one 
of these testimonial records involves a case in which the allegation is that a doctor 
breached the standard of practice in an angiogram procedure. Id. 
While Defendants attempted to use their own means to obtain what was 
requested and refused from Plaintiff, the scope of the effect of Plaintiffs refusal is now too 
great a burden and too prejudicial to allow. Upon review of a U.S. District Court opinion 
from March of 2008, Defendants now know that they have not even seen the tip of the 
iceberg. 
In Bondv. United States, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 1988'1 (Ore. 2008), Judge 
Robert Jones issued an opinion following a Court trial. (The case is appended). In the trial, 
Dr. Schapira was identified as an expert for the Plaintiff, and he testified. Judge Jones 
found that Dr. Schapira was "a very experienced medical/legal expert witness who charges 
$10,000 per day and who has testified at trial more than 100 times in his career, at least 
20 times between 2000 and 2005. In 2005 he testified in depositions as many as 42 times 
.... " Id. at *12 (emphasis added). Judge Jones, understandably. expected Dr. Schapira 
to "be extremely careful in presenting his testimony in his Rule 26 report .... " Id. at *13. 
Obviously, either Dr. Schapira. or Plaintiff have not been here. 
Assuming that Dr. Schapira has kept up the testimonial pace observed by 
Judge Jones. through 2006, 2007, 2008, there would be greater than 165 depositions 
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given, and several, if not dozens of trials. Defendants can not even begin to know how 
many of these involved angiograms, but suspect that it could be dozens, if not more. 1 
This is not, then, a simple case of Plaintiff hiding the ball and Defendants 
working harder to find it. This is an expert who has made a career of this type of work, and 
whose success must depend on his ability to keep from view all that he has said in 
hundreds of cases. 
III. EXCLUSION IS THE APPROPRIATE SANCTION 
FOR PLAINTIFF'S CONDUCT 
That Defendants had requested the testimonial history and expert fee 
information from Plaintiff is not a secret. Plaintiff, in fact, at least provided a list of cases 
in which Mr. Flynn had testified. See Exhibit G, to the Affidavit of Counsel Re: Trial Brief. 
Plaintiff cannot be excused from ensuring that a timely and complete list of that information 
was forthcoming from Dr. Schapira, a man known to Plaintiff's counsel even before this 
case. 
Court's interpreting Federal Rule 26, upon which Idaho's rule was modeled 
have held that failure to exactly comply with Rule 26 results in automatic exclusion of the 
expert. Elgas v. Colorado Belle, 179 F.R.D. 296 (U.S. Dist Nevada 1998). (Attached). 
There, a 9th Circuit court held that a witness whose testimonial history had not been 
disclosed should be excluded. Id., 179 F.R.D. at 300. Disclosure of: 
1 Counsel for Defendants has now reviewed the information available to him, which they 
have secured through their own means. There are at least twenty one (21) cases, identified, in which Dr. 
Schapira testified regarding angiograms and/or catheters, unfortunately, there are no depositions or 
deposition trial testimony transcripts available relative to those cases. 
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Prior recorded testimony is designed to give the 
other party access to useful information to meet 
the proposed experts' opinions. The proliferation 
of marginal or unscrupulous experts will only be 
stopped when the other party has detailed 
information about prior testimony ... [Plaintiff] 
has not shown how the failure to disclose is 
substantially justified or harmless. 
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/d. (emphasis added). See a/so, Waf/ace v. Hounshell. 2008 U.S. Dist LEXIS 44977 (S. 
Dist. Ind. 2008). (Attached). 
This Court has already been fully briefed, in Defendants' trial brief, on Idaho 
law relating to disclosures of experts, and Defendants would only reiterate that the Idaho 
Supreme Court has made it very clear that discovery rules were put in place to prevent the 
evils of non-disclosure and compliance with those rules is needed for the other side to 
prepare effective cross-examination. See, Radmer v. Ford, 120 Idaho 86,89,813 P.2d 
897,900 (1991). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Defendants are faced with an expert whose testimonial history over the last 
4 years is expansive, if not unparalleled. Plaintiff has not provided one single case in 
which the expert has testified, although there are at least 42, and perhaps hundreds. 
Though Defendants, through their own work. have managed to uncover some of that 4 
years of testimony, they do not have anything that speaks to the issues of this case. 
Defendants have every reason to believe that Dr. Schapira has so testified. At this stage, 
Plaintiff has run out of time, and his failure to comply with a request for information, which 
is the /ynchpin of effective cross-examination is prejudicial to the point of damning the 
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effective cross of this witness. Defendants respectfully submit that Dr. Schapira must be 
excluded and so move. 
DATED this 20th day of March, 2009. 
QUANE SMIT LLP 
By ____ -+~------------------
Matthew F. McColl, Of the Firm 
Attomeys for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20th day of March, 2009, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
TO EXCLUDE JAY SCHAPIRA, M.D. by delivering the same to each of the following, by 
the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
Lowell N. Hawkes 
Ryan S. Lewis 
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHTD. 
1322 East Center 
Pocatello, Idaho 
Telephone (208) 235-1600 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[X] Facsimile (208) 235-4200 
Matthew F. McColl 
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LEXSEE 179 F.R.D 296 
MARY ELGAS, Plaintiff, vs. COLORADO BELLE CORP., d/b/a COLORADO 
BELLE HOTEL AND CASINOj and DOES I through XXV, Defendants. 
CV -S-96-347 -LDG-(RJJ) 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEVADA 
179 F.R.D. 296; 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7205 
May 11, 1998, Decided 
May 11, 1998, Filed 
DISPOSITION: [** I] Defendant Colorado Belle 
Corporation's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Expert Witness 
Designation (# 56) granted in part and denied in part. 
COUNSEL: For Plaintiff: Tom Davis, Esq. 
For Defendants: Cam Ferenbach, Esq. 
JUDGES: Hon. Robert J. Johnston, US Magistrate 
Judge. 
OPINION BY: Robert 1 Johnston 
OPINION 
[*297] ORDER 
This matter was submined to the undersigned Mag-
istrate Judge on Defendant Colorado Belle Corporation's 
Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Expert Witness Designation 
(# 56). The Court has considered Defendant's Motion to 
Strike (# 56), the Defendant's Errata (# 59), the Plaintiff's 
Opposition (# 60), and the Defendant's Reply (# 68). 
BACKGROUND 
On April 13, 1996, the Plaintiff, Mary Elgas, filed 
an amended complaint alleging disparate treatment, dis-
parate impact, sexual harassment, retaliation, breach of 
contract, violation of public policy, and intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. Subsequently, the Court dis-
missed the Plaintiffs sixth cause of action for tortious 
discharge in violation of public policy. 
Pursuant to the Court's original Scheduling Order, 
the Plaintiff had until February 24, 1997, to designate her 
expert witnesses. At the request of the parties, the Court 
extended [**2J the deadline to August 8, 1997. On Au-
gust 8, J 997, the Plaintiff identified her experts. The dis-
closure identified James Bass and Dr. Kenneth Jackson, 
M.D., , as experts. The disclosure also stated that the 
Plaintiff "is investigating the possibility of having a cor-
porate security department expert testify at trial." 
The disclosure indicated that Nurse Practitio-
ner, Joyce Matcham would "testify as to Ms. EI-
gas' medical condition while she was working at 
the Colorado Belle." No other information was 
provided regarding Ms. Matcham, including all 
items required by Rule 26(a)(2)(B). 
On September 5, 1997, Defendant, Colorado Belle's 
attorney sent Plaintiff's counsel a letter saying that the 
disclosure was inadequate. The Defendant's objections 
were that the Plaintiff failed to name or retain a corporate 
security department expert, failed to supply a signed re-
port for Bass or Dr. Jackson, failed to list Dr. Jackson's 
qualifications, failed to provide infonnation regarding 
publication, prior testimony or exhibits [**3] for either 
expert, failed to submit Dr. Jackson's compensation rate, 
and failed to give information regarding the basis for 
opinions or data considered for the opinions of either 
expert. 
On September 17, 1997, the Plaintiff served a sup-
plemental disclosure. The supplemental disclosure stated 
that "Dr. Jackson andlor Nurse Matcham will testify as to 
Ms. Elgas's medical condition while she was working at 
the Colorado Belle. . [and thatJ they will also act as 
both fact and expert witnesses." Additionally the sup-
plemental disclosure said that "Dr. Jackson's office 
treated Ms. Elgas in a time frame which allowed the of-
fice to witness and testify to the destructive effects that 
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the Colorado Belle's conduct had on Ms. Elgas while she 
was working at the Colorado Belle." Since the Plaintiff 
states that neither Dr. Jackson [*298] or Matcham has 
been retained, the Plaintiff believes no other disclosure 
for these two witnesses is necessary. 
The Plaintiff attached to the supplemental disclosure 
"Mr. Bass's Curriculum Vitae" and an expert report pre-
pared by 8ass. The supplemental disclosure also listed 
the compensation for Bass. Moreover, the Plaintiff stated 
that "Mr. Bass has previously testified ["*4] about men-
tal health issues in general. He has testified in various 
types of cases, but is unable to currently compile a spe-
cific list of cases." The Plaintiff advised that she would 
disclose the required information for the corporate secu-
rity department expert upon retention. In response to the 
information submitted in the original disclosure and in 
the supplement disclosure, the Defendant filed this Mo-
tion to Strike (# 56). 
DISCUSSION 
Rule 26(a)(2)(A) l of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure requires a party to disclose the identity of all ex-
pert witnesses. Rule 26(a)(2)(B) adds that: 
(8) Except as otherwise stipulated or di-
rected by the court, this disclosure shall, 
with respect to a witness who is retained 
or specially employed to provide expert 
testimony in the case or whose duties as 
an employee of the party regularly in-
volve giving expert testimony, be accom-
panied by a written report prepared and 
signed by the witness. 
Subsection 8 requires the expert report to contain: 
(1) a complete statement of all opinions 
to be expressed and the basis and reasons 
therefor; 
(2) the data or other information consid-
ered by the witness in forming the opin-
ions; 
(3) [H 5] any exhibits to be used as a 
summary of or support for the opinions; 
(4) the qualifications of the witness, in-
cluding a Jist of all publications authored 
by the witness within the preceding ten 
years; 
(5) the compensation to be paid for the 
study and testimony; and, 
(6) a listing of any other cases in which 
the witness has testified as an expert at 
trial or by deposition within the preceding 
four years. 
"The rule contemplates two different classes of experts: 
those retained or specially employed to give testimony in 
the case, and other witnesses who may qualify as an ex-
pert but are not retained or specially employed." Piper v. 
Harnischfeger Corp., 170 F.R.D. 173, 174 (D. Nev. 
1997). This dichotomy was recognized and explained in 
the advisory committee's notes. "The requirement of a 
written report in paragraph (2)(B), however, applies only 
to those experts who are retained or specially employed 
to provide such testimony in the case or whose duties as 
an employee of a party regularly involve the giving of 
such testimony. A treating physician, for example, can be 
deposed or called to testify at trial without any require-
ment for a written report." Fed. R. eiv. [**6] P. 26 ad-
visory committee's n-otes. Since a treating physician's 
opinion on matters such as "causation, future treatment, 
extent of disability and the like" are part of the ordinary 
care of a patient, a treating physician may testify to such 
opinion without being subject to the extensive reporting 
requirements of Rule 26(a)(2)(8). Piper v. Harnischfe-
ger Corp., 170 F.R.D. at 174-175. "However, if a physi-
cian, even though he may be a treating physician, is spe-
cially retained or employed to render a medical opinion 
based on factors that were not learned in the course of 
the treatment of the patient, then such a doctor would be 
required to present an expert written report." H ali v. 
Sykes, 164 F.R.D. 46, 48-49 (E.D. Va. 1995); see gener-
ally Piper v. Harnischfeger Corp., 170 F.R.D. at 175 
(citing cases that support the requirement that a treating 
physician must acquire the opinions through treatment of 
a patient); Shapardon v. West Beach Estates, 172 F.R.D. 
415,417 (D. Haw. 1997) (concluding that treating physi-
cians' opinions based upon information received from 
outside sources, such as an independent medical exami-
nation report, would [*299] trigger the report require-
ment of Rule [**7] 26(a)(2)(B»). 
2 Rule 26(a)(2)(A) provides in pertinent part: "a 
party shall disclose to other parties the identity of 
any person who may be used at trial to present 
evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence." 
"The reason for requiring expert reports is 'the 
elimination of unfair surprise to the opposing party and 
the conservation of resources." Reed v. Binder, 165 
F.R.D. 424, 429 (D.N.J. 1996) (citations omitted). "The 
test of a report is whether it was sufficiently complete, 
detailed and in compliance with the Rules so that sur-
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prise is eliminated, unnecessary depositions are avoided, 
and costs are reduced." Id Furthermore, Rule 
26(a)(2)(B) appears "to require exact compliance in all 
particulars with the disclosures" requirement. Sullivan v. 
Glock. Inc., 175 F.R.D. 497,503 (D. Md. 1997) (citation 
omitted) (declaring "a literal reading of Rules 37(a)(3) 
and 37(c)(I) would result in the application of the auto-
matic exclusion of an expert's trial testimony if there was 
(*"'8) not complete compliance with the requirements of 
Rule 26(a)(2)(B), unless the court finds that there was 
substantial justification for the failure to make complete 
disclosure or that failure to disclose is hannless"). 
1. Dr. Kenneth Jackson, M.D. 
The Court needs only to decide whether Dr. Jackson 
is a treating physician subject to the Rule 26(a)(2)(B) 
expert report requirement. According to Plaintiffs sup-
plemental disclosure. Dr. Jackson would testify about the 
Plaintiffs medical condition and act as both fact and ex-
pert witness. Additionally, Dr. Jackson would testify 
abouj thealJeged destructive effects that Colorado Belle's 
conduct had on the Plaintiff while she worked at Colo-
rado Belle. The Plaintiff argues that an expert report pur-
suant to Rule 26(a)(2)(B) is unnecessary because Dr. 
Jackson is not "retained or specifically employed to pro-
vide testimony" and is "a treating physician" The Plain-
tiff asserts that "Dr. Jackson has not been retained to give 
expert testimony, but rather will testifY at trial as a fact 
witness, where he may be requested to give testimony to 
the area of his expertise, including opinions and the basis 
for such opinions." See, e.g., Brown v. Best ["'*9] 
Foods, A Division of CPC Int'l, Inc., 169 F.R.D. 385, 
388 n.3 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (discussing when a physician 
receiving compensation for expert testimony is "re-
tained" or "specially employed"); Smith v. State Farm 
Fire & Cas. Co., 164 F.R.D. 49. 54- 56 (S.D. W.Va. 
1995) (discussing when experts who are neither fact wit-
nesses nor treating physicians are not retained). 
Treating physicians are not normally subject to the 
strict disclosure requirements of Rule 26(a)(2)(B). Piper 
v. Harnischfeger Corp., 170 F.R.D. at 173-74; Sprague 
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co, 177 F.R.D. 78 CD.N.H.1998) 
(stating "the majority of other courts in the country have 
concluded that Rule 26(a)(2)(B) reports are not required 
as a prerequisite to a treating physician expressing opin-
ions as to causation, diagnosis, prognosis and extent of 
disability where they are based on the treatment"). "[A] 
physician does not need to submit an expert report if 
planned testimony was acquired, 'not in preparation for 
trial, but rather because he was an actor or viewer with 
respect to transactions or occurrences that are a part of 
the subject matter of the lawsuit.'" Bucher v. Gainey 
Transp Servo of Indiana, Inc., [*"10J 167 F.R.D. 387, 
390 (M.D. Pa. 1996). Nonetheless, the Plaintiff cannot 
avoid the Rule 26(a)(2)(B) reqUirements by simply indi-
eating that her expert is a treating physician. Bucher v. 
Gamey Transp. Servo of Indiana, Inc, 167 FR.D. at 390. 
Here, Dr. Jackson has never met the Plaintiff, but 
was the directing physician at the medical clinic visited 
by Ms. Elgas. Specifically, the Plaintiff states that "Dr. 
Jackson did not personally treat Ms. Elgas, he was con-
sulted, and directed the work of the nurse practitioner 
who did treat Ms. Elgas." This is a concern because Dr. 
Jackson's actual involvement with the Plaintiff is limited. 
A treating physician usually acquires knowledge through 
personal treatment of a patient. See Piper V. Harnischfe-
ger Corp., 170 F.R.D. at 175 (citing cases that state treat-
ing physicians generally obtain their opinions through 
direct examination, diagnosis, or treatment of a patient). 
Since Dr. Jackson did not treat the Plaintiff, Dr. Jackson 
is not a typical treating physician. Nevertheless, Dr. 
Jackson did playa role in the Plaintiffs treatment when 
the nurse practitioner consulted him. Thus, to the extent 
that Dr. [*300] Jackson has knowledge of the Plaintiffs 
[**11] medical condition through consultation, Dr. 
Jackson is a treating physician and not subject to Rule 
26(a)(2)(B) requirements. However, Dr. Jackson should 
not be allowed to render a medical opinion based on fac-
tors that were not learned in the course of his limited 
treatment of the Plaintiff at his clinic. 
2. James Bass 
The Court should strike the designation of Bass as 
an expert, because Bass has not listed other cases in 
which he has testified as an expert at trial or by deposi-
tion within the preceding four years. ) An expert's report 
must be "detailed and complete." Sierra Club v. Cedar 
Point Oil Co., Inc., 73 FJd 546, 571 (5th Cir. 1996) (cit-
ing Fed. R. eiv. P. 26 advisory committee's note). 
An expert's failure to maintain records 
in the ordinary course of his business suf-
ticient to allow the disclosures to be 
made, does not constitute "substantial jus-
tification" for the failure to provide re-
quired disclosures as to any retained ex-
pert expected to testifY at the trial of the 
case. The requirements of the Rule 26(a) 
are mandatory as to any expert retained to 
testify. If the expert is unable or unwilling 
to make the disclosures he should be ex-
cluded as a possibility [** 12] for reten-
tion as an expert witness in the case. 
Nguyen v. IBP, Inc., 162 F.R.D. 675 (D. Kan 1995). 
Elgas argues that the she is unable under her current fi-
nancial situation to find another expert. However, the 
Court agrees with Nguyen that "[a) party may not simply 
retain an expert and then make whatever disclosures the 
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expert is willing or able to make notwithstanding the 
known requirements of Rule 26." Id. 
3 Nevada Local Rule 26-1 (e)(3) modifies Fed. 
R Civ. p, 26(a)(2)(C) to require the disclosure of 
experts 60 days before the discovery cut-off date. 
That allows time for a party to depose the person 
who has been identified as an expert and to des-
ignate a rebuttal expert if desired. Discovery, in-
cluding expert disclosures and depositions, must 
be completed within the court-approved discov-
ery period. Discovery is closed in this case. 
Eigas infers in her opposition that any undisclosed 
information should be excluded at the time of trial. Cer-
tainly to the extent prior testimony enhances [*"'13] the 
experts' credibility and standing before the fact finder, 
plaintiffs suggestion is appropriate, Unfortunately, the 
disclosure of prior recorded testimony is designed to give 
the other party access to useful information to meet the 
proposed experts' opinions, The proliferation of marginal 
or unscrupulous experts will only be stopped 'when the 
other party has detailed information about prior testi-
mony. The list of other cases in which the witness has 
testified as an expert should include the court, the names 
of the parties, the case number, and whether the testi-
mony was by deposition or at trial. 
Elgas has not shown how the failure to disclose is 
substantially justified or harmless. Therefore, the Court 
should strike the designation of Bass as an expert. 
3. Corporate Security Department Expert 
The Court should strike the designation of the un-
named corporate security department expert, because the 
Plaintiff has not retained or designated an expert. A party 
must provide the names of expert witnesses it expects to 
call before the close of discovery. See Derby v. Godfa-
ther's Pizza, Inc., 45 F.3d 1212, 1214 (8th CiT. 1995) 
(excluding an expert because the plaintiff failed to timely 
[H 14] disclose expert's identity) Elgas has failed to 
show how her failure to name this expert is harmless, 
Discovery is closed and to allow her to designate a cor-
porate security department expert at this point would be 
prejudicial and cause a substantial hardship to the De-
fendant. Since the Plaintiff has not designated a corpo-
rate security department expert, the requirements of the 
expert report are not met. To allow the Plaintiff to violate 
the requirements of Rule 26(a)(2)(B) and then to provide 
supplemental disclosure after the close of discovery is 
prejudicial to the Defendant. Thus, the Court should 
strike the Plaintiff's designation of a corporate security 
department expert. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing. and good cause appearing 
therefore, 
[*301] IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant 
Colorado Belle Corporation's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's 
Expert Witness Designation (# 56) is granted in part and 
denied in part. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Colo-
rado Belle Corporation's Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Ex-
pert Witness Designation (If 56) is granted as to James 
Bass and the unknown security department expert. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Colo-
rado Belle Corporation's Motion [** 15] to Strike Plain-
tiff's Expert Witness Designation (# 56) is denied as to 
Dr. Kenneth Jackson, M.D. and Nurse Praetitioner, Joyce 
Matcham. 
DATED this IIth day of May, 1998. 
ROBERT J. JOHNSTON 
United States Magistrate Judge 
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OPINION 
FTNDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
JONES, Judge 
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff Pamela L. Bond, the widow of Craig R. 
Bond, deceased, and the personal representative of his 
estate, brings this Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTC A") 
action pursuant to 2B U.S.c. §§ 1346(b) and 2674, 
against the United States of America ("defendant") to 
recover damages for medical malpractice resulting from 
the negligent treatment, wrongful acts, and omissions of 
employees at the Portland Veterans Administration 
Medical Center ("V AMC"). Complaint (# I) at 2-3. Spe-
cifically, plaintiff alleges that defendant was negligent 
for failing to properly and timely diagnose Bond's car-
diac condition; failing to provide him with appropriate 
specialty surgical intervention; failing to conduct medi-
cally necessary testing prior to his discharge; and [*2) 
for improperly discharging him before his dangerous, 
life-threatening cardiac condition was properly stabi-
lized. See id. at 6. As a result, plaintiff claims that Bond, 
who was 55 years old, suffered an untimely death from 
his cardiac condition on September 26, 2005, approxi-
mately 48 hours after he was discharged from the 
VAMC. 
Pursuant to the FTCA, plaintiffs medical malprac-
tice claim was tried to the court, without a jury. The ap-
plicable substantive law in this FTCA case is that of the 
State of Oregon, where plaintiffs alleged injuries oc-
curred. See 28 U.S.c. §§ 1346(b)(1) and 2672. In Ore-
gon, wrongful death actions are authorized under O.R.S. 
§ 30.020, and the standard of care is set forth in O.R.S. § 
677.095(1), as follows: "A physician ... licensed to 
practice medicine ... by the Board of Medical Examin-
ers fOT the State of Oregon has the duty to use that degree 
of care, skill, and diligence that is used by ordinarily 
careful physicians . . . in the same or similar circum-
stances in the community of the physician ... or a simi-
lar community." 
The four-day trial commenced on February 5, 2008. 
After carefully considering the large volume of medical 
literature submitted by both [*3] parties before, during, 
and after trial, as weI! as hearing the testimony of sixteen 
expert witnesses regarding the liability and damages is-
sues in this case, the court concludes that the physicians 
who treated Bond at the V AMC from the time of his 
emergency room admission on September 22, 2005, to 
the time of his discharge on September 24, 2005, met the 
standard of care for physicians in the Portland area. I 
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, defendant 
did not commit medical malpractice. 
I At the end of the trial, the court ruled that the 
parties could submit supplemental literature to 
address the following question What percentage 
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of stenosis would call into play a surgical ap-
proach? In particular, the court sought literature 
showing the percentage breakdowns of stenosis 
correlated with life expectancy (mortality). The 
material submitted by plaintiff is listed in Appen-
dix A, and the defendant's submissions are listed 
in Appendix B. 
SUMMARY OF BOND'S MEDICAL HISTORY 
The data contained in Bond's 607-page medical re-
cord is not subject to dispute; though the interpretation of 
several key tests and the course of treatment the V AMC 
doctors chose to address Bond's cardiac condition [*4] 
involve a number of judgment calls, which plaintiff con-
tends were not appropriate. It is undisputed that Bond, 
who was a combat veteran from the Vietnam conflict, 
was permanently disabled from post-traumatic stress 
disorder ("PTSD") and hearing loss. There is evidence in 
the record that Bond smoked a pack a day of unfiltered 
cigarettes for approximately 30 years and had not yet 
managed to quit as of the date of his discharge from the 
hospitaL See Exhibit P I at 262; and see id. at 170, 174 
(discussing cessation counseling at discharge). Bond also 
struggled with alcohol abuse; a notation in his medical 
records indicates that he reported regularly consuming a 
J 2-pack of beer per day for 30 years. See ld. However, 
his widow testified that she believed his alcohol use de-
clined significantly the past few years. Bond, who was 
six feet two inches tall and weighed 240 pounds, was 
also borderline obese. 
In spite of the health risk factors associated with his 
lifestyle choices, Bond did not suffer from any liver dis-
ease or iung disorder. In June of 2005, physician pro-
gress notes show that he was being treated for PTSD; 
depression; upper back, shoulder, and neck pain; hyper-
tension; elevated cholesterol; [*5J and severe gastroe-
sophageal reflux disease ("GERD"). See id. at 264. Addi-
tionally, the 2005 progress notes from his primary care 
physician show that Bond did not report symptoms of a 
serious cardiac ailment before his September admission 
to the V AMC. Exhibit P I at 246-277. When Bond visited 
the VAMC emergency room for symptoms related to his 
GERD on July 16, 2005, an electrocardiogram C"EKGH), 
which measures the electrical activity of the heart during 
its contractions, showed normal cardiac activity. Id. at 
250,550. 
It is undisputed that when Bond arrived at the 
V AMC emergency room on September 22nd, he was 
suffering from acute coronary syndrome (HASCH) and 
unstable angina as evidenced by his symptoms of severe 
substernal chest pain (reported 10+ on a scale of I to 10), 
shortness of breath, sweating, and nausea. See Exhibit PI 
at 212,217,238,517. When questioned later during his 
admission about his history of chest pain, Bond reported 
for the first time that he had been experiencing episodes 
of pain lasting 45 minutes to 5 hours almost daily for the 
past two months; that the pain radiated to his shoulders; 
that it occurred at rest and with exertion; that it was oc-
casionally associated ["'6] with nausea; and that two 
days before he had experienced his most severe episode, 
which lasted close to 20 hours and was accompanied by 
vomiting and sweating. ld. at 209. 
Each of the seven EKGs taken during Bond's 
V AMC admission showed abnormal readings indicative 
of ischemia, which means that Bond's heart muscle was 
suffering from a lack of oxygenated blood; there was 
also evidence of an older myocardial infarction (UMI") 
that occurred sometime after the July EKG. See id. at 
543-547 (EKG test strips). Further testing revealed that 
Bond had 1313 pglml of brain natriuretic peptide 
("BNP") present in his blood, which is abnormally high 
given that the level should have been less than 126 
pg/ml. Yd. at 203. All of the cardiology experts agreed 
that such a high BNP reading indicated that Bond's heart 
muscle suffered some form of stress. However, Bond's 
levels of Troponin, a cardiac enzyme that is present 
when cell damage or death occurs and is an indicator of a 
recent MI, were negligible-- less than 0.01 uglL--in a 
series of three tests. See id. at 189-191. Finally, an echo-
cardiogram was performed to determine Bond's ejection 
fraction in the left ventricle. The ejection fraction meas-
ures [*7J the contractions of the heart, and is expressed 
as a percentage of blood that is pushed out with each 
heartbeat; Bond had a reading of 56 percent, which falls 
within the normal range. See Exhibit Pl at 189,509. 
It is undisputed that during the first 24 hours or so 
following Bond's admission, the V AMC physicians ap-
propriately treated his cardiac condition with aspirin, 
beta blockers, and ACE inhibitors, as well as intravenous 
nitrates, heparin, and Tirofiban. It also is undisputed that 
the decision to perform a cardiac catheterization and an-
giogram to view the condition of Bond's coronary arter-
ies was appropriate, and that the diagnosis that Bond was 
suffering from coronary artery disease ("CAD") was cor-
rect. Notes in Bond's medical records show that his chest 
pain and other symptoms of cardiac distress disappeared 
during his stay at the V AMC, and the monitoring equip-
ment that he was connected to throughout his admission 
did not register any acute arrhythmias. See id. at 172, 
176, 183, 189. On September 23rd, Bond was up and 
walking around without experiencing further chest pain 
or shortness of breath, and he reported that he was feel-
ing well and wanted to go home. ld. at 183,203. [*8] A 
few hours before he was discharged on September 24th, 
Bond reported that he fe It "great," and had "no chest pain 
since admission." ld. at 176. 
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What remains disputed and therefore must be re-
solved by the court, as the trier of fact, are the following 
issues: 
J. Whether the V AMC doctors mis-read Bond's an-
gjogram when they concluded that he had 40 percent 
stenosis (narrowing) in the proximal section of the left 
anterior descending ("LAD") coronary artery; 
2. If the V AMC doctors did mis-read the angiogram, 
whether the stenosis was 80 percent as plaintiff contends, 
and as noted in Bond's autopsy report, or whether the 
stenosis was some other percentage; 
J. Based on my determination of the percentage of 
stenosis present in Bond's proximal LAD, as well as the 
presence of stenosed areas in the LAD and other coro-
nary vessels, whether the standard of care required an 
invasive procedure such as angiopJasty, stent placement, 
or bypass surgery before Bond was discharged from the 
VAMC to prevent death from an acute cardiac event 
such as an arrhythmia or infarction; 
4. Whether V AMC doctors committed medical mal-
practice in failing to perform a fmal EKG, as ordered, 
before Bond was discharged; and 
5. [*9J Whether V AMC doctors' failure to perform 
an exercise tolerance test ("ETT") before Bond was dis-
charged constituted medical malpractice. 
The above medical issues were the subject of exten-
sive and conflicting expert testimony throughout the 
four-day trial. Based on my review of the testimony, my 
credibility determinations, and my review of the conflict-
ing medical literature offered by the parties, I make the 
findings of fact and conclusions oflaw set forth below. 
FINDINCS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW 
A. The Angiogram Reading, Percentage of Steno-
sis, and Appropriate Treatment 
The primary divergence between plaintiffs and de-
fendant's expert cardiologists revolves around the analy-
sis of the arteries of Bond's heart; in particular, the 
proximal (upper) segment of the LAD. According to 
plaintiff's expert witness, Dr. Jay Schapira, the LAD is 
one of three arteries running downward from the mouth 
of the aorta at the top of the heart and is functionally 
important because it supplies the largest territory of heart 
muscle. Therefore, any blockage or narrowing that im-
pedes the flow of blood through the LAD, especially if it 
occurs near the origin of the vessel as it did in Bond's 
case, is considered [* I 0] serious because a large portion 
of the heart muscle could suffer damage. 
Dr. Schapira claimed that a visual inspection of 
Bond's proximal LAD showed a tight lesion, with 70 to 
80 percent stenosis, that he labeled "the widow maker." 
He also identified areas of stenosis further down the 
LAD, as well as in two other coronary arteries, and 
opined that Bond should have been treated surgically 
before he was discharged from the VAMC, preferably 
with at least four bypasses. Just before trial, with no no-
tice to the court or opposing counsel, Dr. Schapira per-
formed a quantitative analysis using calipers and mi-
crometer to confirm his visual estimation of 80 percent 
stenosis based on a single frame of the digital angiogram 
"film" See Exhibits P58 and P62. 
In contrast, two of defendant's treating cardiology 
experts, Dr. George Giraud and Dr, Eric Stecker, who 
perfonned Bond's cardiac catheterization and interpreted 
the angiogram results on September 23,2005, concluded, 
based on their visual examinations, that the same stenosis 
identified in the proximal LAD was only 40 percent. See 
Exhibit Pl at 509. Because the plaintiffs calibration was 
done without notice to the defense, the court requested 
[* 11] that the defense experts perform a similar calibra-
tion. Dr. Giraud performed the same quantitative analysis 
on the same frame of film and testi fied that his meas-
urements confirmed that the lesion had a stenosis of 38 
to 39 percent. Defendant's leading expert witness, non-
treating cardiologist Dr. John McAnulty, performed 
quantitative angiographY on the same lesion using that 
frame, but also based his measurements on other camera 
angles after reviewing both still-frame and motion pic-
ture films, and calibrated the stenosis at 48 to 50 pereent. 
See Exhibit 0-129. 
There is no question in the court's mind that all of 
the expert witnesses were sincere, highly trained, and 
with respect to most of the opinions they expressed, each 
passed the screening required by Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Parmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S, 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 
L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993). Thus, to resolve this schism of 
expert opinions regarding the percentage of stenosis pre-
sent in Bond's proximal LAD, and to make a determina-
tion as to whether the V AMC doctors mis-read the de-
gree of stenosis shown in Bond's angiogram films, the 
court must evaluate the credibility of each expert who 
gave an opinion about these issues. 
Plaintiffs expert witness, Dr. Jay [*12] Schapira, a 
very active board certified cardiologist from California, 
teaches as an adjunct at UCLA, diagnoses heart disease, 
and maintains a highly active surgical practice in which a 
large percentage of patients receive surgical intervention. 
He describes his practice as invasive cardiology and 
interventional cardiology; that is, utilizing mechanical 
devices to open up coronary arteries, including perform-
ing angioplasty with balloons and inserting stents, He 
testified that he personally performs stent procedures, but 
refers patients who require bypasses to heart surgeons 
who specialize in that procedure. Dr. Schapira also is a 
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very experienced medicaVlegal expert witness who 
charges $ 10,000 per day and who has testified at trial 
more than 100 times in his career; at least 20 times be-
tween 2000 and 2005. In 2005, he testified in depositions 
as many as 42 times, approximately 70 percent of the 
time for the plaintiff in the litigation. At trial in this case, 
he testified that only five percent of his practice deals 
with giving expert testimony in medical/legal litigation 
where he is not the treating physician. Without doubt, 
Dr. Schapira is a highly qualified and highly paid non-
treating [*l3J expert. Thus, the court expected him to be 
extremely careful in presenting his testimony in his Rule 
26 report, his pretrial deposition, and during the trial of 
the case. 
To evaluate the weight of Dr. Schapira's opinions, 1 
examined not only his vast credentials, but also any in-
consistent or questionable basis for his opinions under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702. In his deposition, Dr 
Schapira was asked to justify his position with medical 
articles to support the opinion that a patient with a steno-
sis such as Bond's should have been given immediate 
surgical intervention, and that an invasive procedure 
"would have significantly reduced the mortality rate of 
patients like Mr. Bond." See Plaintiffs Response to De-
fendant's Daubert Motion (# 28) at Exhibit A, p. 7 J. Dr. 
Schapira testified during his deposition that he thought 
the BARI trial, the CASS trial, and several other research 
studies supported his opinion that surgery improves life 
expectancy in patients like Bond. See id. However, when 
I read these studies before the trial, they revealed that the 
researchers concluded the opposite; there is no statisti-
cally significant difference in survival rates between sur-
gical intervention [* 14] versus medical therapy even in 
patients with 3-vessel CAD, particularly if their left ven-
tricu lar ("LV") function (determined by measuring ejec-
tion fraction) was normal. See Exhibit D 120; Appendix 
B, Exhibit 14. Further, the CASS research involved pa-
tients with mild stable angina, who were free of angina 
after infarction, as opposed to patients such as Mr. Bond, 
whom plaintiff contends had unstable angina and high 
risk CAD. Following this observation, I wrote to plain-
tiffs counsel requesting that Dr. Schapira submit articles 
to justify his opinion. Plaintiff submitted trial exhibits 
that included medical treatises and journal articles, see 
Exhibits P ll-P36; however, Dr. Schapira's trial testi-
mony covered only the 2002 ACC/AHA Guideline Up-
date dealing with the classification of risk of death from 
unstable angina, Exhibit P14, and the significance of 
BNP in predicting risk of an adverse cardiac event, Ex-
hibits 29, 32-34. 
Because it remained unclear whether there was a 
correlation between surgical intervention and increased 
chance of survival in patients with the percentage of 
stenosis observed in Bond's proximal LAD, at the court's 
request, post-trial on February 13, 2008, plaintiff [* I 5] 
submitted supplemental articles purporting to support 
plaintiff's claims. See Appendix A. There is reliable 
medical evidence in the 2004 ACC/AHA Guideline Up-
date to support Dr. Shapira's contention that bypass sur-
gery generally improves long-term survival in patients 
with 3-vessel CAD if there is "significant"--meaning 
greater than 50% stenosis--and "[t]he more severe the 
symptoms, the more proximal that LAD CAD, and the 
worse the LV function, the greater the benefit from sur-
gery." Appendix A, Exhibit Cat 3.2.2.2. However, liter-
ally turning the page to read a bit further, the same 
source supports defendant's contention that non-surgical 
medical treatment was an appropriate choice, as follows: 
"LV systolic function remains an important predictor of 
which patients are likely to benefit from surgery. In pa-
tients with a normal EF [ejection fraction], surgical re-
vasculatization generally provides little survival benefit." 
Id. at 3.2.2.4. Bond's echocardiogram shows that his 
ejection fraction was normal. Dr. Schapira's failure to 
fully inform the court of the significance of all of the 
data acquired· during Bond's admission io the V AMC 
does little to bolster his credibility. 
Another problem [* 16] with Dr. Schapira's testi-
mony is that he bases his conclusion that Bond's proxi-
mal LAD stenosis was 80 percent on the findings made 
by the VA pathologist, and he now claims his earlier 
estimate at 70 percent in his Rule 26 report to the court 
was a typographical error. Defendant contended that a 
physician cannot necessarily rely on measurements 
found at autopsy as an indicator of the percentage of 
stenosis present while the patient is alive with his heart 
still beating, and drew the analogy that postmortem 
measurements are akin to measuring the diameter of a 
bicycle tire after it has gone flat--which is what happens 
to arteries after death-- versus measuring a fully inflated 
tire. Defendant's expert, Dr. John McAnulty, emphasized 
this discrepancy at trial when he testified as folJows: 
[T]here's a well-recognized discrepancy 
between findings from an angiogram and 
findings from an autopsy. 
Even if it's understood that the same 
region of the blood vessel is looked at, the 
situation is different enough that meas-
urements very rarely match between the 
two techniques, and overwhelmingly it's 
observed that autopsy measurements re-
sult in greater narrowing than angiogram 
measurements. 
* * * 
[T]here [* l7] are probably a number 
of explanations, but I think the concept of 
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measuring a tube that's collapsed, versus 
one that's held open by pressure is proba-
bly one of the major differences in the 
measurements when a person has died, 
and when a person is being studied with 
an angiogram. 
Transcript of McAnulty Testimony, February 7, 2008, 
("McAnu Ity Tr. ") at 49-50. 
In addition, Dr. McAnulty pointed out that the au-
topsy report did not specify whether the pathologist took 
samples from the proximal region of Bond's LAD coro-
nary artery as described in the angiogram, or from a re-
gion further down the vessel where there were narrow-
ings that may have been 80 percent. 
The V AMC pathologist testified that she did not re-
call and had not specified in her report precisely which 
region of Bond's LAD she obtained the samples that she 
analy~ed, only that it was her common practice to take 
them from the narrowest part of the vessel. In addition, 
the pathologist was not qualified to make a before death 
and after death analysis regarding the degree of stenosis 
observed in Bond's proximal LAD, and Dr. Schapira 
never clarified how that difference could justify his as-
sumption. He simply adopted the autopsy report of ['"18J 
80 percent or greater stenosis by referring to "the Glagov 
phenomenon," a study he claims all pathologists would 
know. However, the V AMC pathologist testified that she 
did not account for the Glagov phenomenon when she 
calculated the percentages of coronary artery stenoses 
listed in her report. 
Plaintiff did not supply the court with a reference to 
Glagov's research study; however, post-trial defendant 
submitted three supplemental articles that discuss 
"Glagov's phenomenon." Appendix B, Exhibits 10-12, In 
1987, Glagov and his fellow researchers published their 
conclusion that "human coronary arteries enlarge in rela-
tion to plaque area and that functional important lUmen 
stenosis may be delayed until the lesion occupies 40 per-
cent of the internal elastic laminal area." Appendix B, 
Exhibit 10. After the stenosis exceeds 40 percent, "lumen 
diameter decreased, resulting in a restriction in flow ... 
[w]hen this [Glagov] phenomenon fails to occur the re-
sult is stenosis," Appendix B, Exhibit 12 at 4, 10; see 
also Exhibit 11 at 518, Fig. 1. None of the articles ex-
plain how the Glagov phenomenon would be relevant to 
support a finding that Bond's proximal LAD stenosis was 
80 percent or greater [* 19J at the time his angiogram 
was performed. 
Regarding the reliability of the testimony provided 
by Dr. George Giraud, a V AMC cardiologist who 
teaches at that hospital as well as the Oregon Health Sci-
ences University ("OHSU"), and who is a specialist who 
directs the VAMC cardiac catheterization lab; and that of 
Dr. Eric Stecker, a cardiologist and electrophysiologist, 
now practicing at the Legacy Good Samaritan Hospital 
here in Portland, I find both of these experts 10 be very 
credible, There is no question that these doctors are dedi-
cated professionals who took great care to review Bond's 
relevant medical history and to perform the cardiac 
catheterization procedure properly, Both testified that 
they took multiple motion picture angiogram views of 
Bond's coronary arteries quickly and efficiently using the 
V AMC's state-of-the-art dual-camera system to adjust 
the camera angle to obtain unobstructed views of the 
LAD along the entire length of the vessel. Doctors 
Giraud and Stecker testified that they spent more than an 
hour conducting a visual examination of Bond's an-
giogram film clips on September 23rd; however, it was 
not standard practice to perform a quantitative analysis 
on a single frame [*20] of film to confirm their visual 
reading that the lesion in Bond's proximal LAD was 40 
percent stenosed. 
When asked by the court to re-examine Exhibit PS8, 
which plaintiff submitted as the prime exhibit of the 
"widow maker" stenosis, Dr. Giraud spent hours analyz-
ing Bond's angiogram and testified that, due to the cam-
era angle, the single frame plaintiff relied upon at trial 
gave a false impression of the severity of the stenosis in 
Bond's proximal LAD artery because there were over-
lapping segments on either side of the lesion. Calibrating 
the thinnest section on Exhibit PSg and comparing other 
camera angles of the same artery, which more faithfully 
represented in three dimensions the severity of the steno-
sis, Dr. Giraud testified that his quantitative analysis con-
firmed that the disputed stenosis was 38 to 40 percent. 
However, because they were Bond's treating doctors, and 
their angiogram interpretations are directly at issue in 
this case, the court recognizes the potential bias inherent 
in the testimony given by doctors Giraud and Stecker 
Defendant's non-treating expert, Dr, McAnulty, pro-
vided the final analysis of the "widow maker" stenosis, 
Dr. McAnulty, one of the leading cardiologists [*21] in 
this community, is also a clinical researcher in the field 
of cardiac sudden death, and currently serves as the 
medical director of arrhythmia services at Legacy Good 
Samaritan Hospital. In the past, he has served as the head 
of the division of cardiology at OHSU, director of the 
OHSU cardiac catheterization lab, director of the OHSU 
arrhythmia service, and head of the OHSU cardiology 
division; he also used to hold an appointment to work at 
the V AMC, but no longer has any formal affiliation with 
that institution. I have commented on the potential bias 
of plaintiffs medical expert witness. By like token, 1 am 
fully aware that doctors do not like to testify against fel-
low doctors or condemn the institution with which they 
11~) 
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are or have been affiliated. In this case, I recognize that 
Dr. McAnulty was once closely allied with the Veterans 
Hospital and would be most reluctant to condemn or 
criticize the procedures of the very persons with whom 
he taught, practiced medicine, and in some cases contin-
ues to work alongside. In particular Dr. Stecker, who 
perfonned Bond's angiogram, was once Dr. McAnulty's 
student, and is now associated with Dr. McAnulty at 
Good Samaritan Hospital and obtained [*22] his posi-
tion at McAnulty's request. Thus, I closely scrutinized 
Dr. McAnulty's testimony for any temptation to simply 
back up the actions of his present and fanner colleagues, 
rather than give an independent analysis. I find that any 
such potential bias did not alter the reliability of his tes-
timony. 
Dr. McAnulty testified unequivocally that in 2005, 
as it is today, the standard of care for cardiologists read-
ing an angIOgram in the Portland metro area was to do a 
visual inspection using motion picture angiogram films, 
and evaluate the vessels in multiple views. Based on an 
initial visual assessment of the lesion in Bond's proximal 
LAD, Dr. McAnulty concluded that the stenosis was 40 
percent, and further testified that he does not routinely 
quantify a stenosis by comparing the diameter of the 
narrowing relative to the vessel before and after, as Dr. 
Shapira did in this case. Dr. McAnulty concurred with 
Dr. Giraud's reasons for objecting to using a single frame 
of angiogram film as the basis for interpreting the degree 
of stenosis in Bond's proximal LAD, testifying that he 
"could not do it from frame 22 alone, because the overlap 
of vessels just makes it impossible to have a reference 
[*23) vessel to compare the stenosis." McAnulty Tr. at 
10. Without knowing precisely what Dr. Giraud's meas-
urements were, Dr. McAnulty engaged in the same quan-
titative analysis as the other experts but utilized addi-
tional views where there was no overlap to better quan-
tify the degree of stenosis, and concluded that it was 48 
to 50 percent. See Exhibit D 129. 
In the final analysis, to resolve the issues of whether 
the V AMC doctors mis-read Bond's angiogram, and 
what percentage of stenosis was present in Bond's 
proximal LAD coronary artery, the court must choose the 
most credible of three sets of witnesses. I find that Dr. 
McAnulty is the least biased, the most credible, and has 
provided the most well-reasoned and thorough analysis 
of Bond's coronary anatomy. He carefully evaluated and 
personally marked articles that justify his position and 
ultimate conclusions. Also, having taught or supervised 
about a third of Oregon's 200 practicing cardiologists, he 
is in a unique position to base his testimony on his exten-
sive knowledge of the degree of care, skill, and diligence 
used by ordinarily careful cardiologists in the Portland 
metro area. Careful doctors who viewed all of Bond's 
angiogram films [*24] could not detennine the amount 
of stenosis with exactness. All experts agreed reading 
angiograms is a most difficult task and that reasonable 
minds could and did differ. Accordingly, I conclude that 
the V AMC doctors did not mis-read Bond's angiogram, 
and that the catheterization report issued by doctors 
Giraud and Stecker met the legal standard of care. Fur-
thennore, J find based on the evidence presented at trial 
that the stenosis in Bond's proximal LAD did not exceed 
50 percent. 
Given that detennination, it is less difficult to find 
that an invasive procedure such as stent placement or 
bypass was not warranted under the circumstances pre-
sented in this case. Dr. Schapira argued that based on the 
2002 ACC/AHA practice Guidelines, Bond was in the 
"highrisk" category for short-term risk of death, see Ex-
hibits P14 and P57, and that an invasive procedure such 
as bypass surgery could be justified under the legal stan-
dard of care. Nevertheless, viewing Bond's medical re-
cord as a whole and given that the extensive medical 
literature showing no statistically significant difference 
in mortality between medical management and an inva-
sive procedure, the course of treatment chosen by the 
VAMC doctors ["25] for this veteran was also easily 
justifiable. The preamble to the ACC/ AHA Guidelines 
themselves say it best: "These practice guidelines are 
intended to assist physicians in clinical decision making 
by describing a range of generally acceptable approaches 
for the diagnosis, management, or prevention of specific 
diseases or conditions .... The ultimate judgment regard-
ing the care of a particular patient must be made by the 
physician and patient in light of all of the available in-
fonnation and the circumstances presented by that pa-
tient." Exhibit P 14 at 3. 
A review of Bond's symptoms showed, without a 
doubt, that he was in aeute coronary distress when he 
arrived at the V AMC, as his seven abnonnal EKGs con-
firmed. His angiogram revealed a number of significant 
stenoses in three different coronary arteries, and he was 
diagnosed--for the first time--with diffuse CAD. When 
questioned about his history of chest pain he revealed--
for the first time--that he had been suffering symptoms 
for two months that were indicative of coronary ischemia 
and unstable angina. Although of questionable relevance 
at the time, Bond's BNP level was at least ten times 
higher than nonnal, and gives some indication [*26] that 
he was suffering from severe ischemia, 
In contrast, Bond's Troponin levels were undetect-
able, meaning that he had not had an MJ within the past 
six days. His echocardiogram showed a normal ejection 
fraction. He responded well to the medications he re-
ceived, his cardiac condition stabilized, and his symp-
toms of cardiac distress disappeared. He did not have 
further arrhythmias or show other signs of ischemia even 
after the intravenous medications were stopped. Doctors 
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who examined him found that did not have a heart mur-
mur, and he was not suffering from pulmonary edema 
because his lungs were clear--"no rales, ron chi or 
wheezes," See Exhibit P I at 211. At discharge, he re-
ported that he felt great and was walking around without 
suffering any symptoms of cardiac distress. 
The 2006 ACCi AHA research study that correlated 
BNP and Troponin levels to predict "mortality benefit 
from coronary revascularization in acute coronary syn-
dromes" elegantly and succinctly demonstrates why the 
judgment call that Bond's treating doctors had to make 
between medical management and a more invasive 
treatment such as revascularization was a difficult one--a 
patient such as Bond who had a Troponin level of [*27) 
less than 0.0 I uglL, but also a BNP higher than 237 
nglL, is literally right on the line between "lower mortal-
ity with revascularization" and "higher mortality with 
revascularization," Exhibit P34, at 1152, Fig, 5. Dr. 
Schapira referred to the figure in this study solely to sup-
port his testimony that the test for BNP was useful to 
stratify patients into risk categories, and that Bond was at 
high risk for an adverse cardiac event based on his BNP 
level of 1313 pg/mL See Transcript of Schapira Testi-
mony, February 5, 2008, ("Schapira Tr.") at 63-65. By 
contrast, Dr. McAnulty explained that the significance of 
the research was that based on those two lab tests alone, 
likelihood of mortality would not have been greater or 
lesser with revascularization. See McAnulty Tr. at 21-23. 
Moreover, the V AMC doctors who treated Bond 
emphasized in their testimony, as previously noted, that 
Bond had a normal ejection fraction, and it factored into 
their decision to manage his CAD medically by putting 
him on a regimen of drug therapy and conducting fol-
]owup tests to monitor his cardiac condition. See Exhibit 
P I at 191. Dr. McAnulty explained the significance of 
this test, as follows: "When the ejection [*28J fraction is 
normal, in a group of patients like Mr. Bond, it's actually 
a favorable prognostic marker. ... In this particular case, 
it's also one more reason why should he have even had a 
tight narrowing, of 80 percent, why, the role of interven-
tion would not have been clear in that when the ejection 
fraction is normal, even if there is a vessel where there 
would be agreement about stenting or coronary bypass 
surgery, the effects of survival on that person, with me-
chanical intervention, are not clearly any better than 
medical therapy, alone." McAnulty Tr. at 34-35. Dr. 
Schapira commented that Bond's good ejection fraction 
made him "at low risk from an arrhythmia that you 
would call a death due to sudden cardiac death ... [but) 
(h]e didn't die of sudden cardiac death .. which is a 
particular unexpected death syndrome. He died of 
ischemia which caused a cardiac arrhythmia." Schapira 
Tr. at 95, 
Although plaintiff's and defendant's cardiology ex-
perts agree, as the V AMC pathologist found, that Bond 
died ofa lethal arrhythmia, meaning that the ventricles in 
his heart either went into fibrillation or he suffered a car-
diac standstill, the precise cause of his arrhythmia re-
mains in dispute, [*29) Dr. McAnulty, who is an expert 
in treating cardiac arrhythmias, testified that while 
ischemia from coronary artery narrowing can cause a 
lethal heart rhythm to occur and is a reasonable explana-
tion, it is not a definitive explanation because the mecha-
nism that triggers lethal arrhythmias is still uncertain. 
McAnulty Tr. at 38-39. Arrhythmias can be caused by 
myocardial damage from CAD, micro-scarring that pro-
motes the chance of developing a lethal arrhythmia at 
any time, elevated adrenal in levels, or from a random 
sudden death rhythm. Id. at 39 The precise cause of 
Bond's arrhythmia is a scientific dispute that need not be 
resolved to answer the ultimate question in this case. 
1 find, based on all of the evidence, and particularly 
on the well-supported testimony of Dr. McAnulty, that 
even if Bond had undergone an invasive cardiac surgery 
with four bypasses, as recommended by Dr. Schapira, his 
life expectancy would not have been extended as com-
pared to treating him medically. 2 Bond died of an un-
forseen arrhythmia from an unknown cause that would 
not definitively have been prevented by an invasive sur-
gical procedure. Therefore, I conclude that the V AMC 
doctors' decision to pursue a more [*30] conservative 
medical approach, and to treat Bond accordingly with a 
well-accepted regimen of drug therapy, did not violate 
the standard of medical care in the community. 
2 Regarding the issue of Bond's life expectancy, 
I note that Dr. Schapira testified that he simply 
took 10 years off Bond's normal life expectancy 
because of Bond's documented use of cigarettes 
and alcohol. Without citing to any epidemiologi-
cal study or other research to support it, Dr, 
Schapira's opinion amounts to nothing more than 
a non-educated guess plucked out of thin air, and 
thus fails the Daubert screening. An expert's will-
ingness to gratuitously guess and express an opin-
. ion with no scientific basis as to one subject, 
casts doubt on the reliability of his other opin-
ions. 
B. The Final EKG Order 
Even in a nationally recognized, first-rate training 
hospital such as the Portland V AMC, the volume of 
medical records generated and the numbers of orders 
issued can overwhelm the capacity of a managed-care 
system to deliver every test precisely as ordered. In 
Bond's case, each doctor or team of doctors handled a 
discrete aspect of his care, posted the observations and 
conclusions on a computer network that other care pro-
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viders [*31] could access hospital-wide, and moved on 
to the next patient. The number of witnesses caJled to 
testify on the care Bond received during his relatively 
brief admission in September of2005 reminded the court 
of the adage: "Too many cooks can spoil the broth." One 
of the doctors-in-training, without a request from a su-
pervisor, ordered an EKG to be performed before Bond's 
discharge. This order was neither carried out nor re-
scinded by superiors. However, during his hospitaliza-
tion Bond had already received seven EKGs, all of which 
were abnormal and indicated that Bond was suffering 
from cardiac ischemia A senior V AMC staff cardiolo-
gist testified, and Dr. McAnulty confirmed, that perform-
ing another EKG would have been redundant because 
Bond was already being treated for ischemia with the 
optimal medical program, his symptoms of acute cardiac 
distress had disappeared within the past 24 to 36 hours, 
his overall condition was stable, and the information 
provided by another EKG would not have provided addi-
tional information to change the diagnosis or treatment, 
nor would it have affected the timing of the discharge or 
the ultimate outcome in Bond's case. In other words, the 
failure to perform ["32] another EKG or rescind it was 
harmless error. 
Once again, Dr, Schapira did not hesitate to opine 
that the defendant's failure to do the final EKG consti-
tuted medical malpractice, even though he never ex-
plained any basis for his opinion. In like manner, he 
summari Iy accused the defendant of wrongfully dis-
charging Bond, without giving any meaningful specifics. 
I find that both of these opinions lack a sufficient basis to 
support his conclusion that the defendant via lated the 
standard of care by neglecting to perform another EKG 
before Bond was discharged. 
C. The Exercise Tolerance Test 
Plaintiff also complains that defendant's failure to 
perform some type of ETT while Bond was hospitalized 
violated the standard of care because the data obtained 
from evaluating the heart's function with exertion could 
have resolved the mixed results of the other objective 
tests, clarified the cause of Bond's pain syndrome, and 
presumably tipped the balance in favor of lifesaving sur-
gical intervention. See Schapira Tr. at 10 I-I 02. Dr. 
Schapira contends that if V AMC doctors were concerned 
about the potentially adverse complications, such as 
bleeding, that could occur from having Bond exercise on 
a treadmill [*33] so soon after his catheretization proce-
dure. such complications could have been avoided by 
performing a pharmacologic stress test while Bond was 
still bedridden. 
However, Dr. McAnulty testified that the standard 
of care for a patient like Bond who had undergone a car-
diac catheterization was to send him home to recover, 
then bring him back for a follow-up ETT as an outpa-
tient. See McAnulty Tr. at 32, He gave two logical and 
compelling reasons: first, it is difficult for someone who 
has had a femoral artery punctured and a tube inserted 
and withdrawn to perform in their usual manner when 
walking during a treadmill exercise test; second, an ETT 
would be of greater diagnostic value to test the effective-
ness of the medical program after the patient had been on 
the additional drug therapy for a longer period of time. 
Id. Regarding the usefulness of a chemical stress test, Dr. 
McAnulty testified that a chemical test does not mimic 
an exercise test to assess a person's performance on the 
prescribed course of medical treatment. Id. at 33. Also, a 
chemical test is used to evaluate CAD; because it was 
already known that Bond had CAD and that it was af-
fecting the blood flow to his heart based on [*34] the 
EKG results, the data obtained from a chemical test 
would have been less useful than an exercise test. See id. 
Accordingly, plaintiffs complaint lacks merit be-
cause the defense proved to the court's satisfaction that a 
pharmacologic stress test perfonned on an inpatient ba-
sis, although not unusual, is a poor substitute to evaluate 
the coronary function of an ambulatory patient like 
Bond, who was capable of returning in a few days for a 
follow-up outpatient ETT to be performed on a treadmill. 
Plaintiff made much ado about the fact that the V AMC 
medical records revealed that six doctors recommended 
or ordered that Bond undergo an ETT, and yet it was not 
done before he was discharged, However, I note that 
there was no time limit specified in the order issued by 
Bond's treating cardiologist, who wrote HI think the best 
plan is to treat him for ischemia with ASA and beta 
blocker and then bring him back for an ETT to see if 
there is objective evidence of ischemia with exertion on 
medications." Exhibit PI at 191. In fact, several VAMC 
staff physicians testified that they anticipated that the 
stress test would best be completed as an outpatient ap-
proximately two weeks after discharge. [*35] Unfortu-
nately, Bond's time ran out. Nevertheless, i find that de-
fendant did not violate the standard of care when it dis-
charged Bond without first performing an ETT. 
CONCLUSION 
Tn sum, evaluating this exceptionally well-tried case 
by extremely competent counsel and confronted with 
outstanding witnesses, I conclude that plaintiff simply 
has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the medical treatment the doctors at the V AMC provided 
to Craig Bond in September of 2005 in any way vio Jated 
the standards of medical care as practiced in this com-
munity; therefore, defendant is not liable under the 
FTCA for his death. Because the issue of liability is dis-
positive, I need not reach the issue of damages. ' 
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3 One of the issues that continues to trouble the 
court is that the defense stipulated that Bond had 
a life expectancy of 15 years, yet took the incon-
sistent position that Bond had an unknown life 
expectancy considering his lifestyle choices and 
the condition of his heart, and that he suffered 
sudden cardiac death unrelated to any treatment 
(or lack of treatment) he received at the V AMC, 
Apparently, defense counsel entered into the 
stipulation simply to save the economists' time, 
["'36] so that if the court reached the damages is-
sue, the court could assume that Bond would 
have lived 15 more years, The economic losses 
could then be based on the disability payments 
received and services provided by a stay-at-home 
spouse doing domestic care for a specific period 
of time, 
In closing, I note that this extremely sensitive case 
involved two casualties of a long-ago war--Bond, who 
became a victim of substance abuse early on, presumably 
because of his combat experience; and his loving, sup-
portive wife who did her best to cope with his disabili-
ties, Yet, sympathy for the litigants can play no role in 
the court's factual findings and conclusions of law. 
Judgment is for the defendant. 
DATED this 10th day of March, 2008, 
/s/ Robert E, Jones 
ROBERT E, JONES 
U,S, District Judge 
APPENDIX A 
The following medical peer-reviewed literature is at-
tached in support of plaintiffs claims: 
Exhibit A E. Braunwald et aI., ACC/AHA 2002 
Guideline Update for the Management of Patients With 
Unstable Angina and Non-ST-Segment Elevafion Myo-
cardial Infarction. A Report of the American College of 
Cardiology/American Heart Association Task Force on 
Practice Guidelines (Committee on the Management of 
Patients [*37] with Unstable Angina), available at: 
http://www,acc.org/clinical! guide-
lines/unstable/unstable, pdf. 
Exhibit B 1. L. Anderson et aI., ACC/AHA 2007 
Guidelines for the Management of Patients With Unsta-
ble Angina and Non-ST-Segment Elevation Myocardial 
Infarction: A Report of the American College of Cardi-
ology/American Heart Association Task Force on Prac-
tice Guidelines (Writing Committee to Revise the 2002 
GUidelines for the Management of Patients with Unsta-
ble AnginaiNon-ST-Elevation Myocardial Infarction) 
116 CIRCULATION e148 (2007). 
Exhibit C 1(. A. Eagle et aI., ACC/AHA 2004 Guide-
line Update for Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Surgery: 
A Report of the American College of Cardiol-
og;>lAmerican Heart Association Task Force on Practice 
Guidelines (Committee to Update the i999 Guidelines 
for Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Surgery), available at; 
http://www.acc. org/c IinicaVguidelines/cabg/cabg.pdf. 
Exhibit 0 S. C. Smith, Jr. et aI., ACC/AHA/SCAI 
2005 Guideline Update for Percutaneous Coronary In-
tervention: A Report of the American College of Cardi-
ology/ American Heart Association Task Force on Prac-
tice Guidelines (ACC/AHA/SCAl Writing Committee to 
Update the 200J Guidelines for Percutaneous Coronary 
["'38] intervention), available at: 
http://www,americanheart,org, 
Exhibit E Robert H. Jones et aI., Long-term Survival 
Benefits of Coronary Artery Bypass Grafting and Percu-
taneous Transluminal Angioplasty in Patients with 
Coronary Artery Disease, 1996 J. THORACIC AND 
CARDIOVASCULAR SURGERY 1013. 
Exhibit F Salim Yusef, et al. Effect of Coronary Ar-
tery Bypass Graft Surgery on Survival: Overview of 10-
Year Results From Randomized Trials by the Coronary 
Artery Bypass Graft Surgery Trialists Collaboration, 344 
LANCET 563 (1994), 
Exhibit G Ron T. van Domburg et aL Sustained 
Benefit 20 Years After Reperfusion Therapy in Acute 
Myocardia/infarction, 46 1. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 15 
(2005), 
Exhibit H Excerpt from: indications for Bypass Sur-
gery, in CECIL MEDlCfNE, Ch, 74 (23d ed, 2008), 
available at: hnp:llwww.mdconsult.comJdaslbook/body 
/891491 12-6/6794987311l492/314.html. 
Exhibit I Airlie Cameron et ai., Coronary Bypass 
Surgery with internal-Thoracic-Artery Grafts--Effects on 
Survival over a 15-year Period, 334 N, ENG. 1. 
MEDICINE 216 (1996), 
Exhibit J Excerpt from: F, D. Loop et aI., Influence 
of Internal-Mammary-Artery Graft on 10-year Survival 
and Other Cardiac Events, 314 N, ENG. j, MEDICfNE 
1 (1986). 
Exhibit [*39] K H. Oelert, Kardiochirurgisches 
Standy-by und AkuteingrifJe nach intervention ellen kar-
diologischen MaBnahmen, 85 Suppl.6 Z KARDIOL 303 
(1996) (Ger.). 
APPENDIXB 
The following medical peer-reviewed literature is at-
tached in support of defendant's contentions: 
12] 
[4J 0221045 
Page iO 
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19881, '* 
Exhibit 1 Alfred F Parisi et aI., Medica! Compared 
with Surgical Management of Unstable Angina: 5-Year 
Mortality and Morbidity in the Veterans Administration 
Study, 80 CIRCULATION 1176 (1989), 
Exhibit 2 TIMI IllB Investigators, Effects of Tissue 
Plasminogen A ctivator and a Comparison of Early inva-
sive and Conservative Strategies in Unstable Angina and 
Non-Q-Wave Myocardial Infarction, 89 CIRCULATION 
1545 (1994), 
Exhibit 3 William E. Boden et aI., Outcomes in Pa-
tients with Acute Non--Q-Wave Myocardial Infarction 
Randomly Assigned to an Tnvasive as Compared with a 
Conservative Management Strategy, 338 NEW ENG. 1. 
MEDICINE 1785 (1998). 
Exhibit 4 Peter A, McCullough et ai., A Prospective 
Randomized Trial of Triage Angiography in Acute Coro-
nary Syndromes Ineligible for Thrombolytic Therapy: 
Results on the Medicine Versus Angiography in Throm-
bolytic Exc/usion (MATE) Trial, 32 J. AM. C. 
CARDIOLOGY 596 (1998). 
Exhibit 5 Lars Wallentin et a1., [*40J Invasive 
Compared with Non-invasive Treatment in Unstable 
Coronary-Artery Disease: FRiSC If Prospective Ran-
domized Multicentre Study, 354 LANCET 708 (1999). 
Exhibit 6 Christopher P. Cannon et aI., Comparison 
of Early Invasive and Conservative Strategies in Patients 
with Unstable Coronary Syndromes Treated with the 
Glycoprotein lIb/IIla Inhibitor Tirofiban, 344 NEW 
ENG. 1. MEDICNE 1879 (200 I). 
Exhibit 7 David A, Morrow et aI., Ability of Minor 
Elevations of Troponins I and T to Predict Benefit From 
an Early Invasive Strategy in Patients with Unstable 
Angina and Non-ST Elevation Myocardial Infarction. 
Results from a Randomized Trial, 286 AM, MEDICAL 
ASS'N 2405 (2001). 
Exhibit 8 David A, Morrow et al., Evaluation of B-
Type Natriuretic Peptide for Risk Assessment in Unstable 
AnginaiNon-ST-Elevation Myocardial Infarction, 41 J, 
AM, C. CARDIOLOGY 1264 (2003). 
Exhibit 9 Leopoldo S. Piegas et aI., The Organiza-
lion to Assess Strategies for Ischemic Syndromes 
(OASIS) Registry In Patients with Unstable Angina, 84 
AM, J. CARDIOLOGY 5A, 7M (1999). 
Exhibit 10 Abstract of: S, Glagov et aI., Compen-
senatory Enlargement of Human Atherosclerotic Coro-
nary Arteries, 316 NEW ENG. J. MEDICINE 1371 
(1987). 
Exhibit [*41] 11 R, H. Mohiadin et aI., Glagov Re-
modeling of the Atherosclerotic Aorta Demonstrated by 
Cardiovascular Magnetic Resonance: The CORDA As-
ymptomatic Subject Plaque Assessmenf Research 
(CASPAR) Project, 6 1. CARDIOVASCULAR 
MAGNETIC RESONANCE 517 (2004). 
Exhibit 12 Vyacheslav A. Korshunov et aI., Vascu-
lar Remodeling: HemodynamiC and Biochemical Mecha-
nisms Underlying Glagov's Phenomenon, 27 
ARTERIOSCLEROSIS, THROMBOSIS, AND 
VASCULAR BIOLOGY 1722 (2007). 
Exhibit 13 Rehan Qayyum et at, Systematic Review, 
Routine and Selective Invasive Strategies for the Acute 
Coronary Syndrome, 148 ANNALS OF INTERNAL 
MEDICINE 186 (2008). 
Exhibit 14 Michal B, Mock et aI., Survival of Medi-
cally Treated Patients in the Coronary Artery Surgery 
Study (CASS) Registry, 66 CIRCULATlON 566 (1982). 
Exhibit 15 Whady Hueb et aI., Five- Year F ollow- Up 
of the Medicine, A ngioplasty, or Surgery Study (MASS 
11): A Randomized Controlled Clinical Trial of 3 Thera-
peutic Strategies for Multivessel Coronary Artery Dis-
ease, 115 CIRCULATION 1802 (2007). 
Exhibit 16 William E. Boden et aI, Optima! Medical 
Therapy with or without PCI for Stable Coronary Dis-
ease, 356 NEW ENG. 1. MEDICINE 1503 (2007). 
Exhibit 17 E. Braunwald et aI., ACC/AHA [*42] 
2002 Guideline Update for the Management of Patients 
With Unstable Angina and Non-ST-Segment Elevation 
Myocardial Infarction: A Report of the American Col-
lege of Cardiology/American Heart Association Task 
Force on Practice Guidelines (Committee on the Man-
agement of Patients with Unstable Angina), available at: 
http://www.acc.org/clinicall guide-
lines/unstable/unstable. pdf. 
Exhibit 18 S. C. Smith, Jr. et aL, ACCIAHA/SCAI 
2005 Guideline Update for Percutaneous Coronary In-
tervention: A Report of the American College of Cardi-
ology/ American Heart Association Task Force on Prac-
tice Guidelines (ACC/AHA/SCAI Writing Committee to 
Update the 2001 Guidelines for Percutaneous Coronary 
Intervention), available at: 
http://www,americanheart.org. 
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and official capacity as Sheriff of Jackson County and 
former Jail Commander of the Jackson County Jail, 
MISSY ROBlNSON, (Miser) Nurse, in her individual 
capacity, Defendants: Max Eric Fiester, Ross E. Ru-
dolph, Stacy Kerns Harris, RUDOLPH FINE PORTER 
& JOHNSON, Evansville, TN. 
For DR. F AISAL AHMED, ADVANCED 
CORRECTIONAL HEAL THCARE, INC., Defendants: 
Michael D. Rogers, Robert Ballard Clemens, Steven D. 
Groth, BOSE MCKINNEY & EVANS, LLP, Indianapo-
lis, IN. 
For DA VTD RlDLEN, in his individual capacity. JOSH 
TElPEN, in his individual capacity, Defendants: Stacy 
Kerns Harris, RUDOLPH FINE PORTER & JOHNSON, 
Evansville, IN. 
JUDGES: Tim A. Baker, United States Magistrate 
Judge. 
OPINION BY: Tim A. Baker 
OPINlON 
ORDER ON DISCOVERY MOTION 
I. Introduction. 
Before the Court is Plaintiffs motion to compel dis-
covery and award sanctions, or in the alternative, to 
strike Defendants' expert witness. [Docket No. 70.] For 
the foregoing reasons, the Court grants [*2] Plaintiff's 
motion in part and strikes Defendants' expert witness. 
II. Background. 
Defendants Jerry Hounshel, Marc Lahrman, Missy 
Miser Robinson, David Ridlen, and Josh Teipen retained 
Dr. Bruce Waller as their expert witness in this case. 
Defendants provided Plaintiff with Dr. Waller's expert 
report on February 15, 2008, as required by Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B). [Docket No, 70, Ex. 1.J 
In this report, Dr. Waller indicated that he did "not main-
tain lists of prior cases/reviews." [Id. at S.J Plaintiff re-
sponded by letter on February 20, 2008, requesting that 
Dr. Waller clarify this statement and noting that if Dr. 
Waller had testified in prior cases, then his report would 
be deficient. [Docket No 70, Ex. 2.] On February 29, 
2008, Defendants provided Plaintiff with an addendum 
to Dr. Waller's report, in which Dr, Waller provided a list 
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of topics on which he had testified that was not necessar-
ily limited to the prior four years. The addendum also 
included four case names without citations (except two 
included the county) that were obtained by defense coun-
sel upon conducting a Lexis search; however, Dr. Waller 
also noted, "I do not recall any details and have no[] re-
cords [*3) for these cases." [Docket No. 70, Ex. 3 at 2.] 
Plaintiff agam objected to the report, so Defendants con-
ducted a West!aw search and produced for Plaintiffs four 
more case names, indicating the counties, the nature of 
the cases, and in two instances the cause numbers. 
[Docket No. 70, Exs. 4-5.] 
m. Discussion. 
Plaintiff argues that Defendants have failed to sat-
isfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B), even 
after having provided them notice and two opportunities 
to cure the deficiencies. Thus, Plaintiff requests the 
Court compel these disclosures and award costs and fees 
or, in the alternative, that the Court strike Dr. Waller as 
an expert witness. Defendants argue that they have sub-
stantially complied with the rule and that to the extent 
they have not, Plaintiff is not harmed. Furthermore, De-
fendants characterize Plaintiffs request as "the extraordi-
nary remedy of witness exclusion" and the alternative 
remedy as "something [Dr. Waller] has already stated he 
is unable to produce," [Docket No. 78 at I.] 
Rule 26(a)(2)(B) requires expert witnesses to dis-
close a written report containing, among other things, "a 
list of all other cases in which, during the previous four 
years, the witness ['"4] testified as an expert at trial or by 
deposition." Other jurisdictions have interpreted this 
provision as follows: 
The information to be disclosed is 
"cases" in which the witness has testified. 
The identification "cases" at a minimum 
should include the courts or administra-
tive agencies, the names of the parties, the 
case number, and whether the testimony 
was by deposition or at trial. Such infor-
mation should be sufficient to allow a 
party to review the proceedings to deter-
mine whether relevant testimony was 
given. With this information, a party 
should be able to determine the type of 
claim presented and locate any recorded 
testimony. 
Bethel v. United States, Civil Action No. 05-cv-01336-
PSF-BNB, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43395 at *3-4 (D. 
Colo June 13, 2007); Norris v. Murphey, Civil Action 
00-12599-RBC, 2003 U.S. Dist LEXIS 10795, at *3-4 
(D. Mass. June 26, 2003); Nguyen v. IBP, Inc., 162 
F.R.D. 675,682 (D. Kan. 1995). Defendants' expert does 
not claim that his list of cases includes "all" cases in 
which he has testified in the last four years. Furthermore, 
the information included to identify these cases does not 
sufficiently enable Plaintiff to obtain the expert's testi-
mony in them. 
The [*5] consequences of failing to disclose this in-
formation are provided in Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 37(c)(1): 
If a party fails to provide information .. 
as required by Rule 26(a) or (e), the 
party is not allowed to use that informa-
tion or witness to supply evidence on a 
motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless 
the failure was substantially justified or is 
harmless. In addition to or instead of this 
sanction, the court, on motion and after 
giving an opportunity to be heard: 
(A) may order payment 
of the reasonable expenses, 
including attorney's fees, 
caused by the failure; 
(B) may inform the 
jury of the party's failure, 
and 
(C) may impose other 
appropriate sanctions, in-
cluding any of the orders 
listed in Rule 
37(b )(2)(A)(i)-(vi). 
According to this rule, because Defendants have failed to 
provide the required information, they must demonstrate 
that their failure was substantially justified or that it was 
harmless. The Seventh Circuit has provided four factors 
for the district court to consider when determining 
whether the failure to disclose was either substantially 
justified or harmless: "(I) the prejudice or surprise to the 
party against whom the evidence is offered; (2) the abil-
ity [*6J of the party to cure the prejudice; (3) the likeli-
hood of disruption to the tria I; and (4) the bad faith or 
willfulness involved in not disclosing the evidence at an 
earlier date." David v. Caterpillar, 324 F.3d 851, 857 
(7th Cir. 2003). 
Defendants argue that Plaintiff faces no risk of sur-
prise since Plaintiff has time to explore any information 
about Dr. Waller's opinion through deposition before 
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trial They further argue that Plaintiff is not prejudiced 
by the fact that she will be unable to review Dr. Waller's 
prior testimony and opinions "given the scope of material 
that has been provided, the time remaining before trial, 
and the existence of the Plaintiffs own expert witness," 
[Docket No. 78 at 4.] They argue that Plaintiff may still 
depose Dr. Waller so the problem can be cured, Defen-
dants contend that the trial, having not yet been sched-
uled, will not be disrupted by the expert's failure to com-
ply with the rule. Finally, Defendants argue they have 
not acted in bad faith in their failure to disclose these 
cases 
Defendants' good faith is not in question. Likewise, 
because the expert's failure to disclose is not about the 
timing of disclosure but rather the ability to make a suf-
ficient [*7] disclosure. trial disruption or surprise to 
Plaintiff are irrelevant. 
Nevertheless, Defendants' failure to disclose is 
prejudicial. Having access to other cases in which the 
expert witness has testified "allow[sJ the opposition to 
obtain- prior testimony of an expert and, potentially, to 
identify inconsistent positions taken in previous cases for 
use in cross-examination," Bethel, 2007 U.S. Dis!. 
LEXIS 43395, at * J 7, This testimony may also be useful 
to Plaintiff in ascertaining the legitimacy of Defendants' 
expert. See Elgas v. Colorado Belle Corp., 179 F.R.D. 
296, 300 CD. Nev, 1998) ("[T]he disclosure of prior re-
corded testimony is designed to give the other party ac-
cess to useful information to meet the proposed experts' 
opinions. The proliferation of marginal or unscrupulous 
experts will only be stopped when the other party has 
detailed information about prior testimony."). Further-
more, a deposition cou Id not cure all prejudice to Plain-
tiff--Dr. Waller will not be able to reproduce his prior 
testimony at the deposition, particularly since he does 
"not recall any details" and has no records of these cases. 
[Docket No. 70, Ex, 3 at 2.] 
Likewise, Defendants' reason--that their expert [*8] 
does not keep a list of cases--does not substantiaJly jus-
tify their expert's failure to provide this information as 
required by the rule. See Norris, 2003 U,S. Dist. LEXIS 
10795, at * II ("An expert cannot deliberately put him-
self or herself in a position where it is impossible to 
comply with a rule and then claim that he or she cannot 
comply. Self-induced inability to comply with a rule is 
simply not justified."); Palmer v, Rhodes Machmery, 187 
F.R.D. 653,656 (N.D. Okla, 1999) (denying defendant's 
motion for relief from the reporting requirement deter-
mining that "the cost or difficulty of compiling the list is 
insufficient for the purpose of meeting the 'substantial 
justification' requirement" where defendant's expert did 
not believe he could compile a completely accurate list); 
Nguyen, 162 F.R.D, at 681 ("An expert's failure to main-
tain records in the ordinary course of his business suffi-
dent to allow the disclosures to be made[J does not con-
stitute 'substantial justification' for the failure to provide 
the required disclosures as to any retained expert ex-
pected to testify at the trial of the case,"), Rule 26(a)--
amended in 1993 to impose on parties the duty to dis-
close certain ["'9] information without waiting for a re-
quest--requires expert witnesses be disclosed and that 
they provide a signed written report. Rule 26(a)(2)(B) 
lists specific requirements for the report, therefore de-
lineating the basic criteria necessary for a witness to hold 
himself out as an "expert" in federal court. Dr. Waller 
has unambiguously stated that he cannot comply with 
one of those basic criteria. Ignoring the rule and allowing 
Dr. Waller to testify would reinforce Defendants' failure 
to follow the rules and would lower the bar for other 
experts. Therefore, Dr. Waller is not permitted to testify 
in this case, 
Defendants have requested that if they are prohibited 
from presenting Dr. Waller, that they be allowed a mini-
mum of forty-five days to obtain a substitute expert wit-
ness. [Docket No. 85 at 3.] In affirming a district court's 
decision to deny witnesses who were belatedly disclosed 
as experts, the Seventh Circuit noted: 
In affirming this judgment, we are 
mindful of our warning that 'in the normal 
course of events, justice is dispensed by 
the hearing of cases on their merits ... 
We urge district courts to carefully con-
sider Rule 37(c), including the alternate 
sanctions available, [* I 0] when imposing 
exclusionary sanctions that are outcome 
determinative. " 
Musser v, Gentiva Health Servs, 356 F.3d 751, 759-60 
(7th Cif. 2004) (quoting Salgado by Salgado v. Gen. Mo-
tors Corp., ) 50 FJd 735, 740 (7th Cir. 1998». Defen-
dants are unable to cure the prejudice to Plaintiff that 
would result if Dr. Waller were allowed to testify, so no 
sanction other than striking the witness is appropriate. 
However, in keeping with the spirit of the Seventh Cir-
cuit's admonition, the Court will enlarge the deadline by 
forty-five days from the date of this order for Defendants 
to produce an expert witness. As a result, and because a 
trial date has not yet been set, the Court shall also modify. 
the dispositive motions deadlines and the date of the set-
tlement conference, 
IV. Conclusion. 
For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS Plain-
tiffs motion in part and strikes Defendants' expert wit-
ness, Dr. Waller. [Docket No. 70,J Defendants shall have 
forty-five days from the date of this order in which to 
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produce an expert witness and report confonning with 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2). 
This enlargement of time for Defendants to produce 
an expert conflicts with the dispositive motion deadlines 
recently modified [* I 1] by the Court. [See Docket No. 
81J Therefore, the dispositive motion deadlines shall be 
modified as follows: Plaintiffs motion for summary 
judgment will be due on July 14, 2008; Defendants' mo-
tion for summary judgment and response to Plaintiffs 
motion will be due on August 14, 2008; Plaintiffs reply 
and her response to Defendants' motion will be due Sep-
tember 15, 2008; and Defendants' reply will be due Sep-
tember 29,2008. The Court does not anticipate enlarging 
any of these deadlines, including the deadlines for re-
sponse and reply briefs. 
In addition, the settlement conference currently 
set for July 1, 2008, at 9 B.m. is now vacated and re-
scheduled for August 20, 2008, at ] :30 p.m. in Room 
234. All requirements and deadlines established in the 
order originally setting the settlement conference remain 
in effect. [See Docket No. 58.] 
Dated: May 22, 2008 
lsi Tim A. Baker 
Tim A. Baker 
United States Magistrate Judge 
Southern District of Indiana 
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Angela K. Hermosillo, ISB No. 7425 
QUANE SMITH LLP 
Sixteenth Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P. O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 345-8600 
Facsimile: (208) 345-8660 
Attorneys for Defendants ORIGINAL 
MARVIN F. MORGAN, 
Plaintiff, 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
Case No. CV-06-4332 
N 
U1 
V 
N 
0i 
U1 
@J003/010 
r--; .. _ :t-.. 
r""l~ "....,..-
vs. 
MICHAEL ALEXANDER DEMOS, M.D.; 
JOHN D. CHAMBERS, JR. M.D.; AND 
IDAHO HEART INSTITUTE P.C., 
RENEWED MOTIO~ TO EXCLUDE 
PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WITNESS 
JAY N. SCHAPIRA, M.D. 
Defendants. 
COME NOW Defendants, Chambers, Demos and the Idaho Heart Institute, 
by and through their counsel of record, the law firm of Quane Smith LLP, and move this 
Court for its Order excluding the testimony of Jay N. Schapira, M.D. on the grounds, 
and for the reasons that Plaintiff has violated the Court's Order of March 24, 2009, 
demanding a list of cases in which Jay N. Schapira, M.D. has provided expert witness 
RENEWED MOTION TO EXCLUDE PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WITNESS JAY N. SCHAPIRA, 
M.D.-1 129 
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testimony, and on the further grounds that Jay N. Schapira, M.D. should be excluded 
under Idaho Rule of Evidence 702. 
This Motion is made upon the facts of this case, the pleadings and files 
herein, including, but not limited to, the Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Renewed 
Motion to Exclude, filed contemporaneously herewith; the Memorandum in Support of 
Renewed Motion filed contemporaneously herewith; and the Motion to Exclude Jay N. 
Schapira, M.D. and the accompanied pleadings. This Motion is also based upon, and 
supported by the Idaho Rules of Evidence, including, but not limited to Rule 702, and 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, including, but not limited to, Rules 26 and 37. 
Oral argument is ,requested. 
+-
DATED this <J c;". day of March, 2009. 
QUANE SM1YJ UP . 
By ~ 
Matthew . McColl, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SE~ )g/ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this __ day of March, 2009, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing RENEWED MOTION TO EXCLUDE PLAINTIFF'S 
EXPERT WITNESS JAY N. SCHAPIRA, M.D. by delivering the same to each of the 
following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
Lowell N. Hawkes 
Ryan S. Lewis 
Lowell N. Hawkes, Chartered 
1322 East Center 
Pocatello, Idaho 
[Xl U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[J Hand-Delivered 
[] Overnight Mail 
{] Facsimile 
,~ 
Matthew F. McColl 
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QUANE SMITH LLP 
Sixteenth Floor, U.S. Bank Plaza 
101 South Capitol Boulevard 
P. O. Box 519 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 345-8600 
Facsimile: (208) 345-8660 
Attorneys for Defendants ORIGINAL 
MARVIN F. MORGAN, 
Plaintiff, 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
Case No. CV-06-4332 
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vs. 
MICHAEL ALEXANDER DEMOS, M.D.; 
JOHN D. CHAMBERS, JR. M.D.; AND 
IDAHO HEART INSTITUTE P.C., 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
RENEWED MOTION TO EXCLUDE 
PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WITN ESS 
JAY N. SCHAPIRA, M.D. 
Defendants. 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Renewed Motion to 
Exclude the Testimony of Jay N. Schapira, M.D., Plaintiff's standard of health care 
practice witness. The procedural history is well known to this Court. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION TO EXCLUDE PLAINTIFF'S 
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II. 
FACTS 
Defendants refer this Court to its Motion, Memorandum, and Affidavit of 
Exciude Jay N. Schapira, M.D., a courtesy copy of which is attached hereto. 
On March 24, 2005, at or around the hour of 2:00 p.m., this Court 
convened a hearing to undertake Defendants' Motion to Exclude Jay N. Schapira, M.D. 
At that hearing, this Court directed counsel for Plaintiff to provide a list, in compliance 
with Defendants' discovery requests, of the testimonial history of Jay N. Schapira, 
M.D. by 12:00 noon on March 25, 2009. At approximately 3:30 p.m., Plaintiff's 
counsel faxed to defense counsel the list appended as Exhibit E to the Affidavit of 
Counsel in Support of Renewed Motion to Exclude Plaintiff's Expert Witness Jay N. 
Schapira, M.D., filed contemporaneously herewith. 
Omitted from the list of cases provided were four cases in which Jay N. 
Schapira, M.D. has provided deposition testimony over the requested period. See 
A ffidavit, supra. Three of those cases were accessible by an internet search, and an 
additional case was secured by defense counsel dependently, and involves trial 
testimony in the year 2008. Id. 
Importantly, in the matter of Bond v. United States, Dr. Schapira omitted 
a case in which U.S. District Judge Jones discussed Dr. Schapira's extensive 
testimonial history: 
Dr. Schapira also is a very experienced medicaillegal expert 
witness who charges $ 10,000 per day and who has 
testified at trial more than 100 times in his career; at least 
20 times between 2000 and 2005. In 2005, he testified in 
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depositions as many as 42 times, approximately 70 percent 
of the time of the plaintiff in the litigation. 
Without doubt, Dr. Schapira is a highly qualified and highly 
paid non-treating expert. Thus, the court expected him to 
be extremely careful in presenting his testimony in his Rule 
26 report, his pretrial deposition, and during the trial of the 
case. 
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19881, *12 - *13. 
141 008/010 
The judge in Bond went on to describe Dr. Schapira's trial testimony in 
that court trial, including Dr. Schapira's opinions on his examination of a heart patient. 
'd., * 14. Judge Jones noted that Dr. Schapira had failed to be fully candid with the 
court with respect to the significance of certain data stating: "Dr. Schapira's failure to 
fully inform the court of the significance of all of the data acquired during Bond's 
admission to the VAMC does little to bolster his credibility." 'd. Judge Jones further 
pointed out that "another problem with Dr. Schapira's testimony is that he bases his 
conclusions that Bond's proximal LAD stenosis was 80 percent on the findings made 
by the VA pathologist, and he now claims his earlier estimate at 70 percent in his Rule 
26 report to the court was a typographical error." 'd. Finally, Judge Jones stated: 
Regarding the issue of Bond's life expectancy, I note that 
Dr. Schapira testified that he simply took 10 years of 
Bond's normal life expectancy because of Bond's 
documented use of cigarettes and alcohol. Without citing 
to any epidemiological study or other research to support it, 
Dr. Schapira's opinion amounts to nothing more than a non-
educated guess plucked out of thin air, and thus fails the 
Daubert screening. An expert's willingness to gratuitously 
guess and express an opinion with non scientific basis as to 
one subject, casts doubt on the reliability of his other 
opinions. 
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Id., *30. 
In the matter of Panayiotou v. Johnson, also omitted, an Alabama 
Supreme Court case, the Alabama Supreme Court discussed whether or not it should 
apply the "sham affidavit doctrine" to an affidavit of Dr. Schapira to prevent the direct 
contradiction of his deposition testimony. Id., 995 So. 2d 871, 879 (Ala. 2008). 
Despite Dr. Schapira's extensive testimonial history from 2002 through 
2007, only five cases are cited to from 2008. He omitted at least the trial testimony 
in Blaha v. Ganem, M.D. See Affidavit, supra. 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff has now violated an Order of this Court. This list supplied is 
obviously incomplete. There is no way to know whether any list could ever be 
complete. There is no way to know whether we could ever trust this witness. 
Plaintiff's failures to comply have made it impossible for Defendants to prepare for this 
witness and have cast in doubt the reliability of a witness who has not provided a 
complete testimonial history. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants respectfully move this Court under Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure 26 and 37, and under this Court's gate-keeping function in the Rules of 
Evidence 702, for an Order excluding this witness. 
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DATED this \) iay of March, 2009. 
QUANESf~ 
By , 
Matthew F. McColl, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SEf\VICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thisdi+day of March, 2009, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED 
MOTION TO EXCLUDE PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WITNESS JAY N. SCHAPIRA, M.D. by 
delivering the same to each of the following, by the method indicated below, 
addressed as follows: 
Lowell N. Hawkes 
Ryan S. Lewis 
Lowell N. Hawkes, Chartered 
1322 East Center 
Pocatello, Idaho 
[J U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[] Hand-Delivered 
[] Overnight Mail 
[Xl Facsimile 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
MARVIN F. MORGAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL ALEXANDER DEMOS, M.D.; 
JOHN D. CHAMBERS, JR. M.D.; AND 
IDAHO HEART INSTITUTE P.C., 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
: 55. 
County of ADA ) 
Case No. CV-06-4332 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN 
SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION 
TO EXCLUDE PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT 
WITNESS JAY N. SCHAP/RA, M.D. 
Comes now Matthew F. McColl, having been first duly sworn upon oath 
and depose and says: 
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1 . I am an attorney with the law firm Quane Smith LLP, counsel of 
record for Defendants Chambers, Demos and the Idaho Heart Institute. The 
information and facts specified herein are based upon your Affiant's own first-hand 
and personal knowledge. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of a 
Supreme Court of Alabama published decision: Panayiotou, M.D. v. Johnson, 995 S. 
2d 871 (Ala. 2008). 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of Bond v. 
U.S., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19881 (Ore. 2008). 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of Potts v. 
Radioshack, 2006 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6504 (Ct. App. Cal. 4th App. 2006). 
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit 0 is what your Affiant believes to be a 
true and correct copy of the direct examination of Jay Schapira, M.D. in the matter of 
Blaha v. Ganem conducted on April 15, 2008 in the Superior Court of the State of 
Arizona in and for the County of Maricopa. 
6. The above-referenced exhibjts are not contained on the list provided 
by counsel for Plaintiff, which list was received by fax in my office 35 minutes after 
the hearing which took place yesterday afternoon. 
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FURTHER your Affiant saith naught. 
Matthew F. McColl 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 25 th day of March, 2009. 
~Qf,d~tfut~ 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
Commission expires 1 2/1 2/14 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this __ day of March, 2009, I served a true 
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Lowell N. Hawkes 
Ryan S. Lewis 
Lowell N. Hawkes, Chartered 
1322 East Center 
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OPINION 
[*872) STUART,lustice. 
Dr. Hercules Panayiotou appeals the order of the 
Mobile Circuit Court denying his motion for a summary 
judgment in the medical-malpractice action filed against 
him by Jamie Sullivan Johnson, as administratrix of the 
estate of Mae Sullivan, deceased. We reverse and re-
mand . 
l. 
On March 7, 2002, Dr. Panayiotou performed a 
heart-catheterization procedure on Mae Sullivan at the 
Mobile Infirmary Medical Center. During the course of 
the procedure, a coronary artery ruptured. Emergency 
coronary artery bypass surgery was performed; however, 
Sullivan died on March 9, 2002. 
On March 8, 2004, Johnson sued Dr. Panayiotou, 
Mobile Infirmary Medical Center, and Dr. Panayiotou's 
medical practice, [MC Diagnostic & Medical Clinic, 
PC., in the Mobile Circuit Court, alleging medical mal-
practice. 'an May 1),2007, Dr. Panayiotou moved for a 
slim mary judgment arguing that Johnson could not estab-
lish, by substantial evidence, that he had breached the 
appropriate standard of ("'*2] care during his treatment 
of Sullivan. Specifically, Dr. Panayiotou argued that be-
cause 10h_nson's action was governed by the Alabama 
Medical Liability Act, § 6-5-540 et seq. , Ala . Code 1975 
("the AMLA"), Johnson was required to present expert 
testimony from a "similarly situated health care pro-
vider" to establish a breach of the standard of care . See 
Holcomb v. Carraway, 945 So. 2d 1009, 10 12 (Ala. 
2006) (stating that a plaintiff ordinarily must present 
expert testimony to establish that a defendant health-care 
provider failed to meel the standard of care; however, 
"such expert testimony is allowed only from a 'similarly 
situated health care provider"') . Dr. Panayiotoll further 
argued that the only expert witness identified by John-
son, Dr. Jay N. Schapira, was not a "similarly situated 
health care provider" as that term [*873J is detined in § 
6-5-548(c) because, he says, while Dr. Panayiotou was 
certified by the American Board of Internal Medicine 
("AB 1M") in internal medicine, cardiovascular disease, 
and interventional cardiology, Dr. Schapira was certified 
by ABIM in only internal medicine and cardiovascular 
disease. 1 Therefore, Dr. Panayiotou argued, because it 
was undisputed that he was [**3] practicing interven-
tional cardiology when he performed the heart-
catheterization procedure on Sullivan, Dr. Schapira was 
not a similarly situated health-care provider eligible to 
provide expert testimony regarding the standard of care. 
In conjunction with his motion for a summary judgment, 
Dr. Panayiotou submitted an excerpt of his own deposi-
tion in which he stated that he received his "interven-
tional cardiology certification the first time [the examina-
tion) was ever given in 1999" and a copy of his curricu-
lum vitae showing, under a head ing listing the examina-
tions he had passed: 
"ABIM: Intemal Medicine, 25 September 1991 
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"ABIM: Cardiovascular Subspecialty, November 
1993 
"ABIM: lnterventional Cardiology, November 
1999." 
Mobile Infirmary Medical Center and IMC 
Diagnostic & Medical Clinic, P.c., were later 
dismissed from the case. 
2 Section 6-5-548(c) provides: 
"(c) Notwithstanding any provi-
sion of the Alabama Rules of Evi-
dence to the contrary, if the health 
care provider whose breach of the 
standard of care is claimed to have 
created the cause of action is certi-
fied by an appropriate American 
board as a special ist, is trained and 
experienced in a medical specialty, 
and holds himself or herself (**4] 
out as a specialist, a 'similarly 
situated health care provider' is 
one who meets all of the follOWing 
requirements: 
"( I) Is licensed 
by the appropriate 
regulatory board or 
agency of this or 
some other state. 
"(2) Is trained 
and experienced in 
the same specialty. 
"(3) [s certified 
by an appropriate 
American board in 
the same specialty. 
"(4) Has prac-
ticed in this spe-
cialty during the 
year preceding the 
date that the alleged 
breach of the stan-
dard of care oc-
curred." 
(Emphasis added.) 
On June 14,2007, Johnson filed her response to Dr. 
Panayiotou's summary-judgment motion, arguing that § 
6-5-548(c) requires only that an expert witness be certi-
fied in the same "specialty" as the defendant to be con-
sidered a similarly situated health-care provider and that 
Dr. Panayiotou and Dr. Schapira are in fact both certified 
in the same specialty .- internal medicine. Cardiovascu-
lar disease, she argues, is actually a "subspecialty" of 
internal medicine, and interventional cardiology is, at 
best, she argues, another "subspecialty" of internal medi-
cine. However, she argues, interventional cardiology is 
more properly viewed as a subspecialty of cardiovascular 
disease and thus a "sub-subspecialty" of inlernal l ++ 5] 
medicine, 
Johnson also argued that, although Dr. PanayioloLl 
held an ABIM-issued "certificate of added qualification" 
in interventional cardiology at the time he performed the 
heart catheterization on Sullivan, ABIM did not formally 
recognize interventional cardiology as a subspecialty of 
cardiovascular disease until July 2006. In support of her 
argument, she submitted printed copies of pages from the 
Web sites of both ABIM and the American Board of 
Medical Specialties ("ABMS") indicating that, on July 
14,2006, ABlM, in an attempt to standardize the way it 
recognized subspecialties, announced that it now recog-
nized all certificates of added qualifications as subspe-
cialties of internal medicine. 1 Johnson [·874] also 
submitted an affidavit from Dr. Schapira in which he 
stated that 
"Dr. Panayiotou was not board certified 
in the specialty or subspecia Ity of inter-
ventional cardiology at the time of the in-
cident made the basis of this suit (March 
9, 2002), but rather had a 'certificate of 
added qualification' that was not recog-
nized as either a specialty or a subspe-
cialty by [ABMSJ , .. until July of 2006 
when [ABIMJ reclassified the 'certificate 
of added qualification' in inlerventional 
cardiology [**61 as a subspecialty of car-
diology." 
Finally, Johnson also submitted a copy of Dr. Panay-
iotou's curriculum vitae and noted that it specifically 
designated the examination he passed in November 1993 
as being for the "Cardiovascular Subspecialty" (emphasis 
added), but the November 1999 examination was merely 
listed as being for "interventional cardiology" with any 
description of that practice as a subspecialty conspiCU-
ously absent. ~ 
3 ABMS is an umbrella organization that over-
sees 24 specialty boards, including ABIM, and 
establishes standards for specialty certification. 
The other boards governed by ABMS include the 
American Board of Allergy & Immunology, the 
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American Board of Anesthesiology, the Ameri-
can Board of Colon & Rectal Surgery, the 
American Board of Dermatology, the American 
Board of Emergency Medicine, the American 
Board of Family Medicine, the American Board 
of Medical Genetics, the American Board of 
Neurological Surgery, the American Board of 
Nuclear Medicine, the American Board of Ob-
stetrics & Gynecology, the American Board of 
Ophthalmology, the American Board of Ortho-
paedic Surgery, the American Board of Otolaryn-
gology, the American Board of Pathology, the 
American Board of [**7] Pediatrics, the Ameri-
can Board of Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation, 
the American Board of Plastic Surgery, the 
American Board of Preventive Medicine, the 
American Board of Psychiatry & Neurology, the 
American Board of Radiology, the American 
Board of Surgery, the American Board of Tho-
racic Surgery, and the American Board of Urol-
ogy. 
4 In court filings contained in the supplemental 
record, Johnson indicated that, at a June 19,2007, 
hearing on Dr. Panayiotou's summary-judgment 
motion, she also proffered as evidence a printed 
copy of e-mail correspondence her counsel had 
engaged in with Joan Otto, senior credentials 
manager for ABrM, on the topic of certificates of 
added qualifications and subspecialties. However, 
she acknowledged in her motion to supplement 
the record that the trial court rejected the proffer 
as not being in the proper form, apparently be-
cause it was unauthenticated. 
After receiving Johnson's motion opposing his 
summary-judgment motion, Dr. Panayiotou filed, on 
June 18, 2007, a motion asking the trial court to strike 
Dr. Schapira's affidavit on the ground that it contradicted 
his previous sworn testimony. 5 See Wilson v. Teng. 786 
So. 2d 485, 497 (Ala. 2000) ("This Court [H8] has held 
that 'a party is not allowed to directly contradict prior 
sworn testimony to avoid the entry of a summary judg-
ment.'" (quoting Continental Eagle Corp. v. Mokrzycki, 
611 So. 2d 313, 317 (Ala. 1992»). The next day, June 
19,2007, Dr. Panayiotou filed another motion asking the 
tria I court also to strike the printed copies of pages taken 
from ABMS and ABlM's respective Web sites on the 
ground that the documents were unsworn, uncerti fled, 
unauthenticated, and, therefore, inadmissible. See Carter 
v. Cantrell Mach. Co., 662 So. 2d 891, 893 (Ala. 1995) 
("The documents were not properly authenticated and, 
thus, they were inadmissible hearsay, which cannot be 
relied on to defeat a properly supported motion for a 
summary judgment. "). Dr. Panayiotou simultaneously 
submitted a personal affidavit in which he made the fol-
lowing statements: 
"2. I am a physician duly licensed to 
practice medicine in the State of Alabama 
and was so licensed at the relevant times. 
1 am certified by [ABIMJ as a specialist in 
Internal Medicine, Cardiology ["875] 
and Interventional Cardiology and was so 
certified at the relevant times, 
"3. [ABIMJ formally recognized cer-
tification in the subspecialty of Interven-
tional Cardiology [**9) in 1999. In 1999, 
as part of the certification process in 
Interventional Cardiology, I submitted 
verified data to the Board stating that I 
had successfully accomplished the appro-
priate number of interventional cardiology 
procedures to enable me to take the ex-
amination for certification in lnterven-
tional Cardiology. 
"4. As a result of passing this exami-
nation, (ABIMJ certified me as a special-
ist in the subspecialty of Interventional 
Cardiology. 
"5. By meeting the certification re-
quirements of [ABIMJ, beginning in 1999 
I was allowed to represent to the public 
that I am board-certified in the subspe-
cialty of Interventiona I Cardiology." 
On June 21, 2007, Dr. Panayiotou submitted two addi-
tional affidavits. In the first, ABIM official Joan Otto 
swore that "[ABIM] recognized certification in Interven-
tional Cardiology in \999" and that "Dr. Panayiotou was 
certified by [ABIM] in I nterventional Cardiology in 
1999." In the second, Amy A, Mosser, vice president of 
administration and operations for ABMS, swore as fol-
lows: 
"5. ABMS approved the certification 
process for Interventional Cardiology in 
J 996 and began recognizing certification 
in this subspecialty in 1999, when the first 
certifying examination [h J OJ was of-
fered by the ABIM. 
"6. ABIM, like other Member 
Boards, originally designated ils board 
certification for subspecialties as a 'cer-
tificate of added qualifications.' This was 
in conformity with general ABMS prac-
tice at that time. Subsequently, ABMS 
decided to transition away from such lan-
guage. The ABMS Bylaws in effect in 
2002 required future applications for sub-
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specialty certificates to be designated as 
subspecialty certificates, but gave the 
Member Boards discretion to continue 
designating existing subspecialty certifi-
cates as certificates of added qualifica-
tions or special qualifications or to dis-
continue those terms and simply use the 
subspecialty designation. These differ-
ences in terminology are just that, how-
ever, and have no substantive effect on 
ABMS's recognition of certification. 
ABMS has continually recognized ABIM 
certification in the subspecialty of Inter-
ventional Cardiology since its inception in 
1999." 
5 During his deposition, Dr. Schapira testified 
that interventional c<udiology had been a subspe-
cialty of internal medicine "[s]ince 1999 or 2000" 
and that the interventional cardiology board 
"started in 1999,2000." 
On August 15, 2007, the trial court denied Dr. 
Panayiotou's [**11] motion for a summary judgment, 
holding that Dr. Schapira was a similarly situated health-
care provider "regardless of [his] lack of sub-
subspecialty certification" and without addressing 
whether Dr. Panayiotou was actually certified as a spe-
cialist in interventional cardiology in March 2002 when 
he performed the heart catheterization on Sullivan. The 
tfial court simultaneously entered an order granting Dr. 
Panayiotou's "motion to strike" without specifying 
whether it intended to grant the June 18 motion to strike, 
the June 19 motion to strike, Of both. 
Dr. Panayiotou subsequently moved the trial court to 
certify its order denying his motion for a summary judg-
ment for a permissive appeal pursuant to Rule 5, Ala. R. 
App. P., and, on September 7, 2007, the trial court did 
so. On September 21, 2007, Dr. Panayiotou petitioned 
this Court for permission to appeal. We granted that peti-
tion on November 1,2007. 
II. 
"'We apply the same standard of review 
[in reviewing the grant or denial [*876] 
of a summary-judgment motion] as the 
trial court applied. Specifically, we must 
determine whether the movant has made a 
prima facie showing that no genuine issue 
of material fact exists and that the movant 
is entitled IHI2] to a judgment as a mat-
ter of law. Rule 56 (c), Ala. R. Civ. P; 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield 0/ Alabama v. 
Hodurski. 899 So. 2d 949, 952-53 (Ala 
2004). In making such a determination, 
we must review the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the nonmovanl. Wilson 
v. Brown, 496 So. 2d 756, 758 (Ala. 
1986). Once the movant makes a prima 
facie showing that there is no genuine is-
sue of material fact, the burden then shi fis 
to the nonmovant to produce "substantial 
evidence" as to the existence of a genuine 
issue of material fact. Bass v. SoUlhTrus( 
Bank 0/ Baldwin County, 538 So. 2d 794, 
797-98 (Ala. 1989); Ala. Code 1975, § 
12-21-12.'" 
Mutual Assurance, Inc. v. Schulte. 970 So. 2d 292, 295 
(Ala. 2007) (quoting Dow v. Alabama Democratic Parly. 
897 So. 2d 1035, 1038-39 (Ala. 2004». 
II I. 
This appeal presents two issue for this Court to con-
sider: (I) what is the meaning of the term "specially" as 
used in § 6-5-548(c); and (2) was Dr. Panayiolou certi-
fied by ABIM as a specialist in interventional cardiology 
at the time he allegedly breached the standard of care in 
March 2002. 
The legislature has defined a similarly situated 
health-care provider as a health-care provider that is 
"certified by an [H13] appropriate American board in 
the same specialty" as the defendant health-care pro-
vider. 6 § 6-5-548(c)(3) (emphasis added). Dr. Panay-
iotou argues that a "specialty" for the purposes of § 6-S-
548(c) is any specialized area of medicine in which a 
medical board offers certification and that, because 
ABIM offers certification in interventional cardiology, 
that area is therefore a "specialty" for purposes of § 6-5-
548. Johnson, however, argues that an area of medicine 
is a "specialty" only if it is specifically designated by a 
medical board as a "specialty"; hence, she argues, be-
cause ABIM officially designates interventional cardiol-
ogy as a "subspecialty," il is nol a "specialty" for § 6-5-
548 purposes. 
6 This presupposes that the defendant health-
care provider is certified by an appropriate board 
as a specialist; if not, § 6-5-S48(b) governs in-
stead of § 6-5-S48(c), and there is no such re-
quirement. 
We agree with Dr. Panayiotou that a specialty is any 
specialized area of medicine in which an American 
medical board offers certification. There is no indication 
in the AMLA that the legislature intended to define the 
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term "specialty" based upon the taxonomic scheme used 
by ABTM, ABMS, or any [**14] other professional 
medical board. 7 That any appropriate American medical 
board offers certification in an area of medicine is itself 
evidence that that area of medicine is a specialty. 
7 Eighteen of the specialty boards govemed by 
ABMS, including ABIM, offer certification in 
specialized areas of medicine that they officially 
designate as "subspecialties." 
The interpretation of the term "specialty" advocated 
by Johnson, if adopted, would be problematic in its ap-
plication because it fails to recognize that some areas of 
medicine may technically be deemed "subspecialties" by 
some boards, but recognized as specialties by others. For 
examp Ie, in Chapman v. Smith, 893 So. 2d 293 (Ala. 
2004), this Court recognized that the defendant anesthe-
siologist was certified in the specialty field of pain man-
agement by the American Academy of Pain Management 
("AAPM"), a non-ABMS board.' (*877] ABMS does 
not recognize pain management as a "specialty" under its 
taxonomic scheme; however, the relevant ABMS board, 
the American Board of Anesthesiology, does recognize 
"pain medicine" as a "subspecialty." Thus, applying the 
argument advanced by Johnson, whether a board-
certified anesthesiologist practicing in the [** J 5] pain-
management/pain-medicine field was a specialist in that 
field would hinge on whether the anesthesiologist's cer-
tificate was issued by AAPM, in which case he would be 
recognized by our courts as a specialist, or by the Ameri-
can Board of Anesthesiology, in which case he would 
not be recognized as a specialist -- even though both 
boards apparently agree that the field is a unique area of 
medicine and recognize it as such. The only difference is 
that the field is deemed a "subspecialty" in the ABMS 
hierarchy. Whether an area of medicine is a "specialty" 
for purposes of § 6-5-548 should not change depending 
on which board has certi fied the particular health-care 
provider in that specialty. 
8 The defendant physician in Chapman was also 
board-certified in anesthesiology, although the 
opinion does not identify the board that issued 
that certification. 893 So. 2d at 296. 
Moreover, if we were to adopt Johnson's argument 
relying on the taxonomic designations used by ABiM 
and ABMS, it would pave the way for a gastroenterolo-
gist, an endocrinologist, or a nephrologist, all of whom 
practice in an area recognized as a "subspecialty" by 
ABIM, to testify as a similarly situated health-care pro-
vider [""'J6] against a cardiologist merely because they 
were all certified by ABIM in the "specialty" of internal 
medicine -- regardless of the fact that their expertise is in 
the digestive system, the endocrine system, and the kid-
neys, respectiveJy, and that they might have had minimal 
experience with medical issues related to the heart. This 
is precisely the situation § 6-5-548 was enacted to pre-
vent. Thus, we now explicitly hold that if an appropriate 
American medical board recognizes an area of med icine 
as a distinct field and certifies health-care providers in 
that field, that area is a specialty for purposes of § 6-5-
548. 
We note that the Supreme Court of Michigan 
reached a similar conclusion when it considered th is is-
sue. In Woodard v. Custer, 476 Mich. 545,719 N.W.2d 
842 (2006), that court considered the definition of "spe-
cialty" as the term is used in Mich. Compo Laws § 
600.2169, which states, in relevant part: 
"( I) In an action alleging medical mal-
practice, a person shall not give expert 
testimony on the appropriate standard of 
practice or care unless the person is li-
censed as a health professional in this 
state or another state and meets the fol-
lowing criteria: 
"(a) If the party against [""" 17] whom 
or on whose behal f the testimony is of-
fered is a specialist, specializes at the time 
of the occurrence that is the basis for the 
action in the same specialty as the party 
against whom or on whose behalf the tes-
timony is offered. However, if the party 
against whom or on whose behalf the tes-
timony is offered is a specialist who is 
board certified, the expert witness must be 
a specialist who is board certified in that 
specialty." 
Referring to Dorland's !tIustrated Medical Dictionary 
(28th ed.), the Woodard court concluded: 
"[AJ 'specialty' is a particular branch of 
medicine or surgery in which one can po-
tentially become board certified. 
" ... Moreover, 'sub' is defined as 'a 
prefix ... with the meanings "under," "be-
low," "beneath" "secondary," "at 
["878] a lower point in a hierarchy[.}''' 
Random House Webster's College Dic-
tionary (1997). Therefore, a 'subspecialty' 
is a particular branch of medicine or SUT-
gery in which one can potentially become 
board certified that falls under a specialty 
or within the hierarchy of that specialty. A 
subspecialty, although a more particular-
ized specialty, is nevertheless a specialty 
Therefore, if a defendant physician spe-
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cializes in a subspecialty, the plaintiffs 
[** 18] expert witness must have special-
ized in the same subspecialty as the de-
fendant physician at [he time of the occur-
rence (hat is the basis for the action. " 
476 Mich, at 561-62, 719 N.W,2d at 851 (emphasis 
added). The court also noted in a footnote that ABMS 
had filed an amicus curiae brief in which it agreed that a 
sUbspecialty constitutes a specialty, 476 Mich. at 562 
n,6, 719N,W.2dat851 n,6. 
Having held that interventional cardiology is a rec-
ognized specialty. we must now address whether in fact 
Dr. Panayiotou was certified in that specialty at the time 
of the a Ileged breach of the standard of care. Dr. Panay-
iotou alleges that he was; Johnson alleges he was noL In 
conjunction with his motion for a summary judgment. 
Dr. Panayiotou submitted evidence, summarized above, 
sufficient to make a prima facie showing that he was 
board-certified in interventional cardiology at the time of 
the alleged breach of the standard of care in March 2002; 
thus, the burden then shifted to Johnson to produce sub-
stantial evidence showing that Dr, Panayiotou was not 
board-certified in interventional cardiology in March 
2002. Johnson has failed to meet that burden. 
The evidence Johnson submitted in an attempt 
[H 19] to meet her burden included: (I) printed copies of 
pages from the Web sites of both ABIM and ABMS; (2) 
an affidavit from Dr. Schapira; and (3) Dr, Panayiotou's 
curriculum vitae. • Dr. Panayiotou filed separate motions 
to strike both the printed copies of the pages from the 
Web sites and Dr. Schapira's affidavit, and the tfial court 
subsequently entered an order granting a motion to strike 
without stating which motion to strike it was granting. 
Dr. Panayiotou's position is that the trial court's order 
granted both motions to strike, while Johnson alleges it is 
unc lear what O1olion or motions the trial court intended 
to strike, Regardless of the trial court's intent, however, 
the evidence submitted by Johnson was insufficient to 
rebut Dr. Panayiotou's prima facie showing that he was 
board-certified in interventional cardiology at the time he 
allegedly breached the standard of care in March 2002, 
9 After the trial court denied Dr. Panayiotou's 
motion for a summary judgment and after we 
granted his subsequent petition to fi Ie an immedi-
ate permissive appeal of that ruling, Johnson ob-
tained a new affidavit from ABIM official Joan 
Ono and moved the trial court to supplement the 
record to include [**20] that affidavit. Dr. 
Panayiotou objected, arguing that Rule 1 OCt), Ala, 
R. App, P., does not allow the record on appe al to 
be supplemented to include evidence that was not 
in the record at the trial court level. The trial 
court nevertheless granted Johnson's motion to 
supplement, and the new affidavit was added to 
the record. DL Panayiotou has since moved this 
Court to strike the supplement to the record, and 
that motion has been granted. See Cowen v, MS 
Enters" Inc" 642 So. 2d 453, 455 (Ala, J 994) 
("Rule IOU) provides for the supplementation of 
the record only to include matters that were in 
evidence in the trial court. That rule was not in-
tended to allow the inclusion of material in the 
record on appeal that had not been before the trial 
court."), 
We first note that the printed copies of pages from 
the ABIM and ABMS Web sites submittcd by Johnson 
"were not [*879J properly authenticated and, thus, thcy 
were inadmissible hearsay, which cannot be relied 011 10 
defeat a properly supported motion for a summary j udg-
ment." Carfer, 662 So. 2d at 893, Accordingly, we will 
not consider that evidence on appeal, regardless of 
whether the trial court actually struck it. See Chatham v. 
CSX Transp., Inc" 613 So. 2d 341,346 (Ala. 1993) 
[*"21] (stating that this Court "may not consider" inad-
missible evidence that a party properly moved to strike) 
Citing Wilson, supra, Dr, Panayiotou also urges us not to 
consider Dr. Schapira's affidavit, which directly contra-
dicted his deposition testimony. However, the so-called 
"sham affidavit doctrine" applied by this Court in Wi/-
son, which prevents an individual from contradicting 
prior sworn testimony to avoid the entry of a summary 
judgment, has, to date, been applied only against actual 
parties in Alabama, and Dr. Schapira is an expert wit-
ness, not a party, See Champ Lyons, Jr. & Ally W, How-
ell, Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure Annotated § 56,7 
(4th ed. 2004) ("Strong dictum in Tittle v, Alabama 
Power Co" 570 So, 2d 60 I (Ala, 1990) suggests that the 
rule preventing a party from contradicting an earlier 
deposition by affidavit for purposes of avoidance or (he 
entry of summary judgment does not apply to prevent 
such activity when the deponent is a non-paliy,"). While 
one law review article has noted that other courts to con-
sider the issue have "generally agreed that [the sham-
affidavit doctrine] applies to the contradictory testimony 
of expert witnesses," Applying the Sham Affidavit [* ;022] 
Doc/rine in Arizona, 38 Ariz, SL LJ. 995, 1048 (Winter 
2006) (footnotes omitted), and one court has noted that 
"[itJ can think of no reason, however, not to apply this 
rule to the present case involving the testimony and affi-
davit of the plaintiffs sole expert witness," A delman-
Tremblay v, Jewel Cos, 859 F.2d 517, 521 (7th CiL 
1988), we need not address that issue at this time be-
cause, even if we considered the affidavit, we would 
have to conclude that Johnson failed to create a genuine 
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issue of fact regarding whether Dr. Panayiotou was 
board-certified in interventional cardiology in March 
2002. 
In his affidavit, Dr. Schapira declared that Dr. 
Panayiotou was not board certified in interventional car-
diology in March 2002 because, at that time, Dr. Panay-
iotou held only a "certificate of added qualification." 
Johnson argues that Dr. Schapira's statement is further 
supported by Dr. Panayiotou's own curriculum vitae, 
which omits the word "subspecialty" next to "'nterven-
tiona I Cardiology" in the list of examinations passed by 
Dr. Panayiotou, but explicitly lists "Cardiovascular Sub-
specialty" (emphasis added) in that same list, thus indi-
cating, Johnson argues, that even Dr. Panayiotou [**23] 
recognized that interventional cardiology was not a "sub-
specialty" in 1999 when he passed the examination. 
However, Johnson's argument was directly refuted 
by an ABMS official, who, in an affidavit submitted by 
Dr. Panayiotou, explained that there was no substantive 
difference between a certificate of added qualification 
and certification in a subspecialty, and that" ABMS has 
continually recognized ABIM certification in the subspe-
cialty of Interventional Cardiology since its inception in 
J999." In light of this definitive evidence on this point, 
we can say as a matter of law that the certificate of added 
qualification Dr. Panayiotou held in interventional cardi-
ology in March 2002 was the equivalent of subspecialty 
certification and that he was accordingly a board-
certified specialist in interventional cardiology at that 
time. 
We further note that the Michigan Supreme Court, 
in Woodard, did not have to directly consider this issue; 
however, a concurring Justice nevertheless did so and 
similarly concluded that there was no functional [*880] 
difference between a certificate of added qualification 
and board certification, stating: 
"As we did above with regard to the 
'specialty' versus 'subspecialty' [* *24) 
dispute, it is again necessary for us to re-
solve a question that arises in most cases 
as a result of nomenclature often used to 
distinguish between certifications offered 
for broad specialty areas and certifications 
offered for the narrower subspecialty ar-
eas. Specifically. certifications coinciding 
with the broader specialty areas are often 
referred to by p3l1ies and in case law as 
board certifications. while certifications 
coinciding with the narrower specialty ar-
eas are referred to as 'certificates of spe-
cial qualifications' or 'certificates of added 
qualifications,' The result is that in many 
cases, such as Woodard, plaintiffs will ar-
gue that certificates of special qualifica-
tions are not board cel1ifications that need 
to be matched. We c{arifY. however, that 
under (he above definition 0/ the phrase 
'board certified,' any difference between 
what are traditionally referred (0 as 
board certificatiOns and what have com-
monly been called certificates 0/ special 
qualifications is merely one 0/ semantics. 
When a certificate of special qualifica-
tions is a credential bestowed by a na-
tional, independent medical board indicat-
ing proficiency in a medical specialty, it is 
itself a board certification ["*25j thaI 
must be matched" 
476 Mich. 545, 613, 719 N.W.2d 842, 878 (Taylor, CJ., 
concurring in the result) (emphasis added). 
V. 
Dr. Panayiotou moved the trial court to enter a 
summary judgment in his favor in the medical-
malpractice action filed against him by Johnson, alleging 
that she had failed to identify a similarly situated health· 
care provider who would testify that he had breached the 
standard of care in his treatment of Sullivan. The trial 
court denied his motion, holding that the expert identi-
fied by Johnson, Dr. Schapira, was in fact similarly situ-
ated to Dr. Panayiotou because they were both board-
certified by ABIM in internal medicine. However, be-
cause Dr. Panayiotou put forth evidence indicating that 
he was also board-certified by ABIM in interventional 
cardiology when the alleged malpractice occurred and 
that Dr. Schapira did not hold that certification, the trial 
court erred in holding that Dr. Panayiotou and Dr. 
Schapira were similarly situated health-care providers. 
Accordingly, the order of lhe trial court denying Dr. 
Panayiotou's motion for a summary judgment is re-
versed, and this cause is remanded for the trial court to 
enter a summary judgment for Dr. Panayiotou. 
REVERSED [**26) AND REMANDED 
See, Lyons, Woodall, Smith, Bolin, and Parker, JJ., 
concur. 
Cobb, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
Murdock, J., dissents. 
CONCUR BY: COBB (In Part) 
DISSENT BY: COBB (In Part) 
DISSENT 
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COBB, Chief Justice (concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part). 
The majority opinion presents a new rationale for 
defining the term "specialty" as applied to similarly situ-
ated health-care providers under Ala. Code 1975, § 6-5-
548. Although J do not disagree with this rationale and I 
concur in its adoption, I do not believe that it is appropri-
ate to apply it to this case. In this case, and under the 
state of the lawaI the time the trial court found that Dr. 
Panayiotou and Dr. Schapira were similarly situated 
health-care providers, the trial court was correct. The 
record shows that, in the context of the medical proce-
dur: in question, Dr. Schapira [·881) had experience 
similar to or greater than Dr. Panayiotou. Under these 
circumstances, I believe that it would be more just to 
apply t,he. new constr.uction of § 6-5-548 as adopted by 
the majority prospectively, rather than retroactively. Sec, 
e.g., Ex parte FP" 857 So, 2d 125 (Ala. 2003); Cily oj 
Daphne v. City oj Spanish Fort, 853 So. 2d 933 (Ala. 
2003); and Ex parte Bonner, 676 So. 2d 925 (Ala, 
1995)(cases [**27] supporting the general rule that stat-
u,tes should be construed prospectively and not retrospcc-
tlvel~ In the absence of a particular indication of legisla-
tive mtent to apply statute retrospeetively). 
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OPINION BY: ROBERT E. JONES 
OPINION 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LA W 
JONES, Judge: 
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff Pamela L. Bond, the widow of Craig R. 
Bond, deceased, and the personal representative of his 
estate, brings this Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") 
action pursuant to 28 U.S .c. §§ 1346(b) and 2674, 
against the United States of America ("defendant") to 
recover damages for medical malpractice reSUlting from 
the negligent treatment, wrongful acts, and omissions of 
employees at the Portland Veterans Administration 
Medical Center ("VAMC"). Complaint (# I) at 2-3. Spe-
cifically, plaintiff alleges that defendant was negligent 
for failing to properly and timely diagnose Bond's car-
diac condition; failing to provide him with appropriate 
specialty surgical intervention; failing to conduct medi-
cally necessary testing prior to his discharge; and [*2J 
for improperly discharging him before his dangerous, 
life-threatening cardiac condition was properly stabi-
lized . See id. at 6 . As a result, plaintiff claims that Bond, 
who was 55 years old, suffered an untimely death from 
his cardiac condition on September 26, 2005, approxi-
mately 48 hours after he was discharged from the 
VAMC. 
Pursuant to the PTCA, plaintiffs medical malprac-
tice claim was tried to the court, without a jury. The ap-
plicable substantive law in this FTCA case is that of the 
State of Oregon, where plaintiffs alleged injuries oc-
curred. See 28 U.S.C . §§ 1346(b)(I) and 2672. In Ore-
gon, wrongful death actions are authorized under O .R.S. 
§ 30.020, and the standard of care is set forth in O. R.S. § 
677.095(1), as follows : "A physician licensed Lo 
practice medicine .. . by the Board of Medical Examin-
ers for the State of Oregon has the duty to use that degree 
of care, skill , and diligence that is used by ordinaril y 
careful physicians . .. in the same or similar circum-
stances in the community of the phys ician . . . or a simi-
lar community." 
The four-day trial commenced on February 5, 2008. 
After carefully considering the large volume of medical 
literature submitted by both [·3] parties before, during, 
and after trial , as well as hearing the testimony of sixteen 
expert witnesses regarding the liability and damages is-
sues in this case, the court concludes that the physicians 
who treated Bond at the VAMC from the time of his 
emergency room admission on September 22, 2005, to 
the time of his discharge on September 24, 2005, met the 
standard of care for physicians in the Portland area. ' 
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, defendant 
did not commit medical malpractice. 
At the end of the trial, the court ruled that the 
parties could submit supplemental literature to 
address the following questio n: What percentage 
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of stenosis would call into play a surgical ap-
proach? In particular, the court sought literature 
showing the percentage breakdowns of stenosis 
correlated with life expectancy (mortality). The 
material submitted by plaintiff is listed in Appen-
dix A, and the defendant's submissions are listed 
in Appendix B. 
SUMMARY OF BOND'S MEDICAL HISTORY 
The data contained in Bond's 607-page medical re-
cord is not subject to dispute; though the interpretation of 
several key tests and the course of treatment the V AMC 
doctors chose to address Bond's cardiac condition [*4J 
involve a number of judgment calis, which plaintiff con-
tends were not appropriate. It is undisputed that Bond, 
who was a combat veteran from the Vietnam conflict, 
was permanently disabled from post-traumatic stress 
disorder CHPTSD") and hearing loss. There is evidence in 
the record that Bond smoked a pack a day of unfiltered 
cigarettes for approximately 30 years and had not yet 
managed to quit as of the date of his discharge from the 
hospital. See Exhibit P I at 262; and see id, at 170, 174 
(discussing cessation counseling at discharge). Bond also 
struggled with alcohol abuse; a notation in his medical 
records indicates that he reported regularly consuming a 
12-pack of beer per day for 30 years. See id. However, 
his widow testified that she believed his alcohol use de-
clined significantly the past few years. Bond, who was 
six feet two inches tall and weighed 240 pounds, was 
also borderline obese. 
In spite of the health risk factors associated with his 
lifestyle choices, Bond did not sutTer from any liver dis-
ease or lung disorder. In June of 2005, physician pro-
gress notes show that he was being treated for PTSD; 
depression; upper back, shoulder, and neck pain; hyper-
tension: elevated cholesterol; [*5] and severe gastroe-
sophageal reflux disease (HGERD"). See id. at 264. Addi-
tionally. the 2005 progress notes from his primary care 
physician show that Bond did not report symptoms of a 
serious cardiac ailment before his September admission 
to the V AMC, Exh ibit P I at 246-277, When Bond visited 
the V AMC emergency room for symptoms related to his 
GERD on July 16, 2005, an electrocardiogram (HEKGH), 
which measures the electrical activity of the heart during 
its contractions, showed normal cardiac activity. Id. at 
250,550. 
It is undisputed that when Bond arrived at the 
VAMC emergency room on September 22nd, he was 
suffering from acute coronary syndrome ("ASC") and 
unstable angina as evidenced by his symptoms of severe 
substernal chest pain (reported J 0+ on a scale of 1 to 10), 
shortness of breath, sweating, and nausea. See Exhibit PI 
at 212, 217, 238,517. When questioned later during his 
admission about his history of chest pain, Bond reported 
for the first time that he had been experiencing episodes 
of pain lasting 45 minutes to 5 hours almost daily for the 
past two months; that the pain radiated to his shoulders; 
that it occurred at rest and with exertion; that it was oc-
casionally associated ("6] with nausea; and thal rwo 
days before he had experienced his most severe epi sode, 
which lasted close to 20 hours and was accompanied by 
vomiting and sweating. ld, at 209. 
Each of the seven EKGs taken during Bond's 
VAMC admission showed abnormal readings indicative 
of ischemia, which means that Bond's heart muscle was 
suffering from a lack of oxygenated blood; there was 
also evidence of an older myocardial infarction ("MI") 
that occurred sometime after the July EKG. See id. at 
543-547 (EKG test strips). Further testing revealed that 
Bond had 1313 pglml of brain natriuretic peptide 
("BNPIl) present in his blood, which is abnormally high 
given that the level should have been less than 126 
pglml. ld. at 203, All of the cardiology experts agreed 
that such a high BNP reading indicated that Bond's heart 
muscle suffered some form 0 f stress. However, Bond's 
levels of Troponin, a cardiac enzyme that is present 
when cell damage or death occurs and is an indi cator of a 
recent MI, were negligible-- less than 0.0 I uglL--in a 
series of three tests. See id. at 189-191. Finally, an echo-
cardiogram was performed to determine Bond's ejection 
fraction in the left ventricle. The ejection fraction meas-
ures [*1] the contractions of the heart, and is expressed 
as a percentage of blood that is pushed out with each 
heartbeat; Bond had a reading of 56 percent, which falls 
within the normal range. See Exhibit P I at J 89,509. 
It is undisputed that during the tirst 24 hours or so 
following Bond's admission, the V AMC physicians ap-
propriately treated his cardiac condition with aspirin, 
beta blockers, and ACE inhibitors, as well as intravenous 
nitrates, heparin, and Tirofiban. It also is undisputed that 
the decision to perform a cardiac catheterization and an-
giogram to view the condition of Bond's coronary arter-
ies was appropriate, and that the diagnosis that Bond was 
suffering from coronary artery disease ("CAD") was COT-
rect. Notes in Bond's medical records show that his chest 
pain and other symptoms of cardiac distress disappeared 
during his stay at the V AMC, and the monitoring equip-
ment that he was connected to throughout his admission 
did not register any acute arrhythm ias. See id. at J 72, 
176, 183, 189. On September 23rd, Bond was up and 
walking around without experiencing further chest pain 
or shortness of breath, and he reported that he was feel-
ing well and wanted to go home. ld. at 183, 203. [*8] A 
few hours before he was discharged on September 24th, 
Bond reported that he felt "great," and had "no chest pain 
since admission." Id. at 176. 
03/25/2009 14:45 FAX I4J 016/068 
Page 3 
2008 U.S, Dist LEXIS 19881," 
What remains disputed and therefore must be re-
solved by the court, as the trier of fact, are the following 
issues: 
I. Whether the V AMC doctors mis-read Bond's an-
giogram when they concluded that he had 40 percent 
stenosis (narrowing) in the proximal section of the left 
anterior descending ("LAD") coronary artery; 
2. If the V AMC doctors did mis-read the angiogram, 
whether the stenosis was 80 percent as plaintiff contends, 
and as noted in Bond's autopsy report, or whether the 
stenosis was some other percentage; 
3. Based on my determination of the percentage of 
stenosis present in Bond's proximal LAD, as well as the 
presence of stenosed areas in the LAD and other coro-
nary vessels, whether the standard of care required an 
invasive procedure such as angioplasty, stent placement, 
or bypass surgery before Bond was discharged from the 
V AMC to prevent death from an acute cardiac event 
such as an arrhythmia or infarction; 
4. Whether VAMC doctors committed medical mal-
practice in fai I ing to perform a final EKG, as ordered, 
before Bond was discharged; and 
5. [*9] Whether V AMC doctors' failure to perform 
an exercise tolerance test ("Err") before Bond was dis-
charged constituted medical malpractice. 
The above medical issues were the subject of exten-
sive and con flicting expert testimony throughout the 
four-day trial. Based on my review of the testimony, my 
credibility determinations, and my review of the conflict-
ing medical literature offered by the parties, 1 make the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth below, 
FINDJNGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW 
A. The Angiogram Reading, Percentage of Steno-
sis, and Appropriate Treatment 
The primary divergence between plaintiffs and de-
fendant's expert cardiologists revolves around the analy-
sis of the arteries of Bond's heart; in particular, the 
proximal (upper) segment of the LAD. According to 
plaintiffs expert witness, Dr. Jay Schapira, the LAD is 
one of three arteries running downward from the mouth 
of the aorta at the top of the heart and is functionally 
important because it supplies the largest territory of heart 
muscle. Therefore, any blockage or narrowing that im-
pedes the flow of blood through the LAD, especially if it 
occurs near the origin of the vessel as it did in Bond's 
case. is considered [·10] serious because a large portion 
of the heart muscle could suffer damage. 
Dr. Schapira claimed that a visual inspection of 
Bond's proximal LAD showed a tight lesion, with 70 to 
80 percent stenosis, that he labeled "the widow maker." 
He also identified areas of stenosis further down the 
LAD, as well as in two other coronary arteries, and 
opined that Bond should have been treated surgically 
before he was discharged from the V AMC, prefe rably 
with at least four bypasses, Just before trial, with no no-
tice to the court or opposing counsel, Dr. Schapira per-
formed a quantitative analysis using calipers and mi-
crometer to confirm his visual estimation of 80 percent 
stenosis based on a single frame of the digital angio gram 
"film." See Exhibits P58 and P62. 
In contrast, two of defendant's treating cardiology 
experts, Dr. George Giraud and Dr. Eric Stecker, who 
performed Bond's cardiac catheterization and interpreted 
the angiogram results on September 23,2005, concluded, 
based on their visual examinations, that the same stenosis 
identified in the proximal LAD was only 40 percent. Sec 
Exhibit PI at 509. Because the plaintiffs calibration was 
done without notice to the defense, the court requested 
['" II] that the defense experts perform a similar calibra-
tion, Dr. Giraud performed the same quantitative analysis 
on the same frame of film and testi fied that his meas-
urements confirmed that the lesion had a stenosis of 38 
to 39 percent. Defendant's leading expert witness, non-
treating cardiologist Dr. John McAnulty, performed 
quantitative angiography on the same lesion using thai 
frame, but also based his measurements on other camera 
angles after reviewing both still-frame and motion pic-
ture films, and calibrated the stenosis at 48 to 50 percent. 
See Exhibit 0-129, 
There is no question in the court's mind that all 01' 
the expert witnesses were sincere, highly trained, and 
with respect to most of the opinions they expressed, each 
passed the screening required by Daubert v, Merrell Dow 
Parmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 
L. Ed. 2d 469 (J 993). Thus, to resolve this schism of 
expert opinions regarding the percentage of stenosis pre-
sent in Bond's proximal LAD, and to make a determina-
tion as to whether the V AMC doctors mis-read the de-
gree of stenosis shown in Bond's angiogram films, the 
court must evaluate the credibility of each expert who 
gave an opinion about these issues. 
Plaintiffs expert witness, Dr. Jay [+ 12] Schapira, a 
very active board certified cardiologist from California, 
teaches as an adjunct at UCLA, diagnoses heart disease, 
and maintains a highly active surgical practice in which a 
large percentage of patients receive surgical intervention. 
He describes his practice as invasive cardiology and 
interventional cardiology; that is, utilizing mechanical 
devices to open up coronary arteries, including perform-
ing angioplasty with balloons and inserting stents. He 
testified that he personally performs stent procedures, but 
refers patients who require bypasses to heart surgeons 
who specialize in that procedure. Dr. Schapira also is a 
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very experienced medical/legal expert witness who 
charges $ 10,000 per day and who has testified at trial 
more than 100 times in his career; at least 20 times be-
tween 2000 and 2005. In 2005, he testified in depositions 
as many as 42 times, approximately 70 percent of the 
time for the plaintiff in the litigation. At trial in this case, 
he testified that only five percent of his practice deals 
with giving expert testimony in medical/legal litigation 
where he is not the treating physician. Without doubt, 
Dr. Schapira is a highly qualified and highly paid non-
treating (* 13] expert. Thus, the court expected him to be 
extremely careful in presenting his testimony in his Rule 
26 report, his pretrial deposition, and during the trial of 
the case. 
To evaluate the weight of Dr. Schapira's opinions, I 
examined not only his vast credentials, but also any in-
consistent or questionable basis for his opinions under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702. In his deposition, Dr. 
Schapira was asked to justify his position with medical 
articles to support the opinion that a patient with a steno-
sis such as Bond's should have been given immediate 
surgical intervention, and that an invasive procedure 
"would have significantly reduced the mortality rate of 
patients like Mr. Bond." See Plaintiffs Response to De-
fendant's Daubert Motion (# 28) at Exhibit A, p. 71. Dr. 
Schapira testified during his deposition that he thought 
the BARI trial, the CASS trial, and several other research 
studies supported his opinion that surgery improves life 
expectancy in patients like Bond. See id. However, when 
I read these studies before the trial, they revealed that the 
researchers concluded the opposite; there is no statisti-
cally significant difference in survival rates between sur-
gical intervention [*141 versus medical therapy even in 
patients with 3-vessel CAD, particularly if their left ven-
tricular (ilL V") function (determined by measuring ejec-
tion traction) was normal. See Exhibit D120; Appendix 
B, Exhibit 14. Further, the CASS research involved pa-
tients with mild stable angina, who were tree of angina 
after infarction, as opposed to patients such as Mr. Bond, 
whom plaintiff contends had unstable angina and high 
risk CAD. Following this observation, I wrote to plain-
tiff's counsel requesting that Dr. Schapira submit articles 
to justify his opinion. Plaintiff submitted trial exhibits 
that included medical treatises and journal articles, see 
Exhibits PI I-P36; however, Dr. Schapira's trial testi-
mony covered only the 2002 ACC/AHA Guideline Up-
date dealing with the classification of risk of death from 
unstable angina, Exhibit PI4, and the significance of 
BNP in predicting risk of an adverse cardiac event, Ex-
hibits 29,32-34. 
Because it remained unclear whether there was a 
correlation between surgical intervention and increased 
chance of survival in patients with the percentage of 
stenosis observed in Bond's proximal LAD, at the court's 
request, post-trial on February 13, 2008, plaintiff [" 15j 
submitted supplemental articles purporting to support 
plaintiffs claims, See Appendix A. There is reI jable 
medical evidence in the 2004 ACC/AHA Guideline Up-
date to support Dr. Shapira's contention that bypass sur-
gery generally improves long-term survival in patients 
with 3-vessel CAD if there is "significant"--meaning 
greater than 50% stenosis--and "[tJhe more severe the 
symptoms, the more proximal that LAD CAD, and the 
worse the LV function, the greater the benefit from sur-
gery." Appendix A, Exhibit C at 3.2.2.2. However, liter-
ally turning the page to read a bit further, the same 
source supports defendant's contention that non-surgical 
medical treatment was an appropriate choice, as follows: 
"LV systolic function remains an important predictor of 
which patients are likely to benefit from surgery. In pa-
tients with a normal EF [ejection tractionJ, surgical re-
vasculatization generally provides little survival benefit." 
Id. at 3.2.2.4. Bond's echocardiogram shows Ihat his 
ejection fraction was normal. Dr. Schapira's failure 10 
fully inform the court of the Significance of all of the 
data acquired during Bond's admission to the VAMC 
does little to bolster his credibility, 
Another problem [* \6] with Dr. Scnapira's testi-
mony is that he bases his conclusion that Bond's proxi-
mal LAD stenosis was 80 percent on the findings made 
by the VA pathologist, and he now claims his earlier 
estimate at 70 percent in his Rule 26 report to the court 
was a typographical error. Defendant contended that a 
physician cannot necessarily rely on measurements 
found at autopsy as an indicator of the percentage of 
stenosis present while the patient is alive with his heart 
still beating, and drew the analogy that postmortem 
measurements are akin to measuring the diameter of a 
bicycle tire after it has gone flat--which is what happens 
to arteries after death-- versus measuring a fully inflated 
tire. Defendant's expert, Dr. John McAnulty, emphasized 
this discrepancy at trial when he testified as follows: 
[T)here's a weI/-recognized discrepancy 
between findings trom an angiogram and 
findings trom an autopsy. 
Even if it's understood that the same 
region of the blood vessel is looked at, the 
situation is different enough that meas-
urements very rarely match between the 
two techniques, and overwhelmingly it's 
observed that autopsy measurements re-
sult in greater narrowing than angiogram 
measurements. 
.... '+ 
[T]here ['" 17J are probably a number 
of explanations, but J think the concept of 
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measuring a tube that's collapsed, versus 
one that's held open by pressure is proba-
bly one of the major differences in the 
measurements when a person has died, 
and when a person is being studied with 
an angiogram. 
Transcript of McAnulty Testimony, February 7, 2008, 
("McAnulty Tr.") at 49-50. 
In addition, Dr. McAnulty pointed out that the au-
topsy report did not specify whether the pathologist took 
samples from the proximal region of Bond's LAD coro-
nary artery as described in the angiogram, or from a re-
gion further down the vessel where there were narrow-
ings that may have been 80 percent. 
The V AMC pathologist testified that she did not re-
call and had not specified in her report precisely which 
region of Bond's LAD she obtained the samples that she 
analyzed, only that it was her common practice to take 
them from the narrowest part of the vessel. In addition, 
the pathologist was not qualified to make a before death 
and after death analysis regarding the degree of stenosis 
observed in Bond's proximal LAD, and Dr. Schapira 
never clarified how that difference could justify his as-
sumption. He simply adopted the autopsy report of [* J 8] 
80 percent or greater stenosis by referring to "the Glagov 
phenomenon," a study he claims all pathologists would 
know. However, the VAMC pathologist testified that she 
did not account for the Glagov phenomenon when she 
calculated the percentages of coronary artery stenoses 
listed in her report. 
Plaintiff did not supply the court with a reference to 
Glagov's research study; however, post-trial defendant 
submitted three supplemental articles that discuss 
"Glagov's phenomenon." Appendix B, Exhibits 10-12. In 
1987, Glagov and his fellow researchers published their 
conclusion that "human coronary arteries enlarge in rela-
tion to plaque area and that functional important lumen 
stenosis may be delayed until the lesion occupies 40 per-
cent of the internal elastic laminal area." Appendix B, 
Exhibit J O. After the stenosis exceeds 40 percent, "lumen 
diameter decreased, resulting in a restriction in flow ... 
IwJhen this [Glagov] phenomenon fails to occur the re-
su It is stenosis." Append ix B, Exhibit 12 at 4, 10; see 
also Exhibit ) I at 518, Fig. I. None of the articles ex-
plain how the Glagov phenomenon would be relevant to 
support a finding that Bond's proximal LAD stenosis was 
80 percent or greater [* 19] at the time his angiogram 
was performed. 
Regarding the reliability of the testimony provided 
by Dr. George Giraud, a V AMC cardiologist who 
teaches at that hospital as well as the Oregon Health Sci-
ences University ("OHSU"), and who is a specialist who 
directs the VAMC cardiac catheterization lab; and that of 
Dr. Eric Stecker, a cardiologist and electrophysiologist. 
now practicing at the Legacy Good Samaritan Hospital 
here in Portland, I find both of these experts to be vcry 
credible. There is no question that these doctors are dedi-
cated professionals who took great care to review Bond's 
relevant medical history and to perform the cardiac 
catheterization procedure properly. Both testitied that 
they took multiple motion picture angiogram views or 
Bond's coronary arteries quickly and efficiently using the 
V AMC's state-of-the-art dual-camera system to adjust 
the camera angle to obtain unobstructed views of the 
LAO along the entire length of the vessel. Doctors 
Giraud and Stecker testified that they spent more than an 
hour conducting a visual examination of Bond's an-
giogram film clips on September 23rd; however, it was 
not standard practice to perform a quantitative analysi> 
on a single frame [*20] of film to confirm their visual 
reading that the lesion in Bond's proximal LAD was 40 
percent stenosed. 
When asked by the court to fe-examine Exhibit PS8, 
which plaintiff submitted as the prime exhibit of the 
"widow maker" stenosis, Dr. Giraud spent hours analyz-
ing Bond's angiogram and testified that, due to the cam· 
era angle, the single frame plaintiff relied upon at trial 
gave a false impression of the severity of the stenosis in 
Bond's proximal LAO artery because there were over-
lapping segments on either side of the lesion. Calibrating 
the thinnest section on Exhibit P58 and comparing other 
camera angles of the same artery, which more faithfully 
represented in three dimensions the severity of the steno-
sis, Dr. Giraud testified that his quantitative analysis con-
firmed that the disputed stenosis was 38 to 40 percent. 
However, because they were Bond's treating doctors, and 
their angiogram interpretations are directly at issue in 
this case, the court recognizes the potential bias inherent 
in the testimony given by doctors Giraud and Sleeker 
Defendant's non-treating expert, Or. McAnulty, pro-
vided the final analysis of the "widow maker" stenosis. 
Dr. McAnulty, one of the leading cardiologists [*21] in 
this community, is also a clinical researcher in the field 
of cardiac sudden death, and currently serves as the 
medical director of arrhythmia services at Legacy Good 
Samaritan Hospital. In the past, he has served as the head 
of the division of cardiology at OHSU, director of the 
OHSU cardiac catheterization lab, director of the OHSU 
arrhythmia service, and head of the OHSU cardiology 
division; he also used to hold an appointment to work at 
the VAMC, but no longer has any formal affiliation with 
that institution. I have commented on the potential bias 
ofpJaintiffs medical expert witness. By like token, I am 
fully aware that doctors do not like to testify against fel-
low doctors or condemn the institution with which they 
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are or have been affiliated. In this case, I recognize that 
Dr. McAnulty was once closely allied with the Veterans 
Hospital and would be most reluctant to condemn or 
criticize the procedures of the very persons with whom 
he taught, practiced medicine, and in some cases contin-
ues to work alongside. In particular Dr. Stecker, who 
performed Bond's angiogram, was once Dr. McAnulty's 
student, and is now associated with Dr. McAnulty at 
Good Samaritan Hospital and obtained [*22] his posi-
tion at McAnulty's request. Thus, I closely scrutinized 
Dr. McAnulty's testimony for any temptation to simply 
back up the actions of his present and former colleagues, 
rather than give an independent analysis. I find that any 
such potential bias did not alter the reliability of his tes-
timony. 
Dr. McAnulty testified unequivocally that in 2005, 
as it is today, the standard of care for cardiologists read-
ing an angiogram in the Portland metro area was to do a 
visual inspection using motion picture angiogram films, 
and evaluate the vessels in multiple views. Based on an 
initial visual assessment of the lesion in Bond's proximal 
LAD, Dr MCAnulty concluded that the stenosis was 40 
percent, and further testified that he does not routinely 
quantify a stenosis by comparing the diameter of the 
narrowing relative to the vessel before and after, as Dr. 
Shapira did in this case. Dr. McAnulty concurred with 
Dr. Giraud's reasons for objecting to using a single frame 
of angiogram film as the basis for interpreting the degree 
of stenosis in Bond's proximal LAD, testifying that he 
"could not do it from frame 22 alone, because the overlap 
of vessels just makes it impossible to have a reference 
[*23J vessel to compare the stenosis." McAnulty Tr. at 
10. Without knowing precisely what Dr. Giraud's meas-
urements were, Dr. McAnulty engaged in the same quan-
titative analysis as the other experts but utilized addi-
tional views where there was no overlap to better quan-
tify the degree of stenosis, and concluded that it was 48 
to 50 percent. See Exhibit D 129. 
In the final analysis, to resolve the issues of whether 
the V AMC doctors mis-read Bond's angiogram, and 
what percentage of stenosis was present in Bond's 
proximal LAD coronary artery, the court must choose the 
most credible of three sets of witnesses. J find that Dr. 
McAnulty is the least biased, the most credible, and has 
provided the most well-reasoned and thorough analysis 
of Bond's coronary anatomy. He carefully evaluated and 
personally marked articles that justify his position and 
ultimate conclusions. Also, having taught or supervised 
about a third of Oregon's 200 practicing cardiologists, he 
is in a unique position to base his testimony on his exten-
sive knowledge of the degree of care, skill, and diligence 
used by ordinarily careful cardiologists in the Portland 
metro area. Careful doctors who viewed all of Bond's 
angiogram films [*24] could not determine the amount 
of stenosis with exactness. All experts agreed read ing 
angiograms is a most difficult task and that reasonable 
minds could and did differ. Accordingly, I conclude thaI 
the VAMC doctors did not mis-read Bond's angiogram, 
and that the catheterization report issued by doctors 
Giraud and Stecker met the legal standard of care. Fur-
thermore, I find based on the evidence presented at trial 
that the stenosis in Bond's proximal LAD did not exceed 
50 percent. 
Given that determination, it is less difficult to find 
that an invasive procedure such as sten! placement or 
bypass was not warranted under the circumstances pre-
sented in this case. Dr. Schapira argued that based on the 
2002 ACC/AHA practice Guidelines, Bond was in the 
"highrisk" category for short-term risk of death, see Ex-
hibits PI4 and P51, and that an invasive procedure such 
as bypass surgery could be justified under the legal stan-
dard of care. Nevertheless, viewing Bond's medical re-
cord as a whole and given that the extensive medical 
literature showing no statistically significant difference 
in mortality between medical management and an inva-
sive procedure, the course of treatment chosen by the 
VAMC doctors [*25] for this veteran was also easily 
justifiable. The preamble to the ACC/AHA Guidelines 
themselves say it best: "These practice guidelines are 
intended to assist physiCians in clinical decision making 
by describing a range of generally acceptable approaches 
for the diagnosis, management, or prevention of specific 
diseases or conditions .... The ultimate judgment regard-
ing the care of a particular patient must be made by the 
physician and patient in light of all of the available in-
formation and the circumstances presented by that pa-
tien!." Exhibit Pl4 at 3. 
A review of Bond's symptoms showed, without a 
doubt, that he was in acute coronary distress when he 
arrived at the V AMC, as his seven abnormal EKGs con-
firmed. His angiogram revealed a number of significant 
stenoses in three different coronary arteries, and he was 
diagnosed--for the first time--with diffuse CAD, When 
questioned about his history of chest pain he revealed--
for the first time--that he had been suffering symptoms 
for two months that were indicative of coronary ischemia 
and unstable angina. Although of questionable relevance 
at the time, Bond's BNP level was at least ten times 
higher than normal, and gives some indication [*26] that 
he was suffering from severe ischemia. . 
In contrast, Bond's Troponin levels were undetect-
able, meaning that he had not had an MI within the past 
six days. His echocardiogram showed a normal ejection 
fraction. He responded well to the medications he re-
ceived, his cardiac condition stabilized, and his symp-
toms of cardiac distress disappeared. He did not have 
further arrhythmias or show other signs of ischemia even 
after the intravenous medications were stopped. Doctors 
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who examined him found that did not have a heart mur-
mur, and he was not suffering from pulmonary edema 
because his lungs were clear--"no rales, ronchi or 
wheezes." See Exhibit PI at 211. At discharge, he re-
ported that he felt great and was walking around without 
suffering any symptoms of cardiac distress, 
The 2006 ACC/AHA research study that correlated 
BNP and Troponin levels to predict "mortality benefit 
from coronary revascularization in acute coronary syn-
dromes" elegantly and succinctly demonstrates why the 
judgment call that Bond's treating doctors had to make 
between medical management and a more invasive 
treatment such as revascularization was a diffkult one--a 
patient such as Bond who had a Troponin level of [*27] 
less than 0.0 I uglL, but also a BNP higher than 237 
ng/L, is literally right on the line between "lower mortal-
ity with revascularization" and "higher mortality with 
revascularization H Exhibit P34, at 1152, Fig. 5. Dr. 
Schapira referred to the figure in this study solely to sup-
port his testimony that the test for BNP was useful to 
stratifY patients into risk categories, and that Bond was at 
high risk for an adverse cardiac event based on his BNP 
level of 1313 pglml. See Transcript of Schapira Testi-
mony, February 5, 2008, ("Schapira Tr.") at 63-65. By 
contrast, Dr. McAnulty explained that the significance of 
the research was that based on those two lab tests alone, 
likelihood of mortality would not have been greater or 
lesser with revascularization. See McAnulty Tr. at 21-23. 
Moreover, the VAMC doctors who treated Bond 
emphasized in their testimony, as previously noted, that 
Bond had a normal ejection fraction, and it factored into 
their decision to manage his CAD medically by putting 
him on a regimen of drug therapy and conducting fol-
lowup tests to monitor his cardiac condition. See Exhibit 
P I at 191. Dr. McAnulty explained the significance of 
this test, as follows: "When the ejection [*28] fraction is 
normal, in a group of patients like Mr. Bond, it's actually 
a favorable prognostic marker .... In this particular case, 
it's also one more reason why should he have even had a 
tight narrowing, of 80 percent, why, the role of interven-
tion would not have been clear in that when the ejection 
fraction is normal, even if there is a vessel where there 
would be agreement about stenting or coronary bypass 
surgery, the effects of survival on that person, with me-
chanical intervention, are not clearly any better than 
medical therapy, alone." McAnulty Tr. at 34-35. Dr. 
Schapira commented that Bond's good ejection fraction 
made him "at low risk from an arrhythmia that you 
would call a death due to sudden cardiac death ... [but] 
[h]e didn't die of sudden cardiac death ... which is a 
particular unexpected death syndrome. He died of 
ischemia which caused a cardiac arrhythmia." Schapira 
Tr. at 95, 
Although plaintiff's and defendant's cardiology ex-
perts agree, as the V AMC pathologist found, that Bond 
died of a lethal arrhythmia. meaning that the ventricles in 
his heart either went into fibrillation or he suffered a car-
diac standstill, the precise cause of his arrhythmia re-
mains in dispute. [*29] Dr. McAnulty, who is an expert 
in treating cardiac arrhythmias, testified that while 
ischemia from coronary artery narrowing can cause a 
lethal heart rhythm to occur and is a reasonable exp lanil-
tion. it is not a definitive explanation because the mecha-
nism that triggers lethal arrhythmias is still uncertain. 
McAnulty Tr. at 38-39. Arrhythmias can be caused by 
myocardial damage from CAD, micro-scarring that pro-
motes the chance of developing a lethal arrhythm ia al 
any time, elevated adrenalin levels, or from a random 
sudden death rhythm. Id. at 39. The precise C<lUse of 
Bond's arrhythmia is a scientific dispute that need not be 
resolved to answer the ultimate question in this case. 
I find, based on all of the evidence. and particularly 
on the well-supported testimony of Dr. McAnulty, that 
even if Bond had undergone an invasive cardiac surgery 
with four bypasses. as recommended by Dr. Schapira, his 
life expectancy would not have been extended as com-
pared to treating him medically. ' Bond died of an un-
forseen arrhythmia from an unknown cause thai would 
not definitively have been prevented by an invasive sur-
gical procedure. Therefore. I conclude that theY AMC 
doctors' decision to pursue a more [*30J conservative 
medical approach, and to treat Bond accordingly with a 
well-accepted regimen of drug therapy, did not via/ate 
the standard of medical care in the community. 
2 Regarding the issue of Bond's life expeclancy, 
I note that Dr. Schapira testified that he simply 
took 10 years off Bond's normal life expectancy 
because of Bond's documented use of cigarettes 
and alcohol. Without citing to any epidemiologi-
cal study or other research to support it, Dr. 
Schapira's opinion amounts to nothing more than 
a non-educated guess plucked out of thin air, and 
thus fails the Daubert screening. An expert's will-
ingness to gratuitously guess and express an opin-
ion with no scientific basis as to one subject, 
casts doubt on the reliability of his other opin-
ions. 
B. The Final EKG Order 
Even in a nationally recognized, first-rate training 
hospital such as the Portland V AMC, the volume of 
medical records generated and the numbers of orders 
issued can overwhelm the capacity of a managed-care 
system to deliver every test precisely as ordered. In 
Bond's case, each doctor or team of doctors handled a 
discrete aspect of his care, posted the observations and 
conclusions on a computer network that other care pro-
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viders [*31] could access hospital-wide, and moved on 
to the next patient. The number of witnesses called to 
testity on the care Bond received during his relatively 
brief admission in September of 2005 reminded the court 
of the adage: "Too many cooks can spoil the broth." One 
of the doctors-in-training, without a request from a su-
pervisor, ordered an EKG to be perfonned before Bond's 
discharge. This order was neither carried out nor re-
scinded by superiors, However, during his hospitaliza-
tion Bond had already received seven EKGs, all of which 
were abnonnal and indicated that Bond was suffering 
from cardiac ischemia. A senior VAMC staff cardiolo-
gist testified, and Dr, McAnulty confinned, that perform-
ing another EKG would have been redundant because 
Bond was already being treated for ischemia with the 
optimal medical program, his symptoms of acute cardiac 
distress had disappeared within the past 24 to 36 hours, 
his overall condition was stable, and the infonnation 
provided by another EKG would not have provided addi-
tional information to change the diagnosis or treatment, 
nor would it have affected the timing of the discharge or 
the ultimate outcome in Bond's case. In other words, the 
failure to perform [*32] another EKG or rescind it was 
harmless error. 
Once again, Dr. Schapira did not hesitate to opine 
that the defendant's failure to do the final EKG consti-
tuted medical malpractice, even though he never ex-
plained any basis for his opinion. In like manner, he 
summarily accused the defendant of wrongfully dis-
charging Bond, without giving any meaningful specifics. 
I find that both of these opinions lack a sufficient basis to 
support his conclusion that the defendant violated the 
standard of care by neglecting to perfonn another EKG 
before Bond was discharged. 
C. The Exercise Tolerance Test 
Plaintiff also complains that defendant's fai lure to 
perfonn some type of ETT while Bond was hospitalized 
violated the standard of care because the data obtained 
from evaluating the heart's function with exertion could 
have resolved the mixed results of the other objective 
tests, clarified the cause of Bond's pain syndrome, and 
presumably tipped the balance in favor of lifesaving sur-
gical intervention, See Schapira Tr. at IOl-102. Dr. 
Schapira contends that ifVAMC doctors were concerned 
about the potentially adverse complications, such as 
bleeding, that could occur fi:om having Bond exercise on 
a treadmill [*33] so soon after his catheretization proce-
dure, such complications could have been avoided by 
performing a pharmacologic stress test while Bond was 
still bedridden. 
However, Dr. McAnulty testified that the standard 
of care for a patient like Bond who had undergone a car-
diac catheterization was to send him home to recover, 
then bring him back for a follow-up ETT as an outpa-
tient. See McAnulty Tr. at 32, He gave two logical and 
compelling reasons: first, it is difficult for someone who 
has had a femoral artery punctured and a tube inserted 
and withdrawn to perform in their usual manncr when 
walking during a treadmill exercise test; second, an ETT 
would be of greater diagnostic value to test the e ITcctive-
ness of the medical program after the patient had been on 
the additional drug therapy for a longer period of time, 
ld. Regarding the useful ness of a chern ical stress lest, Dr. 
McAnulty testified that a chemical test does not mimic 
an exercise test to assess a person's performance on the 
prescribed course of medical treatment. Id. at 33. Also. i.l 
chemical test is used to evaluate CA 0; because it was 
already known that Bond had CAD and that it was af-
fecting the blood flow to his heart based on ,+34 J the 
EKG results, the data obtained from a chemical tcsi 
would have been less useful than an exercise test. Sec id. 
Accordingly. plaintiff's complaint lacks merit be-
cause the defense proved to the court's satisfaction that a 
pharmacologic stress test performed on an inpatient ba-
sis, although not unusual, is a poor substitute to evaluate 
the coronary function of an ambulatory patient like 
Bond, who was capable of returning in a few days for a 
follow-up outpatient ETT to be performed on a treadmill. 
Plaintiff made much ado about the fact that the V AMC 
medical records revealed that six doctors recommended 
or ordered that Bond undergo an ETT, and yet it was not 
done before he was discharged. However, I note that 
there was no time limit specified in the order issued by 
Bond's treating cardiologist, who wrote "/ think the best 
plan is to treat him for ischemia with ASA and beta 
blocker and then bring him back for an ETT to see if 
there is objective evidence of ischemia with exertion on 
medications." Exhibit PI at 191. In fact, several VAMC 
staff physicians testified that they anticipated that the 
stress test would best be completed as an outpatient ap-
proximately two weeks after discharge. [*35J Unfortu-
nately, Bond's time ran out. Nevertheless, I find that de-
fendant did not violate the standard of care when it dis-
charged Bond without tirst performing an ETT. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, evaluating this exceptionally well-tried case 
by extremely competent counsel and confronted with 
outstanding witnesses, I conclude that plaintiff simply 
has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the medical treatment the doctors at the V AMC provided 
to Cra ig Bond in September of 2005 in any way violated 
the standards of medical care as practiced in this com-
munity; therefore, defendant is not liable under the 
FTCA for his death, Because the issue of liability is dis-
positive, r need not reach the issue of damages. \ 
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3 One of the issues that continues to trouble the 
court is that the defense stipulated that Bond had 
a life expectancy of 15 years, yet took the incon-
sistent position that Bond had an unknown life 
expectancy considering his lifestyle choices and 
the condition of his heart, and that he suffered 
sudden cardiac death unrelated to any treatment 
(or lack of treatment) he received at the VAMC. 
Apparently, defense counsel entered into the 
stipulation simply to save the economists' time, 
[*36] so that if the court reached the damages is-
sue, the court could assume that Bond would 
have lived 15 more years. The economic losses 
could then be based on the disability payments 
received and services provided by a stay-at-home 
spouse doing domestic care for a specific period 
of time. 
In closing, I note that this extremely sensitive case 
involved two casualties of a long-ago war--Bond, who 
became a victim of substance abuse early on, presumably 
because of his combat experience; and his loving, sup-
portive wife who did her best to cope with his disabili-
ties. Yet, sympathy for the litigants can play no role in 
the court's factual findings and conclusions of law. 
Judgment is for the defendant. 
DA TED this 10th day of March, 2008. 
/sl Robert E. Jones 
ROBERT E. JONES 
u.S. District Judge 
APPENDIX A 
The following medical peer-reviewed literature is at-
tached in support of plaintiffs claims: 
Ex.hibit A E. Braunwald et aL, ACC/AHA 2002 
Guideline Update for the Management of Patients With 
Unstable Angina and Non-ST-Segment Elevation Myo-
cardial Infarction A Report of the American College of 
Cardiology/American Heart Association Task Force on 
Practice Guidelines (Committee on the Management of 
Patients [*37] with Unstable Angina), available at: 
http://www.acc.org/clinical! guide-
Ii nes/unstab le/u nstab Ie. pdf. 
Exhibit B J. L. Anderson et ai., ACCIAHA 2007 
Guidelines for the Management of Patients With Unsta-
ble A ngina and Non-ST-Segment Elevation Myocardial 
Infarction. A Report of the American College of Cardi-
ology/American Heart Association Task Force on Prac-
tice Guidelines (Writing CommIttee to Revise the 2002 
Guidelines for the Management of Patients with Unsta-
ble Angina/Non-S7~Elevation Myocardia/ fnfarclion) 
116 CIRCULATION e148 (2007). 
Exhibit C K. A. Eagle et aI, ACC/AHA 200., G uide-
line Update for Coronary Artery Bypass Graji Surgery. 
A Report of the American College of Cardiol-
ogy/American Heart Association Task Force on Prw.:{ic'e 
Guidelines (Committee to Update the 1999 Guidelines 
for Coronary Artery Bypass Graft Surgery), available at: 
http://www .acc. orglcl i n i calfgu idel ines/cabg/cabg. pd f. 
Ex.hibit D S. C. Smith, Jr. et aL, ACCI AHA/SCA I 
2005 Guideline Update for Percutaneous Coronary In-
tervention: A Report of the American College oj Cardi-
ology/ American Heart Association Task Force on Prac-
tice Guidelines (ACC/AHA/SCA! Writing Committee 10 
Update the 2001 Guidelines for Percutaneous Coronary 
[*38] fntervention), available at: 
http://www.americanheart.org. 
Exhibit E Robert H. Jones et aI., Long-ferm Survival 
Benejits of Coronary Artery Bypass Grafting and Percu-
taneous Trans/uminal Angiopfasty in Patients with 
Coronary Artery Disease. 1996 1. THORACIC AND 
CARDIOVASCULAR SURGERY 1013. 
Exhibit F Salim Yusef, et at. Effect of Coronary Ar-
tery Bypass Graft SurgelY 011 Survival: Overview (~l J 0-
Year Results From Randomized Trials by the Coronary 
Artery Bypass Graft Surgery Tr;alists Col/aboral ion, 344 
LANCET 563 (1994). 
Exhibit G Ron T. van Domburg et al. Sustained 
Benejil 20 Years After Reperfus/on Therapy in Acufe 
Myocardial Infarction, 461. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 15 
(2005). 
Exhibit H Excerpt from: Indications for Bypass Sur-
gery, in CECIL MEDICINE, Ch. 74 (23d ed. 2008), 
available at: http://www.mdconsult.com/das!book/body 
189 [49112-6/67949873 I11492/314,htmi. 
Exhibit I Airlie Cameron et aI., Coronary Bypass 
SurgelY with Internal- Thoracic-Artety Grafts--EfJecls on 
Survival over a 15-year Period, 334 N. ENG. J. 
MEDICINE 216 (1996). 
Exhibit J Excerpt from: F. D. Loop et aI., Influence 
of lnternaf-Mammary-Artery Graft on fO-year Survival 
and Other Cardiac Events. 314 N. ENG. J. MEDICINE 
I (1986). 
Exhibit [*39] K H. Oelert, Kardiochirurgisches 
Sfandy-by und AkuteingrijJe nach in/erventione/len kar-
diologischen MaBnahmen, 85 Suppl.6 Z KARDlOL 303 
(1996) (Ger.). 
APPENDIX B 
The following medical peer-reviewed literature is at-
tached in support of defendant's contentions: 
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Exhibit I Alfred F. Parisi et al.. Medical Compared 
with Surgical Management of Unstable Angina: 5-Year 
Mortality and Morbidity in the Velerans Administration 
Study, 80 CIRCULATION 1176 (1989). 
Exhibit 2 TI MI IlIB Investigators, Effects of Tissue 
Plasminogen A cfivator and a Comparison of Early Inva-
sive and Conservative Strategies in Unstable Angina and 
Non-Q-Wave Myocardial Infarction. 89 CIRCULATION 
1545 (J 994). 
Exhibit 3 William E. Boden et aI., Outcomes in Pa-
tients with Acute Non--Q-Wave Myocardial Infarction 
Randomly Assigned fo an Invasive as Compared with a 
Conservative Management Strategy, 338 NEW ENG. J. 
MEDICINE 1785 (1998). 
Exhibit 4 Peter A. McCullough et aI., A Prospective 
Randomized Trial afTriage Angiography in Acute Coro-
nary Syndromes Ineligible for Thrombolytic Therapy: 
Results on the Medicine Versus Angiography in Throm-
bolytic Exclusion (MATE) Trial, 32 1. AM. C. 
CARDIOLOGY 596 (1998), 
Exhibit 5 Lars Wallentin et aL, [*40] Invasive 
Compared with Non-invasive Treatment in Unstable 
Coronary-Artery Disease: FRISC /I Prospective Ran-
domized Mutticentre Study, 354 LANCET 708 (1999). 
Exhibit 6 Christopher P. Cannon et aI., Comparison 
of Early InvaSive and Conservative Strategies in Patients 
with Unstable Coronary Syndromes Treated with the 
Glycoprotein lib/fila Inhibitor Tirofiban, 344 NEW 
ENG. J. MEDICNE 1879 (2001). 
Exhibit 7 David A. Morrow et aI., Ability of Minor 
Elevations of Troponins I and T to Predict Benefit From 
an Early InvaSive Strategy in Patients With Unstable 
Angina and Non-ST Elevation Myocardial Infarction: 
Results from a Randomized Trial, 286 AM. MEDICAL 
ASS'N 2405 (200 J). 
Exhibit 8 David A. Morrow et aI., Evaluation of B-
Type Natriuretic Peptide for Risk Assessment in Unstable 
Angina/Non-ST-E/evation Myocardial Infarction, 41 J. 
AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 1264 (2003). 
Exhibit 9 Leopoldo S. Piegas et aI., The Organiza-
tion to Assess Strategies for Ischemic Syndromes 
(OASIS) Registry in Patients with Unstable Angina, 84 
AM. J. CARDIOLOGY 5A, 7M (1999). 
Exhibit 10 Abstract of: S. Glagov et aI., Compen-
senatory Enlargement of Human Atherosclerotic Coro-
nary Arteries, 316 NEW ENG. J. MEDICINE 1371 
( 1987). 
Exhibit [>1<41 J 11 R. H. Mohiadin et al.. (J{ugov Re-
modeling 0/ the Atherosclerotic Aorla Demonstrated hy 
Cardiovascular Magnetic Resonance. The COHDrt As-
ymptomatic Subject Plaque Assessment Research 
(CASPAR) Project, 6 1, CARDIOVASCULAK 
MAGNETIC RESONANCE 517 (2004). 
Exhibit 12 Vyacheslav A. Korshunov et al., VOo5('Il-
lar Remodeling: HI!f11odynamic and Biochemical Mt:cha-
nisms Underlying Glagov's Phenomenon, 27 
ARTERIOSCLEROSIS, THROMBOSIS, AND 
VASCULAR BIOLOGY 1722 (2007). 
Exhibit 13 Rehan Qayyum el aI, Sysfl!malic ReView 
Routine and Selective Invasive Strategies fur the Acufe 
Corunary' Syndrome. 148 ANNALS OF INTERNAL 
MEDICINE 186 (2008). 
Exhibit 14 Michal B. Mock et aI., Survival aIMedi-
cally Treated Patients in the Coronary Artery Surgery 
Study (CASS) RegisOy, 66 CIRCULATION 566 (1982) 
Exhibit 15 Whady Hueb et aI., Five- Year Follow-Up 
of the Medicine, Angioplasty, or Surgety Study (MASS 
1/). A Randomized Controlled C/inicul Trial of 3 Thera-
peutic Strategies for Multivessel Coronary Artery Dis-
ease, I 15 C I RCU LA TION J 802 (2007). 
Exhibit 16 William E. Boden et aI., Optimal Medical 
Therapy with or withoul PCI for Stuble Curonary Dis-
I!ase, 356 NEW ENG. 1. MEDICINE 1503 (2007). 
Exhibit 17 E. Braunwald ct aI., ACCIAlfA (·42J 
2002 Guideline Update for the Management of Patients 
With Unstable Angina and Non-ST-Segment Elevation 
Myocardial Infarction: A Report 0/ the American Col-
lege of Cardiulogy/American Hear! Association Task 
Force on Pra(.,tice Guidelines (Committee on the Man-
agement ofPatien!s with Unstable Angina), available at: 
http://www.acc,org/clinical/ guide-
lines/unstable/unstable,pdf. 
Exhibit 18 S. C. Smith, Jr. et aI., ACClAJ-IA/SCAI 
2005 Guideline Update for Percutaneous CoronOlY In-
tervention: A Report of the American Colll!ge of Cardi-
olugy/ American Heart Association Task Force on Prac-
lice Guidelines (ACe/AHA/SCAI Writing Committee to 
Update the 200/ Guidelines for Percutaneuus Coronaty 
Intervention), available at: 
http://www.americanheart.org. 
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Johnson, Judge. 
DISPOSITION: Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions. 
CORE TERMS: cholesterol, juror, conversation, causes of action, new trial, stress, at-Will, cholesterol levels, 
misconduct, recording, good cause, disability, wrongful termination, incapacity, fired, tape, reporter's transcript, 
medication, impl ied agreement, employment contract, retaliation, manager's, diet, medical condition, recorded, 
blood, order granting, declaration, terminate, recorder 
COUNSEL: Geniene B. Stillwell for Plaintiff and AppelJant. 
Horvitz & Levy, Barry R. Levy, H. Thomas Watson, Jason T. Weintraub; Woldt & Associates and Wendy A. Woldt for 
Defendant and Appellant. I. 
,JUDGES: 0' LEARY, J.; BEDSWORTH, ACTING P.J., IKOLA, J. concurred. 
OPINION BY: O'LEARY 
OPINION 
INTRODUCTION 
Thomas Potts was employed by RQgiQ~!Jack.ComQ[QtJ.9_n ___ ...as a store manager and was required to work an average 
of 50 to 60 hours a week. Potts had high cholesterol. One of Potts's doctors, believing Potts's high cholesterol was 
not being managed well by diet and medication, directed him to not work more than 40 hours a week so as to 
reduce stress, wnich in turn could lower his cholesterol levels. Potts [*2] informed his supervisor of the work 
restriction imposed by his doctor and indicated he wanted to take intermittent medical leave under the California 
Family Rights Act (Go\.', COQ~,.§ t2..915.2J 1 (the CFRA). In subsequent meetings with his supervisor to discuss the 
issue, Potts attempted to tape record the conversations, the tone of the meetings quickly deteriorated, and Potts 
was ultimately fired. Potts claimed he was fired because of his request for qualifying medical leave. Radioshack _~ 
maintained Potts was fired for insubordination because he insisted on tape recording the meetings wi 
supervisor's consent in violation of company policy. 
FOOTNOTES 158 
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A jury returned a special verdict awarding $ 1 million in compensatory damages to Potts for breach of an implied 
agreement to not terminate employment except for good cause, violation of his rights under the CFRA, and wrongful 
termination in Violation of publiC [*3] policy. The jury found against R(ldioshack .on Its cross-complaint for illegal 
recording under Penal Code section 632. The trial court denied R£lillQ.sJl.ill::K .,.·s motion for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict (JNOV), but granted its motion for new trial due to juror misconduct. 
Potts appeals the order granting new trial contending there was no prejudicial juror misconduct. ftadio!?hack .,. 
appeals the order denying ]NOV contending there is insufficient evidence to support a judgment in Potts's favor on 
the contract or the CFRA causes of action. Ri;lqios.hack .. .,.also contends the jury's verdict In Potts's favor on the 
wrongful termination cause of action was inconsistent with its verdict in fi.ru:ti.Q:illads. ... ·s favor on another of his 
causes of action (perceived disability discrimination). 
We agree with R,adio?hack .the evidence is insufficient to support a judgment in Potts's favor on the contract causes 
of action because Potts expressly agreed in writing he was an (It-will employee. We also agree with RQ.QLoSQQCK .... the 
evidence does not support a judgment In Potts's favor on the CFRA causes of action because he failed to 
demonstrate that his high cholesterol constituted a "serious medical condition" [*4] under the CFRA-the 
uncontroverted evidence being that Potts's high cholesterol was a completely asymptomatic condition, which has 
never impacted his ability to perform his job. However, we reject RadiQ.S.QJ:g:k_.'s assertion the inconsistent verdicts 
mandate judgment for it on the wrongful termination cause of action-the proper remedy is a new trial on that cause 
of action. We reject Potts's contention the new trial order was an abuse of discretion. 
II 
FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
Potts was 52 years old when hired by B1Lq~.!s __ .in 1997 as a management trainee. He was rapidly promoted. and 
by July 2000, he was manager of a high-volume store in Newport Beach. As a salaried manager, Potts was required 
to work a minimum of 48 to 54 hours per week, and frequently worked up to 60 hours per week. Potts received 
numerous performance awards during his tenure at .R,qd!o.?hi;l~k •.• His goal was to become a District Manager, and 
shortly before he was fired by P.,g.dlosha£:k ... in March 2002, had been told he was next in line to go into the District 
Manager training program. 
In January 2001, Ali Yazdansharif became the Ril.Q].Q.sJl.f1(:_k .• District Manager responsible for Potts and the Newport 
Beach store. Yazdansharif reported [*5] to 8,adjQst)a.Ck: ... Regional Manager Dan Barnes. 
Potts had undergone two surgeries for bladder cancer in the early 1990s and a follow up surgery in 2001 to remove 
scar tissue. He was under the care of general practitioner, Dr. Richard Enns, and a urologist, Dr. Mark Sullivan. Since 
1998, Potts had been treated by Dr. Enns for high cholesterol with cholesterOl lowering medication, and 
recommended diet and exercise regimes. In February 2000, Dr. Sullivan learned of Potts's high cholesterol when a 
blood test showed a total cholesterol level of 325. Dr. Sullivan also began monitoring Potts's cholesterol levels. In 
February 2002, Potts's total cholesterol level registered 287. Dr. Sullivan believed stress contributed to high 
cholesterol. Potts told Dr. Sullivan he was under stress due to the high number of hours he worked. Dr. Sullivan 
advised Potts to cut down on his hours. On February 21, 2002, Dr. Sullivan wrote a note stating, "Mr. Potts should 
work no more than 40 hours a week[.J" (We will discuss the medical evidence in more detail, anon.) 
The next day, Potts telephoned Yazdansharif and told him about the work restriction. Yazdansharif told Potts they 
would discuss the matter when Yazdansharif [*6] returned from a business trip. On Monday March 4, Yazdansharif 
called Potts and told him "to fax the doctor's note to him[.]" Potts testified when they spoke later that day 
Yazdansharif said Potts had three options: transfer as manager to a smaller store, accept a demotion, or take a leave 
of absence. Potts protested that his store was currently understaffed (down by two sales associates), but if he had 
proper staffing with an assistant manager, he could run the store working only 40 hours a week. Yazdansharif did 
not advise Potts he had to fill out any forms regarding his reduced hours request. 
Potts thought Yazdansharif's three options did not sound correct. He had researched the matter on the Internet and 
read something about the Family Medical Leave Act, 2 which he understood allowed for an employee to take 
intermittent leave using vacation or sick time to make up the difference. Potts found similar language in 
Rj'!Qi9shack .,.·s own policy manual. He called an attorney's office and spoke with a man named Charles Russell, whom 
he understood to be an attorney, but whom he later learned was a paralegal. Russell confirmed Potts's 
understanding of the FMLA. At the time, Potts had three [*7) weeks of vacation and four weeks of sick time on the 
books. 
FOOTNOTES 
2 The federal Family and Medical Leave Act (~J;:-,-§ 2614) (FMLA), closely parallels the CFRA. similar15 :J 
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On Tuesday March 5, Yazdansharif spoke with Mark Robinson, a R9JJ.LR2J19~t.-human resources representative. He 
told Robinson that Potts had a medical restriction to work only 40 hours a week due to stress and high blood 
pressure, and such a work restriction would make it diFficult for Potts to manage a store. Robinson thought the issue 
was one involving the Americans with Disabilities Act. J He instructed Yazdansharif to place Potts on temporary 
"manager returning from leave status" and give him an "essential [job] functions [information form]" for his 
physician to complete. Yazdansharif did not mention to Robinson that Potts had mentioned wanting intermittent 
leave under the FMLA, Robinson testified that had he known Potts was making a FMLA leave request, he would have 
worked to see if the request could be accommodated, (*8] as it was not R.il(;J.i9~I}QI:!< .• 's policy to demote an 
employee seeking FMLA leave, 
FOOTNOTES 
3 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.c. § 12101 et seq.), 
Yazdansharif testified he considered whether Potts was requesting FMLA leave, and he discussed with either 
Robinson or Jeff Bland, another human resources representative, whether Potts could take intermittent leave, 
Yazdansharif understood from whichever one he spoke with that there was no problem with an employee taking 
intermittent leave, Bland denied having any such discussion with Yazdansharif. 
Later that day, Potts and Yazdansharif spoke again. Yazdansharif told Potts he would not be allowed to manage any 
R.actiQshilck ... store working only 40 hours a week. He now told Potts his choices were to take workers' compensation 
leave or move to a sales associate position while retaining some of his manager's benefits. When Potts told 
Yazdansharif what he had learned about the FMLA and intermittent leave, Yazdansharif did not reply stating the 
optIons [*9] he had offered were RactiQ.sh_iKls .... 's policy. Yazdansharifdiq not provide Potts with any explanation of 
his rights under either the FMLA or the CFRA, he did not tell Potts he could take intermittent leave, and he did not 
tell Potts he needed any further medical certification of his condition, They scheduled a meeting for the next day. 
On March 6, Yazdansharif came to the RadiQsJL~I.~k. ... store where Potts worked, They went into the back orfice to talk. 
Yazdansharif did not have any forms with him to give Potts, Potts took out a tape recorder and placed it on the desk, 
telling Yazdansharif he wanted to tape the conversation, Yazdansharif told Potts he could not record their 
conversation. Potts told Yazdansharif he wanted to record because he was confused, and wanted to clearly 
understand his options as they kept changing, Yazdansharif again told Potts he could not record, so Potts turned the 
tape recorder off. • The meeting quickly turned hostile over the issue of recording-Potts insisting he had a right to 
reCOrd the conversation, and Yazdansharif insisting Potts not record, 80th men started yelling at each other. 
Yazdansharif told Potts to give him the store keys. Potts refused, YazdanshariF [*10] then demanded, "give me 
your fucking keys, . , ," Potts said, "fuck you[)" and again refused to give Yazdansharif the keys, Because 
Yazdansharif had begun using profanity, Potts turned the tape recorder back on and tried to get him to repeat the 
profanity on tape, but Yazdansharif would not. 
FOOTNOTES 
4 At trial, Potts testified he was almost completely deaf in one ear and he routinely taped recorded conversations 
so he could confirm what had been said. He often tape recorded Ragioshack .... meetings, always with his tape 
recorder in plain view, and no one ever objected or told him recording violated R~Ql~r;:K ... policy or required 
consent. Potts conceded he never told Yazdansharif about his hearing problem. 
Yazdansharif left the store for about 20 minutes, went out to the parking lot and talked on his cell phone, When he 
returned, Yazdansharif brought another store employee into the back office, and again directed Potts to turn over his 
keys. Potts complied and left the store. Potts and other employees believed Potts was (*11] being fired. 
Yazdansharif instructed Potts to come to the district office in the morning-Potts believed to pick up his final 
paycheck, 
As he was driving home, Potts telephoned Russell (the paralegal) who told Potts he had "every right" to record his 
conversations with Yazdansharif, and in fact Potts had done Yazdansharif a favor by putting the tape recorder out 
where Yazdansharif could see it because he could have hidden the tape recorder to record the conversation. 
The next day, March 7, Potts went to the Rgdioshack ..... district office for a meeting with Yazdansharif. Potts brought 
with him a small tape recorder and a video camcorder attached to his clipboard. The camcorder was running as Potts 
went into Yazdansharif's office. When Yazdansharif saw the recorder he "made a snicker about oh, what's the 
camcorder for." Potts told Yazdansharif an attorney told him he "absolutely had every right to record and document 
the conversation," Yazdansharif claimed he told Potts he could not record, and did not believe the conversation was 
being recorded. Potts denied this, and testified the light showing the camera was recording was on and pointed 
directly at Yazdansharif, 5 160 
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s Potts also relies upon a portion of the transcript of the meeting indicating Yazdansharif had said to Potts, "if you 
want to record no problem man, okay." Potts asserts this statement demonstrates he believed Yazdansharif was 
agreeing to being recorded. But the context in which the statement was made was that Yazdansharif fjrst told 
Potts he had to call regional headquarters to see jf the policy against tape recording could be waived, and if so 
"then if you want to record, no problem man .... " 
[* 12] During this first conversation, Yazdansharif and Potts discussed Potts's medical restriction and employment 
options. Potts attempted to raise his request for FMLA leave, but Yazdansharlf would not discuss it with him. 
Yazdansharif had the necessary FMLA/CFRA forms, but did not give them to Potts. Yazdansharif never indicated Potts 
needed to provide any additional medical information or ask him any qUestions about the duration of Potts's medical 
leave. 
After about 23 minutes, a telephone call came from Bland. Yazdansharif asked Potts to wait outside the office. Potts 
complied. Yazdansharif then had a conference call with Bland and Barnes. Yazdansharif told them Potts had refused 
to provide him any information about his medical condition or any of the information necessary to fill out the FMLA 
leave forms. Yazdansharif talked to them about Potts wanting to record their conversations. The decision was made 
to fire Potts during this call if he insisted on recording. 
After Yazdansharif got off the phone, he called Potts back in telling him to leave all his recording equipment outside, 
Potts complied. Yazdansharif did not tell Potts he was going to be fired, but asked when the last [*13] inventory 
had been done at his store. Yazdansharif told Potts to come back later that afternoon to speak to Barnes or someone 
else in human resources. 
When Potts returned, he had his tape recorder with him and told Yazdansharif he wanted to record their 
conversation. Yazdansharif refused. Potts said if he could not record, there would be no meeting. Yazdansharif fired 
Potts. Potts asked if he could talk to Barnes; Yazdansharif ignored him. A few days later, Potts telephoned Barnes. 
Barnes asked if Potts was tape recording the conversation, Potts said he was not. Barnes nonetheless refused to talk 
to Potts. 
In the formal paperwork terminating Potts, Yazdansharif indicated Potts was fired for poor work performance, 
attitude, and attendance. At trial, Yazdansharif and Barnes testified Potts was not fired for poor work performance. 
When Potts filed for unemployment benefits, Yazdansharif told the insurance representative Potts was fired "for 
using profanity and trying to record the[irJ conversation[.J" In his depOSition in an unrelated lawsuit, Yazdansharif 
testified Potts was fired for having a bad attitude and cussing. 
Potts filed this action seeking compensatory and punitive [*14] damages against Radioshack yand individual 
defendants Yazdansharif and Barnes. The complaint contained causes of action for breach of implied employment 
contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, violation of rights under the CFRA and 
retaliation for exercising those rights, actual disability discrimination (high cholesterol) and perceived disability 
discrimination (high blood pressure) under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), age discrimination, 
wrongful termination in violation of public policy, Intentional infliction of emotional distress, violation of constitutional 
rights, and unpaid wages. RaqiQshac;k yand Yazdansharif cross-complained against Potts ror violation of Penal Code 
S~~hiQ[Lrn, alleging he recorded confidential conversations without consent. 
Prior to commencement of the jury trial, Potts dismissed Barnes and dismissed his causes of action for age 
discrimination, unpaid wages, and violation of constitutional rights. Following Potts's opening statement, the court 
granted nonsuit on his causes of action for disability discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
and on his request for punitive [* 15] damages. Potts dismissed Yazdansharif (and Yazdansharif dismissed his 
cross·complaint) and trial went forward on the remaining causes of action against Rag[Qshgck .. "alone. 
The jury returned a speCial verdict finding for Potts on his causes of action for breach of employment contract, 
breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, violation of CFRA rights, and retaliation in Violation of 
CFRA. As to Potts's cause of action for perceived disability discrimination in violation of the FEHA, the jury found 
Radioshack ... perceived him as being disabled due to high blood pressure, but the perceived disability was not a 
motivating factor in his discharge. However, as to Potts's cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of the 
public poliCies set forth in the CFRA and the FEHA, the jury found the perceived disability was a motivating factor in 
his discharge. The jury awarded Potts $ 83,632 in past lost earnings, $ 750,000 in future lost earnings, and $ 
166,368 for emotional distress. The jury found against ~..Qr;:;.k. . ...on its cross-complaint for violations of PenQ) 
CQQ/;..sectiol} .632 because the conversations were not confidential. 
R.gclioShgl;k ... [* 16) filed a motion for JNOV on the ground there was no substantial evidence to support a verdict 
on any of Potts's causes of action. B.1ldio,S.h.q.cJL.also sought JNOV on the wrongful termination in violation of public 
policy cause of action on the grounds the jury's verdict was inconsistent . .8.adlos./lack .. also filed a motion for new 
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trial on the grounds of, among other things, juror misconduct, and inconsistent verdict. The court denied 
R!;lQiQ~h!lC;k .'s motion for JNOV, but granted Ra9jQ~h~l<:_.'s new trial motion on grounds of juror misconduct. Both 
RadiosbilC~ ,Tand Potts appeal. 
III 
RAQIQSHAJ;:K .,.'5 APPEAL OF ORDER DENYING JNOV 
A. Standard of Review 
RaJ;1J9!;hac,k Tappeals the order denying its motion for JNOV. We review the record de novo, Independently 
determining whether substantial evidence, contradicted or not, supports the jury's verdict. (TQSlllil?_z.ifJjy., San l.uis 
Coastal Unified School Dist. (2001) 86 Cal.ADPAth 1053,-l.~.) Like the trial court, we must accept as true the 
evidence supporting the verdict, disregard conflicting evidence, and indulge every legitimate inference to support the 
verdict. We cannot weigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. (Ibid. ['" 17] ) 
B. Contract Claims 
1. Breach of Employment Contract 
The jury found in Potts's favor on his breach of employment contract cause of action finding RQ.QlQsJ:lilI:)L.,had 
promised by words or conduct not to discharge Potts except for good cause and RadiO$h,ack .,fired Potts without 
good cause. Radioshack .contends Potts's status as an at-will employee precludes a finding in his favor on this 
cause of action. We agree. 
Unless there is a written employment agreement stating otherwise, employment is statutorily presumed to be at will, 
(I,..ab. Code, § 2922.) "An at-will employment may be ended by either party 'at any time without cause,' for any or 
no reason, and subject to no procedure except the statutory requirement of notice. (Citations.]" (GU? v. Bechtel 
fYi.Jioaal, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317. 335 (Guz).) The statutory presumption of at-will employment can be overcome 
by evidence the employer and employee have impliedly agreed the employee will be terminated only for good cause. 
(Guz, suora, 24 Cal. 4th at p. 336; Folev v. Interactive Data Coro, (1988) 4 ;7...kgL ... :2d .6.5.4, QZl4~'LQjL,BQtr, . .z H 
(Foley).) Relevant [*18] factors in finding such an implied agreement include: the employee's length of service, the 
employer's personnel policies and practices, actions or communications by the employer indicating assurances of 
continued employment, and industry practices. (F.Qll;,y~.!?upr?, .o:tl .Q!I.,~9.!;lJ pp_, .980-91)1.) The plaintiff bears the 
burden of proving an implied agreement not to terminate without good cause. The existence of an implied contract 
to discharge only for good cause is normally a factual question for the trier of fact. (L<;t,pt pp" _6}]' 660,,682,) 
RadioshQck ...contends the existence of express written agreements between it and Potts that his employment was 
at will precludes judgment in his favor on his breach of implied agreement cause of action. We agree. In Guz, the 
California Supreme Court observed in dictum "most cases applying California law ... have held that an at-will 
provision in an express written agreement, signed by the employee, cannot be overcome by proof of an implied 
contrary understanding. (Citations.)" (Guz,5JiP.[fiL.'-~4 CaI.4itLgtQ.,31Q..f.r:klQ.) That observation in Guz, is routinely 
followed by cases [* 19] concluding, "There cannot be a valid express contract and an implied contract, each 
embracing the same subject, but requiring different results.' [Citations.] The express term is controlling even if it Is 
not contained in an integrated employment contract. [Citation.] Thus, the ... at-will agreement preclude[s] the 
existence of an implied contract requiring good cause for termination." ((PlJ1Q.~Jeffer •. (;1?"(lgs:l~.JJ.l.J..t!t;L& !:JitrtnCJ(Q 
(1995) ,J~,_Cal"ADDAth 620,~i see also Agosta_\("_Astor (20!Ml.12.J2...CgLAJ2QAth59.Q.QQ4; Sl?BY.£L5,ki'i, {;iUJit~J 
PI.lQIi( BgQig,]nc" CZPO 1) 88 c.QL.~.QQAlh_31, 37-38; tfg99.f;!.aLY~.Ki[T1bt;.C!Y QVil.!iJy eit[l;, In(;,H29,::iJ..l~ C~JJ\.pp.4th 
508, 51?; SJjJ{Jns.!s.Y.JL...Watkfns-Johnsoa Co.~) 221 Cal. APD. 3d 79«::! •. e~R.....uQ.caU~Rtu85.) "When the 
employment contract contains an 'at-will' provision, an employee's 'reliance on ... oral promises of continuing 
employment is simply not justifiable[.]" (Mosta v. A5'tQD5uOra, ..1;1JLCaLAQJ2,4tllilt p, (;;Q4.) 
Applying these rules it is apparent that even assuming Potts had produced sufficient evidence to support a 
finding [* 20] that an implied-in-fact agreement eXisted, 6 as a matter of law the existence of an express written 
agreement specifying at-will employment controls and precludes a finding of an implied agreement to the contrary, 
Here, the uncontroverted evidence was that the employment application Potts filled out and signed on September 
16, 1997, stated he was applying for at-will employment. The application contained a "certification and agreement" 
provision signed by Potts stating, "1 understand and agree that if employed, I will be an employee at will. As an 
employee at will: (1) either [Radiosh(lckl .or I may terminate the employment relationship at any time, with or 
without cause; and (2) there is no agreement, express or implied, between [Radioshackl .... and me for any speCific 
period of employment or for continuing or long term employment. 1 understand and agree that if hired my at! -]will 
employment with [RadioshaclD-.,may only be modified by separate written document signed by me and an 
executive officer of the Company." 
FOOTNOTES 
6 Potts relies on testimony from Yazdansharif and his predecessor that B9Qios.h~g:;~, ~only terminated employees 
for good cause and Potts's own testimony he only terminated employees for good cause. He also introduced 
testimony from numerous BQ.diilliha~JL ... nonmanagerial employees who said they believed they could only be 162 
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[*21] Once hired, Potts signed an "employee acknowledgment form" acknowledging receipt of the employee 
handbook on September 29, 1997. In the acknowledgment form, Potts again specifically agreed his "employment 
with [Radioshack] Tis at-Will," he could be terminated at any time with or without cause, and there were no express 
or implied agreements between himself and Racjioshi:lck .. for continuing employment. Potts speCifically agreed that 
although the provisions of the employee handbook were subject to change, R._QQ[Qsb~lCK ... '5 policy of at-will 
employment "may only be modified by a separate written document, signed by me and a [RadiQshackj ~Executive 
Officer." The Radioshack ... employee handbook states Potts was an at-will employee, and at-will status could "on Iy 
be modified by a separate written document, signed by the employee and a [RCldioshqckJ ... Executlve Ofricer." The 
handbook further provided that "[noJ verbal statements made by any officer or employee at any time shall constitute 
an express or implied contract of employment for a specific period of time or for continUing or long term 
employment." Potts testified he saw / read, and signed the application's at-will agreement and the 
employment [*22] acknowledgement form. He testified he received the employee handbook and understood when 
hired he was an at-will employee. 
5.tarzvnski y. Capital Public Radio, Inc., supra, 88 Caj.App.4th 33/ is Instructive. In that case the plaintiff employee 
worked for the defendant employer for 12 years, repeatedly being assured by his supervisor he would only be fired 
for good cause, before signing an '''Employment At-Will Contract And Acknowledgment Form.'" The 
acknowledgement, quite similar to the one before us, provided, '''I understand and agree that my employment is AT· 
WILL and that either [the employer) or I may terminate the employment relationship at any time, with or withou t 
cause or advance notice. I understand further that only the Board of Directors, by affirmative action, has the 
authority to change or make any agreement contrary to this at-will employment relationship.'" (lct,-'ltJ:L.JQ.) After 
signing the form, the plaintiff was again told by his supervisor he would not be terminated as long as his 
performance was satisfactory. When he resigned seven years later and sued alleging constructive discharge, the 
court concluded the express agreement was [*23] controlling and '''precluded the existence of an implied contract 
requiring good cause for termination.' [Citations.]" (lQ~~§.) Even though not a fully integrated employment 
contract, the acknowledgement form signed by the employee, "clearly and unambiguously told him that his 
employment was at will" and further provided the employment relationship could be changed only by the Board of 
Directors. (lg. fl.t p-,- :36.) Similar acknowledgments have been held in other cases to preclude the existence of an 
implied contract to terminate only for good cause, even if they are not part of a fully integrated employment 
agreement. (See Hj}.!JfJaLQJ(., Kimb.er!yQuq lttJI.C9..re, loc .. ,'§'llJ)[g. 3.9 Cp.LAppAthgt 'p',5.1.~ (confidentiality agreement, 
Signed several years after employment began, providing employment was "'at the mutual consent of both parties[ J''' 
and either party '''can terminate the employment relationship at will, at any time, with or without cause or advance 
notice[J'" precluded claim of implied agreement to contrary}; Ca!J1Q.J(~ l~.rter:, !1iHl9~1$, EJIJ.Uf!( & fv!fJrmMQ, s.upri2.~5 
CaL.ll,lWArl1 g1 pp .. 622~63Q [acknowledgment Signed [*24] by plaintiffs agreeing "'employment is at will and can be 
terminated at any time with or without cause'" precluded claim of implied-in-fact contract requiring good cause for 
termination]. ) 
Potts's exclUSive reliance on (IIe!SQ/ULL lJalte/1. Ter;/J.n.QlQg!es.LL95~9 i 7A C_al,App.4th 597, is misplaced. In Nelson, the 
employee "signed an employment application which provided, among other things, that 'J also understand that 
neither this application nor any other communication by any management representative either written or oral, made 
at the time of hire or during the course of employment, is intended in any way to create an employment contrClct.'" 
The court agreed, "this provision did not unambiguously establish at-will employment" and thus did not preclude the 
plaintiff from demonstrating an implied agreement to not terminate except for good cause. The court also found the 
provision "was internally ambiguous and contradictory" because it "attempts to establish a binding employment 
condition while at the same time expressly providing that neither the application nor subsequent communications can 
create a binding employment condition or contract." (lsi.. at 0.615.) [*25] 
Nelson does not stand for the propOSition that an express at-will agreement can be negated by evidence of an 
implied agreement to not terminate absent good cause. Rather, the decision in Nelson is based on the court's finding 
there was not an express at-will agreement. Although Potts describes the employment application language at issue 
in Nelson as being "almost identical as that signed by [him,J" it is not at all similar. The application at issue in 
Nelson, the only document signed by the employee, said nothing about at-will status and contained only a vague 
statement the application did not constitute an employment contract. By contrast, Potts signed an acknowledgment 
on his application, plus a post-hiring acknowledgment that unambiguously stated he understood and agreed he was 
"an employee at will," his employment could "be terminated at any time, with or without causeLJ'" there were no 
express or implied agreements "for any speCific period of employment or for continuing or long term employment£]" 
and that his status as an at-will employee could "only be modified by a separate written document, signed by [him) 
and an Executive Officer (of Radioshackl...-T [*26] "(!tatics added.) 
In conclUSion, because there can be no implied-In-fact contract reqUiring cause for termination when there is also a 
written agreement expressly providing the employment is at will, the jury's verdict on the breach of employment 
contract cause of action is not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the trial court erred when it denied 
the motion for JNOV on this cause of action. We need not address the remaining related issues of whether there was 
substantial eVidence of an implied agreement to terminate only for good cause or whether the jury's finding that 
there was not good cause for termination was supported by the evidence. 
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2. Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
Because Potts's claim for breach of employment contract fails due to his status as an "at-will" employee, his cause of 
action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing fails as well. (See flaJtY,.J'l.QrtlJ.!1merJ\;iIfl 
Wiltb:!LCOrp-,-il.2m...;LCaI.ApP.4th 467~~,1..61.) Potts essentially concedes this paint, agreeing with the legal 
principle "that jf there was no breach of contract, there can be no breach of the implied covenant." [*27] 
C. CFRA Claims 
The jury returned a verdict for Potts on two CFRA-related causes of action. First, the jury found Ri'tOtOS_oac;;k " 
violated the CFRA by refusing to give Potts CFRA-qualifylng leave. Second, the jury found R~l.dIQsbiLck."retallated 
against Potts by terminating his employment because of his request for CFRA leave, 
The CFRA provides "protections to employees needing family leave or medical leave." (Gibbs v, Ameri(:,an Iliffines, 
(ILC. (999) 74 CaLApDAth 1. 6.) As relevant here, the CFRA allows for an employee to take up to 12 weeks of 
medical leave in a year because of a serious health condition. ( § 12945.2, sl!bdS, (a) & (c)(3)(C).) It is unlawful for 
an employer to refuse an employee's request for qualifying medical leave ( Lil215...2 .. ~IJQ\LlQ)). or to discharge or 
discriminate against an employee who requests such qualifying medical leave ( § 12945.2, subd. (1».7 
FOOTNOTES 
7 Because the CFRA is substantively identical to its federal counterpart, the FMLA, California courts routinely rely 
on federal cases in reviewing the CFRA. (See DVd/~y v. Dr;partment of Transportation (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 255, 
2gb; P'H19. \! .. , Bev.Wx Hospital. Inc. (2QQ.QLZ2CaIJ:i.RR .. AttL26U9J.) 
[* 28] 1. Denial of CFRA Leave 
RagjQ.shgc:;!< ?'s primary contention is Potts has failed to prove a violation of the CFRA because he failed to establi sh 
his high cholesterol was a qualifying "serious medical condition." We agree. 
Facts 
Prior to further analyzing the law, we detail the evidence regarding Potts's medical condition. Potts's case was based 
on his and Dr. Sullivan's testimony. (Dr. Sullivan testified as a treating phYSIcian, not an expert Witness.) Dr. 
Sullivan has about 500 patients who have high cholesterol. He considers an ideal total cholesterol level to be below 
200. With levels over 200, there is an increased risk of heart disease, heart attack, stroke, and other circulatory 
diseases. Between a level of 200 and 230, Dr. Sullivan believed there was "wiggle room" as to his level of concern, 
but whenever he saw a total cholesterol level above 230 he was "very concerned." In treating a patient with high 
cholesterol, he considers factors such as diet, exerCise, and stress. Dr. Sullivan believes stress contributes to high 
cholesterol levels, 
111 February 2000, Potts's total cholesterol was 325, an "awful" result. It was the first Dr. Sullivan knew of Potts's 
high cholesterol [*29] problem. Potts explained Dr. Enns was treating him for high cholesterol with medication, but 
Potts had not been taking his medication lately. Dr. Sullivan advised Potts to resume his medication as prescribed by 
Dr. Enns immediately. 
when Dr. Sullivan saw Potts a year later in February 2001, Potts's total cholesterol level was much improved to 
somewhere around 209. When Potts returned in February 2002, his total cholesterol level was back up to 287, Potts 
advised Dr. Sullivan he was taking his medication and being careful about his diet. Dr. Sullivan inquired about Potts's 
stress levels, Potts said he was under a great deal of stress because he had to work so many hours. Dr. Sullivan 
advised Potts to cut back on his hours and wrote a note saying he should not work more than 40 hours a week. Dr. 
Sullivan conSidered the work hours restriction medically necessary to reduce Potts's stress, which in turn would help 
improve his cholesterol levels. 
Dr. Sullivan testified Potts did not have heart disease or high blood pressure. Dr. Sullivan had never prescribed 
cholesterol redUCing medication for Potts, but on occasion gave him free samples of the medication Potts was taking. 
Dr. Sullivan [*30] agreed Potts's job did not cause him to have high cholesterol, rather Potts's stressful reaction to 
his job was a possible factor in the numbers being so high. The only incapacity Potts ever suffered as a result of his 
high cholesterol was the incapacity resulting from Dr. Sullivan's recommendation Potts reduce his work hours so as 
to reduce stress. 
Potts testified Dr. Enns had been treating him for high cholesterol since around 199B. Throughout the time at issue, 
Potts had pretty much always been taking his medication, gOing off it only with Dr. Enns's knowledge to modify it in 
someway or to figure out if it was causing side effects. Potts had a very healthy diet, but the number of hours he 
worked (60 to 70 hours a week) made it very difficult to get any exercise. Potts testified the purpose of the 40 hour 
a week work restriction was to give him more time off to exercise. Potts believed redUCing his stress could help 
reduce his cholesterol levels. He testified that in the four years of being treated for high cholesterol he had 164 
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absolutely no physical symptoms, was never in incapacitated in anyway, and having high cholesterol did not imp act 
his ability to work. 
Ra(:H9s)lil~k ...called [*31] Potts's treating physician, Dr. Enns. He testified to his extensive training in treating high 
cholesterol. He e)(plained high cholesterol is an entirely asymptomatic condition. High Cholesterol is almost always a 
metabolic problem, and although he recommends diet and exercise, the condition is only effectively dealt with 
through use of statin drugs. Dr. Enns reviewed the history of Potts's cholesterol testing and corresponding changes 
to his medication. When Potts's cholesterol level shot back up in February 2002, Dr. Enns increased Potts's 
medication and advised him to resume a low-cholesterol diet. 8y July 2002, Potts cholesterol level was back down to 
"near goa/." 
Dr. Enns testified high cholesterol is a risk factor for developing heart disease, but it can be controlled through 
medication. He testified stress does not cause high cholesterol levels. To his knowledge, no expert has ever related 
stress to high cholesterol, nor did the American Heart Association mention it in its guidelines. Dr. Enns agreed stress 
can impact other "bad habits" such as poor diet and lack of exercise. He testified high cholesterol in no way affected 
a person's ability to work, and conversely one's work [*32] could not affect his or her cholesterol levels ("unless 
the patient was an ice cream taster"). Nothing in Potts's health record indicated he could not work due to his hig h 
cholesterol or that he ever needed to take time off work to recover from physical effects of high Cholesterol. 
RadiOshai;::k .also introduced testimony from an expert witness, cardiologist Dr. JAv. Schapira. As did the other 
doctors, Dr. Schapira explained high cholesterol is one of several risk factors for developing heart disease, but it has 
no symptoms of its own and does not itself incapaCitate a patient in any way. Tens of millions of Americans have 
elevated cholesterol levels. Dr. Schapira testified the only effective treatment regime for high cholesterol is a 
combination of diet, exercise, and statin drugs. Nothing in the "scientific literature show(s] a causa[l] relationship 
between stress and high cholesterol." 
Dr. Schapira opined there was simply no scientific evidence for the proposition that reduced work hours or reduced 
job-related stress could reduce cholesterol levels. When Potts's counsel questioned Dr. Schapira on various articles 
discussing stress in the context of high cholesterol, Dr. Schapira [*33] explained stress was discussed in those 
studies only as It related to other relevant (actors such as diet and exercise. He was unaware of any study, which 
controlled for diet and exercise, suggesting stress directly affected the biochemical or metaboliC response of 
cholesterol production, 
Potts's medical records indicated that other than having high cholesterol, he was very healthy, had no signs of heart 
disease, and had never suffered any physical incapacity as a result of having high cholesterol. Furthermore, Dr. 
Schapira opined that Dr. Enns's records demonstrated when Potts adhered to his drug program, his cholesterol 
levels were controlled and he was at very low risk for developing heart disease. 
Analysis 
To qualify for CFRA leave, the employee must have a "serious health condition that makes the employee unable to 
perform the functions of the pOSition of that employee .... " ( §..1.22.45.2L!i.\J_Qd,.L<;lU),(C).) "'Serious health 
condition' means an illness, injury, impairment, or physical or mental condition that involves either of the following: 
[P] (A) Inpatient care in a hospital, hospice, or reSidential health care facility. [P] (8) Continuing treatment or 
continuing (*34] supervision by a health care provider." ( ~ 12915,2, subd. (gill).) 
The administrative regulations implementing the CFRA provide, "'Serious health condition'" Includes a physical 
condition of the employee involving either: "(1) inpatient care (I.e., an overnight stay) in a hospital, hospice, or 
residential health care facility, or (2) continuing treatment or continuing supervision by a health care provider, as 
detailed in FMLA and its implementing regulations." (Cal...c.90~Rf.gS., Ji.t'_.?1 §]2~7.10, SUQd .. (0).) Accordingly, 
because Potts relies on the second qualifier (I.e., his high cholesterol did not require any inpatient care, but does 
require continuing treatment or supervision), we look to the FMLA and its implementing regulations in assessing 
whether Potts demonstrated a CFRA-qualifying serious medical condition. (See also c_Q[,J:Qd~B.~gs.." lit.. 2, § 
72<;)J.10 [incorporates into CFRA regulations federal regulations interpreting FMlA to extent they are not InconSistent 
with CFRA, California Constitution, or other state laws].) 
The pertinent regulation is 2!LCgde of FeOergJ RegyliltiOn~ Pilrt 61..5,114. As relevant [*35] to this case, it provides 
a '''serious health condition' entitling an employee to FMLA leave means [a) ... physical ... condition that involves: 
. [PJ (2) Continuing treatment by a health care provider. A serious health condition involving continuing treatment 
by a health care provider includes anyone or more of the following: [PJ ... (P] (iii) Any period of incapacity or 
treatment for such incapacity due to a chronic serious health condition. A chroniC serious health condition is one 
which: [P] (A) Requires periodiC visits for treatment by a health care provider ... ; (P] (8) Continues over an 
e)(tended period of time (including recurring episodes of a single underlying condition); and [PJ (C) May cause 
episodic rather than a continuing period of incapacity (e.g., asthma, diabetes, epilepsy, etc.)," e (2.9_C.f~8,.,_§ 
825,114(il).) 
FOOTNOTES 
8 "A serious health condition involving continUing treatment by a health care provider" also includes one causing16 5 
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a period of incapacity (i.e., inability to work) of more than three consecutive calendar days or incapacity due to 
pregnancy-both of which Potts agrees are inapplicable here. (2.2_C~£J-LBJ)2.2 .. J_l!.1(i.1).) 
[* 36] R,a(;Jioshack ,..contends Potts's high cholesterol does not meet the CFRA standard for a serious health 
condition because the uncontroverted evidence is Potts has never suffered any symptoms from the condition and has 
never been in anyway incapacitated by the condition itself. Potts responds to this argument first by contending 
Radioshack ,..waived the issue by failing to request a second (or third) medical opinion, as permitted by ~Q.Y~mmef)t 
Code sec;:tion :1,2945.2 ... SyJ:~Q.lvi!?jo[1 (k)(1)(C). 
Potts relies on two federal cases concerning the FMLA: Thorson V. G.eroin,i. lo.(:" .. (8th Cir. 2000) 205 F.3d 370, and 
Sims v. Alameda-COntra Costa Transit Dist. (N.p.CaL 1998) 2 F. SUPDLMJ.lli. His reliance on those cases is 
misplaced. Although both cases support the proposition that by failing to request further medical certification an 
employer waives challenges to the content of the employee's certification, neither relieves the employee of his 
burden to prove the medical certification demonstrates the statutory requirements for a "serious health 
condition." (Tl19.!son v. Gemini. In.c.,. suora. 205 ~D, .. J.e.l; Sims v .. A@meili1.::.CQillfp.- r;;:~J[JifJsJ.LQi~.L .. sJJ.Qri.>, 2 
F. Supp. 2d at p. 1263.) [*37] In other words, RaOioshack ~might have waived the right to challenge whether 
Potts suffers from high cholesterol, but not the right to challenge whether high cholesterol is a qualifying serious 
health condition within the meaning of the CFRA. 
We agree With Radiosha<;k .that Potts has failed to make a prima facie showing as a matter of law that his high 
cholesterol constitutes a serious health condition qualifying him for leave under the CFRA. Potts agrees he has never 
suffered any physical symptom from high cholesterol, he has never suffered any physical Incapacity as a result, and 
high cholesterol has never interfered with his ability to work. Rather, he contends he is incapacitated by his high 
cholesterol solely due to Dr. Sullivan's advice that he reduce his work hours as a means of reducing stress, which In 
turn could affect his cholesterol levels. 
Even assuming the medical assertion is correct (i.e., that reducing job-related stress would have a positive effect on 
Potts's cholesterol level), the statutory scheme does not provide for protected leave for treatment of a health 
condition that in and of itself has absolutely no impact on the ability to perform job functions. The CFRA [*38] is 
quite clear that to qualify for leave, the employee must have a "serious health condition that makes the employee 
unable to perform the functions of the pOSition of that employee < ••• " ( §...1~9~'tS.2,J_~IJ.PcL (c)G3H~).J Potts agrees 
his high cholesterol has never in any way affected his ability to perform his job. Furthermore, the purpose of the 
work restriction was to reduce stress (with the hope of a positive impact on cholesterol levels), but stress reduction 
is not in itself a proper use of CFRA leave. As the court noted in Q~~Ltt. v,_ Cilrstt;!nCN.p,Gil, 1.996) 941 F. Svpp, 
1,2.J2, everyone "would like to hold a job as stress-free as possible" (id. atjk12:2.5), and undoubtedly everyone 
would like to have the positive health benefits of living stress-free. But stress inheres in most jobs, and here there is 
absolutely no evidence Potts has ever suffered any incapacity as a result of job stress (see Cole \I .. $i!?terso( C/]qrity 
Q/'tl:J!g lfi@.rnate'NQni. (E.D.Tex. 199.9J.7.2...LS1!RQ ... .-2Q.Qfi8. ... 6J2), or from high cholesterol. 
Potts cites HQQQ,f;[l2. v. G~IJg,rqlQynamics C9rAD..$LCir~ 1998LH.4 L3..9.J5L for the propOSition that [*39] 
"incapacity" includes time away from work for treatment for a serious medical condition, not just time away from 
work due to the physical affects of the serious medical condition. But that point is not in dispute. Clearly, under the 
regulations if one suffers from a serious health condition that causes incapacity, protected leave includes time for 
treatment for the incapaCity. But, Hodgens does not stand for the proposition that any health condition becomes a 
qualifying serious health condition simply by virtue of the need to obtain treatment for the health condition. And in 
any event in Hodgens, the employee's serious medical condition ("atrial fibrillation, a serious and potentially life-
threatening heart condition()") was causing physical symptoms ("chest pains, visual problems, and profuse 
perspiration[]") that interfered with the employee's ability to work. (l!1 ... JrrJ2D, l5J~.:-1.'iZ.) 
Potts also places great reliance on 29 Code of.federal Regulations Dart 825.J..l4(Q)alDli)'s definition of a chronic 
serious health condition as including a health condition that, n(C) May cause episodic rather than a continuing period 
of incapacity (e.g., asthma, diabetes, [*40] epilepsy, etc.)." He then pOints us to 29 Cod..~ .. Qf FedS:Ial.R~g1!lati(lfl:; 
part 825.114(e), which explains that work absences attributable to incapacity for chronic serious health conditions 
qualify for leave "even though the employee ... does not receive treatment (rom a health care provider during the 
absence, and even if the absence does not last more than three days. For example, an employee with asthma may 
be unable to report for work due to the onset of an asthma attack or because the employee's health care provider 
has advised the employee to stay home when the pol/en count exceeds a certain level . ... " (Italics added.) Potts 
argues that his chronic high cholesterol is completely analogous to chronic asthma, and pOSits that if under the 
regulations an employee may have CFRA-qualitying leave when having no (or minimal) asthma symptoms, simply so 
as to avoid triggering an asthma attack (or to nip one in the bud), then an employee should Similarly be allowed 
CFRA-qualifying leave so as to reduce his cholesterol levels, even when he is having no physical effects from high 
cholesterol. The analogy is utterly inapt. It goes without saying an employee in the throes of an asthma [*41] 
attack may well be incapable of performing his or her job duties. Thus. a work absence at the onset of, or to avoid 
such a physically incapacitating response is properly protected. But, the uncontroverted evidence here IS that Potts's 
ability to perform his job duties is no different on a day when his cholesterol is high than on a day when it is under 
control. Potts fa iled to present sufficient evidence that high cholesterol is a CFRA-qualifying serious medical 
condition. Accordingly, his cause of action for violation of the CFRA fails. 9 
166 
https:! /www.lexis.comlresearchlretrieve? _ m=702fa8e 12c I ea41 bce60e3dfb28acccc&doCflU... 3/25/2009 
03/25/2009 14:50 FAX 
FOCUS - 5 Results -
I4J 033/068 
Page I () 0 r 14 
FOOTNOTES 
9 In view of this conclusion, we need not address l!adi_Q~t)~ck ~'s contention that Potts also failed to establish he 
was entitled to CFRA leave because he failed to present evidence that RaoLQsh_ilc.1< ~employed 50 or more 
employees within 75 miles of the store at which Potts worked. ( § 12945.2, subd. (b).) 
2_ Retaliation in Violation of CFRA 
Potts also claimed he was fired in retaliation for having requested CFRA leave. Radioshack .contends that because 
Potts's high cholesterol [*42] did not qualify him for CFRA leave, his cause of action for retaliation fails and it was 
entitled to JNOV on the retaliation cause of action as well. 
Potts responds he was not required to prove he actually had a CFRA-qualifylng serious medical condition, only that 
he in good faith believed he was entitled to CFRA leave. His reliance on Flait v.]YQJ1/J.fYTlerif&fl._lftLMc1J.J:9.m"-{ 1992) 
3 Ci;lI.ApPAth 467 (Ffait), in support of his claim is misplaced. Flait was not a CFRA case. Tn Flait, the plaintiff 
claimed he was discharged in retaliation for his efforts to prevent a subordinate from being sexually harassed. The 
court held the plaintiff's reporting of the harassment was protected activity so long as he was motivated by a 
reasonable, sincere, and good faith belief harassment had occurred. (Id. at.JL 4ZZ.) 
Potts's reliance on tf.Q{fr]1..,g.aY~P£ofe5isi.Qf19Lflied.I~m (fItl}. ClL..2QQ5135H..LJ.9..411, is also misplaced. There, 
although the district court had concluded the plaintiff could sue for retaliation regardless of whether she actually 
qualified for FMlA leave, the Court of Appeals specifically found it unnecessary to address that issue. [*43] (la.. at 
p.420.) 
California courts have held that to prevail on a claim of retaliation in violation of CFRA t the employee must prove: 
"( 1) the defendant was an employer covered by CFRA; (2) the plaintiff was an employee eligible to take CFRA leave; 
(3) theplaintiff exercised her right to take leave for a qualifying CFRApurpose; and (4) the plaintiff suffered an 
adverse employment action, such as termination, fine, or suspension, because of her exercise of her right to CFRA 
leave." (QldJllsgy l'~ Department of Transpo(tation,..2Ll2@L_'NJ;;QLAP.R~11h..atJL,..2Q_L italics added.) Because we ha ve 
concluded Potts's high cholesterol did not qualify him for CFRA leave, we agree with RQdjQ~hQ(;J<: ythat his cause of 
action for retaliation fails. 
D. Wrongful Termination 
RaclJQ.sj1gck ... also contends the trial court erred by denying JNOV on Potts's cause of action for wrongful termination 
in violation of public policy. We disagree. 
The common law tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policies may be based on the policies set forth in 
the CFRA. (Ne!~Qn_.'t..,_ United Iechnoloqies, supra,~:1 Cal.App.4th at p. 612 [violation of CFRA may form [*44] basis 
of employee's claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy}.) RaQiQshack ~is correct that because Potts 
failed to prove violations of the CFRA, it does not support the wrongful termination tort. (See Jennings v. Marral'e 
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 12L US~l;36 [employee could not assert a common law claim for wrongful termination in violation 
of public policies embodied in FEHA when there was no Violation of FEHA].) Accordingly, we need not discuss that 
ground as support for the jury's verdict further. 
Potts's wrongful termination cause of action was also premised upon a violation of the public policy set forth in tlhe 
FEHA. (See Citv of Moorpark v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1143, 1161 [disability discrimination in violation of 
FEHA can form the basis of common law wrongful termination claim].) The FEHA protects against discrimination 
based upon an actual disability and or perceived disability. (See § 12926.1, subd. (d) (FEHA "provide[s) protection 
when an individual is erroneously or mistakenly believed to have any physical or mental condition that limits a rnajor 
life activity"].) 
Potts's complaint contained a cause [*45] of action alleging a violation of the FEHA due to "perceived disability 
discrimination," namely I high blood pressure. The factual basis for the claim was Yazdansharif's testimony he 
thought Potts's medical restriction to work no more than 40 hours a week was due to "high blood pressure and 
stress'" In the special verdict form, as to the perceived disability discrimination cause of action, the jury found 
BiJdioshack Tin fact did regard "Potts as having a physical disability-high blood pressure-that limited his ability to 
work[.]" But, it found the perceived disability of high blood pressure was not a motivating reason for Potts's firing. 
However, in the special verdict form, as to the wrongful termination cause of action, the jury found the perceived 
disability of high blood pressure was a motivating reason for Potts's firing. 
There is no dispute the jury's special verdict was inconsistent-it gave opPOSite answers to the exact same question. 
Such inconSistent verdicts are against the law and require a new trial. (Shaw v. Hughes Aircraft Co. (2000) 83 
Cc;lI.AQPAt/J. UJ9.LD1.4.) 
R.adiosh{\ck ... 's rather terse argument that the inconsistent findings mandated JNOV is [*46] not well taken. Th e 
case upon which it relies, Trujillo v. North County Transit Dist. (1998) 63 CaI.ADp.4th.2Jill, is distinguishable. In that 
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case, an express finding in the special verdict against the plaintiffs on one cause of action precluded the court from 
implying a foundational finding that was legally required (but which the jury had not been asked to make) to support 
the special verdict in the plaintiffs' favor on another cause of action. By contrast, here the jury was asked to make 
the exact same express factual finding on different causes of action, and came up with exact oPPosite results. When 
the jury makes "inconsistent determinations of fact based on the same evidence," a new trial is the appropriate 
remedy. (Cgv?lliJIQ,'L Mjchelin Tire COfQ. .. H9Z9196 CaL App. Jd 95, tOLl57 Cill, Rptr. 60Z.) 
Although primarily raised in the context of Potts's appeal of the new trial order, we will comment here on Potts's 
argument that RQQiQ.~hgck .... has waived complaints about the inconsistent verdict. The record Indicates RadioshCliCk .. 
's counsel prepared the special verdict form (which Potts's counsel approved). Although Radioshack ... denies it Is 
doing so, [*47] it is in fact contending the special verdict form it prepared was defective because It asked the jury 
to decide the same factual issue twice, thus inviting an Inconsistent verdict. In this case, It Is clearly invited error. 
(See Mesecher v. County of San Diego (1992) 9 CaI.AJ2IL"itt:LLQ?l.L~1.Q.61 [inconsistent answers to special 
verdict questions did not invalidate jury's verdict where appellant participated in drafting special verdict form and 
specifically wanted both questions on verdict form].) 
Our agreement with Potts on this point does not, however, win the day for him. As we noted above, an inconsistent 
verdict usually requires a new trial and indeed was one of the grounds on which Radioshack ... sought new trial. But, 
the trial court granted Radioshack ... ·s motion for new trial solely on the grounds of jury misconduct. And as we 
conclude below, that order must be affirmed. 
IV 
pons's APPEAL OF ORDER GRANTING NEW TRIAL 
Potts appeals the order granting new trial due to juror misconduct. He contends there was no misconduct, and even 
jf there was, there was no possible prejudice to fu!.QiQ!ib..Q.~k_ .. as a result. We disagree. 
A. Facts 
RadiQsb9J:..k..T's cross-complaint against [*48] Potts alleged he violated Penall&d.!;..s!!cti.Qn~.6.31 and ~Ll by 
recording confidential conversations without consent. The court instructed the jury that to establish a violation of 
peni'll C.P.~. se~tion 632, Radioshack ... had to prove: (1) that Potts intentionally recorded his conversations with 
Yazdansharif USing an electronic device; (2) RadiQshCl.ch: .and Yazdansharif had a reasonable expectation the 
conversation was not being overheard or recorded; and (3) Potts did not have consent to record from all parties to 
the conversation. The jury was also instructed that a conversation "was confidential if a party to that conversation 
has an objectively reasonable expectation that the conversation is not being overheard or recorded." The jury was 
instructed "Potts acted intentionally if he intended to record[,J" and it was no defense that he did not know it wa s 
illegal or believed it to be legal. The jury ruled against fl.£ldioshQJ;;k . ...on its cross-complaint. 
Ril.QjQs.h9ck .'s motion for new trial due to juror misconduct included a declaration from Juror Maggie Caffrey. As 
relevant here, she stated, "[d)uring deliberations, juror Dale [*49] Miller, the foreman, told us that Potts had a 
legal right to record the conversations he had with [Yazdansharif] about his desire to work fewer hours. [PJ ... 
Many of the jurors, including myself, expressed confusion about whether the recording was illegaL [Juror) Miller 
repeatedly told us that Potts('s] recording was legal. He said that he looked up the issue on the internet and found 
that Potts has a right to record the conversation because it was about his life. Most of the jurors said they believed 
foreman Miller and expressed agreement that Potts had a legal right to record his conversations with .RadiOs,h.i!Q:,. Tn 
Another juror, Mike Bolourchi, submitted a virtually identical declaration regarding Juror Miller's statements, with the 
exception that he said Miller told other jurors "he read that Potts has a right to record the conversation because it 
was about his life." 
In opposition to the new trial motion, Potts submitted a declaration from Juror Miller. Juror Miller denied having told 
other jurors he had researched the recording issue on the Internet or read about it, and denied having done any 
independent research. Rather, he had "express[ed) my opinion that I believed [*50] ... Potts had a right to 
openly record conversations with his supervisor because they concerned his own personal life, not any confidential 
company information." Potts also submitted a declaration from Juror laurel Jones. She stated Juror Miller never said 
anything about independently researching (on the Internet or reading) about Potts's rights to record the 
conversations. 
In granting the new trial motion, the court explained that in its view "when you boil it all down [this case] revolves 
around ... Potts'[sJ insistence on audio taping conversations between himself and ... certain R,adJoshack • 
personnel." R?dioshacK.Y's pOSition was its corporate policy prohibited recording without consent of all parties, its 
supervisor was unwilling to be recorded, and Potts's refusal to disCUSS his request for medical leave "without 
recording the conversations constituted insubordination and grounds for termination." Potts's position was the 
charge of insubordination was simply a pretext for firing him because of his request for CFRA-qualifying medical 
leave. 
Although the trial court would not specifically find Juror Miller had in fact independently researched the law, it to und 
he "introduced [*51] into the deliberation process, and quite emphatically so, a (mis)statement of the law 
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concerning the 'right' of an individual to record a private conversation to which he is a party, a point of law which 
was not contained in the instructions .... (PJ Based upon the representations in the declarations that 'many' jurors 
were confused about the legality of individuals recording conversations, the [cJourt is of the opinion that the 
offending juror's emphatic inFusion of some legal principle of his own creation improperly Influenced jurors votes In 
this case," 
B. Standard of Review 
"'In reviewing (an] order granting a new trial, we apply the following rule: "The determination of a motion for a new 
trial rests so completely within the court's discretion that its action will not be disturbed unless a manifest and 
unmistakable abuse of discretion clearly appears. This is particularly true when the discretion Is exercised In favor of 
awarding a new trial, for this action does not finally dispose of the matter. So long as a reasonable or even fairly 
debatable justification under the law is shown for the order granting the new trial, the order will not be set aside. 
[Citations. [*52] )" [Citations.]'" (Rom~rQ.v. Riggs (1994) 24 C;i3IARp.4th H7, 12l.) 
"In ruling on a request for a new trial based on jury misconduct, the trial court must undertake a three-step Inquiry. 
[Citation.] First, It must determine whether the affidavits supporting the motion are admissible. (EYiO-,-C<2c!e .. § 
1150.) If the evidence IS admissible, the trial court must determine whether the Facts establish misconduct. 
[Citation.] lastly, assuming misconduct, the trial court must determine whether the misconduct was prejudicial. 
[Citations.] A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on each of these issues, and its rulings will not be disturbed 
absent a clear abuse of discretion. [Citations.]" (People v. D9IS£'~.u995) 34.C9J.8RP.L'illl 69.4,]0.3:7.01.) 
C. Analysis 
Potts's challenge to the new trial order rests upon the second and third parts of the court's Inquiry-whether the facts 
establish misconduct and whether the misconduct was prejudicial. 
Potts contends Juror Miller did not commit misconduct. He asserts the comments to the jury regarding the legality of 
Potts's recording his conversations with Yazdansharif were, [*53) at worst, indicative of Juror Miller's 
misunderstanding of the law as contained in the jury instructions and as such were no more than deliberative error 
which may not be used to impeach a verdict. (See Sm..QJs.g1!~fre MurraY', Ltd~ .v.~-'':1Jj1s...CQn'r(;te..CQf151nlC1iQI! J;O. 
(1991) 234 Ci,ll. App. 3d F~4, PSO. 2~9 (al. Rptr. 435.) 
Although we agree jury verdicts should not be lightly set aside, the decision about juror misconduct was the trial 
court's to make. We cannot say the court abused its discretion in finding Juror Miller's statements constituted 
misconduct. The facts here go beyond mere deliberative error. The court instructed the jury on the law regarding 
illegal recording of conversations. Those instructions were essentially that it is illegal to intentionally record a 
conversation in which any party has an objectively reasonable expectation that the conversation Is not being 
overheard or recorded without consent to record from all parties to the conversation. Juror Miller injected into the 
deliberations more than just his interpretation of the law as contained in those instructions. He purported to instruct 
the jury on additional law about which the jury had no [*54] instructions-namely that the content of the 
conversations was an element and conversations "about [one's) life" were removed from the purview of Pene'll Code 
seetiQI'] 6.32. 
Furthermore, the record supports the concluSion Juror Miller purported to have acquired his erroneous knowledge by 
Independently researching, a statement which would have the effect of bolstering his opinion. Potts argues the court 
specifically found Juror Miller made no such claim when it stated it could not find he had independently researched. 
But whether Juror Miller in fact did independentfy research the law is different than whether he represented to his 
fellow jurors that he had done 50. When granting the new trial, the court specifically cited as part of the factual basis 
for its ruling the statements in Juror Caffrey's and Juror Bolourichi's declarations regarding Juror Miller's claim to 
have "looked up the issue on the Internet" or "read" about the issue. It ruled those statements were admissible. 
A jury may not consider extraneous law any more than It may consider extraneous evidence. (Peppi/!:. v" 1'1?1.[~fJf!l( 
09.W2Q Cal.3d 907, 950, 269 Cal. Rptr. 269.) The jury may [*55] only consider statements of law set forth in 
the jury instructions given by the court. ([n rc $ti3nl<;ewitz 098';;)4Q C::al._3d :391, 39,7, 220 Cal. Rptr. 382.) "Jurors 
cannot, without violation of their oath, receive or communicate to fellow jurors information from sources outside the 
evidence in the case. (Citation.] Communication to fellow jurors of information on an issue under litigation except in 
open court and in the manner provided by law constitutes misconduct. [Citation.]" (YQungy~J2ruf.lkili:dU1986Ll!il 
Cal. ADP. 3d 1344, 1349-13SQ. 2.:,32 Cal.. Hptr. !:iSS.) "When extraneous law enters a jury room-i.e., a statement of 
law not given to the jury in the instructions of the court-the defendant is denied his constitutional right to a fair trial 
unless the People can prove that no actual prejudice resulted." (Tn rr; St.fJfJ,ke.W/tz, supra, 40 C:a!.3d at p, 397.) 
We similarly find no abuse of discretion in the court's finding of prejudice. Contrary to Potts's assertion that we 
should review prejudice independently, as a mixed question of law and fact, the Supreme Court has made clear that 
on review of an order granting a new trial, the standard [*56J of review is abuse of discretion. (PeQpl(! v, Ault 
(2QQ11..3J CaI3Jb.1250, 1271-1272.) "Since the trial judge had all the evidence before him on the merits of the 
case, and as well the conflicting affidavits, he was in the best position to evaluate the prejudicial effect of the alleged 
misconduct." (City of..Pleasant Hill v. First Baptist Church_U 969) l,Cal. ApR. 3d ~'§4, 430~ 82 .C.~L RR1LJ·) 
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The trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding Juror Miller's misconduct was prejudicial. Potts argues the 
evidence of misconduct was weak. We disagree. Two Jurors declared that Juror Miller advised them Potts had a legal 
right to record the conversations with YazdanshariF because the conversations were "about his life." Juror Miller 
confirmed he told the other jurors Potts had a right to record the conversations "because they concerned his own 
personal life, not any confidential company information." Potts also contends there was no possibility of prejudice 
from Juror Miller's statements because the statements only concerned B,adiQs.l:l2cK .• '5 cross-complaint for violation of 
Pen.gj. Code section 0;1.2. and had no relevance to the main action. [*57] Nonsense. As the trial court aptly 
surmised, Potts's insistence on recording his conversations with Yazdansharif, and whether such recording was 
proper, was key to the wrongful termination case. The declarations support the court's conclusion that Juror Miller's 
"emphatic infusion of some legal principle of his own creation Improperly influenced the jurors votes In this case. " 
The jurors' declarations state several jurors expressed confusion about the legality of recording the conversation 5, 
and once Juror Miller repeatedly told them Potts's recording was legal because it concerned hiS own life, the "jurors 
said they believed [him) and expressed agreement that Potts had a legal right to record his conversations with 
Radioshack .• " 
v 
POTTS'S PROTECTIVE APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT: 
NONSUIT ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES CLAIM 
The trial court granted Ri:!9jQsnacl5 ~'s motion for nonsuit on Potts's causes of action for disability discrimination, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and on his request for punitive damages. Potts filed a protective cross-
appeal from the judgment, but the only issue he raises is the propriety of the order granting nonsuit on his claim for 
punitive damages. 10 Furthermore, ("'58] he agrees the order granting nonsuit on punitive damages should only be 
addressed if we reverse the new trial order. Because we affirm the order granting new trial, we will not discuss the 
punitive damages claim further. 
FOOTNOTES 
10 The grant of nonsuit on Potts's disability discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional distress causes of 
action was dispositive of those causes of action. (fQJ.llJJ.g!O_ 'Iillley Chateau. BlancJiQ11JCQYfJl~~A?!i.I1LJ!.,. 
Depi'lrtmentQf Vet.e.aws Affairs (1998) 67J:;;gl.ADp.4th 741,]51 ("The reason for the 'dispositive' motions is that 
the plaintiff cannot win, because the plaintiff has presented insufficient evidence to support a favorable 
judgment"].) Accordingly, we agree with RgQ.(O!i.hru;;k_"that Potts's failure to challenge those rulings on appeal 
precludes those causes of action From being reconsidered in a new trial. 
V 
PENDING MOTION FOR COSTS 
RadlOshack .... has filed a motion demanding that Potts pay one-half of ~!3c!i.oshClCk .'5 costs of preparing a record on 
appeal under California Rules of Court, ryleJQ(gl [*59] . U The declarations from counsel do not appear to conflict 
on the salient facts. Prior to filing its motions for new trial and JNOV, Ri;ldiQshac.k .. paid $ 10,500 for an original and 
one copy of most of the reporter's transcript from the trial. Potts purchased copies of that reporter's transcript from 
the reporter. When Potts Filed his notice of appeal, he deSignated select portions of the trial proceedings to be 
included in the reporter's transcript. However, he did not deposit costs of preparing an original reporter's transcript, 
or file a certified copy of the proceedings (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4(b)), and the superior court issued a default 
notice. Potts tried to lodge his copies of the reporter's transcript, but was told only an original could be used. Potts's 
counsel wrote to Radioshack ... 's counsel asking her to confirm that Rac!ioshgck ... would be providing us with the 
original reporter's transcript. Radioshack .... 's counsel responded it was Potts's responsibility to procure the record for 
appeal. Potts then paid the reporter $ 900 to prepare a duplicate original of the reporter's transcript which was filed. 
FOOTNOTES 
11 CilJifornia R\.ltl;'s. oJJ;;.QurL...rule .. tQ.W pertaining to multiple appeals in the same case provides that "only one 
record need be prepared" and in such a case separately represented appellants "must equally share the cost at 
preparing the record, unless otherwise agreed by the appellants or ordered by the superior court." 
(*60J RgdiQs.hacK · .. -then filed its notice of appeal, designated the entire reporter's transcript as part of the record 
on appeal, and depOsited the amou nt estimated by the reporter for preparation of the complete trial transcript-$ 
4, 700.~diQshClck. ·.wrote to Potts demanding pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 10Ca), he pay one-half of 
the costs of preparing the reporter's transcript, including in its demand not only the amount it depOSited, but also 
the amount it had earlier paid to obtain the reporter's transcript for new trialnNOV motions. In other words, 
RpQ.lQ~!J.QQs...demanded Potts pay one-half of $ 15,200. Potts refused asserting the new charges of $ 4,700 were 
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largely comprised of preparing duplicate originals of the reporter's transcripts 8-\'ldiQShack .had already purchased 
and could have provided for purposes of this appeal. 
We are unsympathetic towards RaQio,S!l';H:k .... on this issue, Although Potts initially defaulted under California Rul.es of 
CQurt. rule 4, he cured his default by expending $ 900 to obtain duplicate originals of the reporter's transcript and 
lodging them with the superior court, RQPiQ~hq~k .... then filed its notice of appeal, [*61] spent $ 4,700 largely to 
obtain new originals of reporter's transcripts it had already purchased, and now seeks to force Potts to kick in ha If of 
the total $ 15,200 costs of obtaining two sets of originals, We have discretionary authority to make any appropriate 
award or apportionment of costs on appeal (Qll, E\1.![es.Qf .c9J.!ct, r,yle U.(a)l'U), Accordingly, we deny HadiOSha,ck; .... '5 
motion and order that the parties shall each bear their own costs incurred on this appeal. 
VII 
DISPOSITION 
The order denying Radios,haCk .... 's motion for ]NOV is reversed. The matter is remanded with directions that the trial 
court enter a new order granting Radioshack .... ·5 motion for JNOV as to the complaint's causes of action for breach of 
employment contract, breacr1 of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, violation of CFRA rights, and 
retaliation in violation of CFRA. The order granting RaQiQs.tlil.!:k,-.·s motion for new trial is affirmed as to the cause of 
action for wrongful termination in violation of public poliCy. Radioshack ... 's motion to compel Potts to share its costs 
of preparing the reporter's transcript on appeal is denied. In the interests of justice, the parties shall bear 
their [*62J own costs on this appeal. 
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MARICOPA 
ROBERT F. BLA.HA, a married man, ) 
individually and as the son of ) 
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JAMES GANEM, M.D., et aI., 
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Phoenix, Arizona 
April 15, 2008 
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1 PROCEEDINGS 
2 (Trial continues.) 
3 THE COURT; And that all being said. we'll continue 
4 with the examination of Dr. Schapira. 
5 MR. REYNOLDS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
6 JAY N. SCHAPIRA, 
7 called as a witness herein, having been previously 
8 sworn upon his oath, resumes the witness stand, is 
9 examined, and testifies as follows: 
10 DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued) 
11 BY MR. REYNOLDS: 
12 Q. Dr. Schapira. do you recall from the 
13 deposition of Alex Milenkov reviewing that record as to 
14 whether or not he commented that the catheter had 
15 jumped a little bi during the March 12th. 2004 
16 procedure? 
17 A. Yes, I do. 
18 Q. Okay. And based on that observation, could 
19 you tell the Jury what your expert opinion is in that 
20 regard? 
21 A. Yes. When you see a jumping of the catheter 
22 that's consistent with some technical problems -- the 
23 angulation, the fact that the lesion is not giving, and 
24 it's consistent with the problem with the quickness and 
25 speed which the catheter is being pushed through the 
Judie Bryant - Certified Reporter 
I4J 040/068 
174 
03/25/2009 14:52 FAX 
Page 4 
artery -
2 MR. SKELTON: Objection, Your Honor, as to 
3 foundation. IMth all due respect, Dr. Schapira wasn't 
4 there for him to speculate here. 
5 THE COURT: He'll be subject to cross-examination. 
6 I'm going to allow him to testify as to what 
7 significance·- and there may be different explanations 
8 for it -- of what a jumping catheter might indicate. 
9 And he's going to be cross-examined, and they'll be 
10 other experts called on the issue. 
11 The objection is overrured. 
12 Go ahead. Dr. Schapira. 
13 A. r think the answer was finished. Was there 
14 another question? 
15 Q. BY MR. REYNOLDS: No, I just wanted to --
16 that's fine. 
17 Can you -- I'd just like you to look. 
18 I've put up the Page from the procedure log, the March 
19 12,2004 procedure log. And can you teU me when it's 
20 your opinion that the perforation occurred with respect 
21 to Mary Blaha during this procedure? 
22 A. I believe, sir that it occurred -- first of 
23 all, it's not exactfy marked down here. I believe, 
24 sir, it's between 1712 and 1716. 
25 Q. Okay. 
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1 A. We can see where the 1.4 millimeter was 
2 inserted over the wire, and then we can see where the 
3 1716 - where the angiomax strip and the Reopro were 
4 discontinued. Those are blood thinners, powerful blood 
5 thinners that Mary was getting. And so when -- there's 
6 a hole basically that's blown in the side of the artery 
7 -- the artery is leaking. Torrents of blood come 
8 through, and so you want to stop the blood thinners so 
9 hopefully there will be some clotting and the bleeding 
10 will stop. It's like the sealing of the hole in the 
11 artery. Similar to when you draw blood from an artery 
12 or a vein; you try to get the bleeding to stop. 
13 Q. And just to kind of jump from the .9 
14 millimeter to the 1.4, is it your understanding in this 
15 case that that's what occurred; it started off with a 
16 .9 and went to a 1.4 millimeter? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. And can you describe for the Jury what the 
19 difference is in the thickness of the catheters between 
20 a.9anda1.4? 
21 A. Well, yes. It's just what the numbers say;.9 . 
22 millimeters versus 1.4 at the catheter tip, and it's 
23 just the number of fibers. It's the array of the 
24 fibers, and it's the hole that the fibers will leave 
25 when they're pushed through the lesion. 
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1 Now if you'll look at the volume of that, 
2 if you think three dimensional and you take Pi R 
3 squared, which is the radius -- excuse me, "R" being 
4 the radius and "pi" being 3,14 - and square the 
5 radius, you come out with a number so the .14 is -- I 
6 don't want to waste time doing the math, but it's 
7 roughly twice as big. Maybe I'll do it at break and do 
8 the arithmetic. 
9 Bull mean A 1.4 is considerably bigger 
10 than a 0.9, if you take Pi R squared, and it's a bigger 
11 thing to push through. And the way this works is it 
12 photoablates. The optical energy ablates the 
13 cholesterol and plaque and melts it away. "Melts" is 
14 not the right term. And so you want to move it in such 
15 a way so it has time to do that. You won't want to use 
16 it as a battering ram; and when you do, it'll jump. 
17 Q. And is a jump then consistent with a 
18 perforation, in your opinion? 
19 A. It's consistent with pushing too hard, too 
20 quick, and a perforation, yes. 
21 Q. Okay. Do you know or can you tell us whether 
22 or nol in Ihis case Dr. Ganem took the appropriate 
23 precautions for the setup of this procedure? 
24 A. To a degree, yes, sir. 
25 Q. And can you tell us with respect to whether or 
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not it was below the standard of care for him not to 
2 have had an echocardiogram machine available in the 
3 cath lab? 
4 A. Yes, sir. Echocardiogram was not available 
5 readily for the cath lab. 
6 Q. And was that something that -- in other words, 
7 my understanding is a perforation is a known risk of 
8 the procedure; correct? 
9 A. Yes. sir. particularly in a patient like Mary 
10 with her risk factors. 
11 Q. Okay. And is it the standard of care that a 
12 doctor should try to anticipate what might happen and 
13 have the right equipment there for any emergency that 
14 may arise? 
15 A. Yes, sir. Under normal circumstances you 
16 should. and particularly if you're doing a case which 
17 is high risk, because of the anatomic features that we 
18 talked about this morning. and when it's your second 
19 case and where you've had a dissection before and 
20 problems delivering devices in the vessel from prior 
21 experience in December. 
22 Q. I'd like to--
23 MR. REYNOLDS: Exhibit 28, which is the lab 
24 schedule for Friday, March 12th. 
25 Any objections? 
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1 MR. KENT: It's irrelevant. 
2 MR. SKELTON: Join. 
3 MR. REYNOLDS: Your Honor, I'd like to offer it for 
4 just pOint of timing --
5 MR. KENT: Your Honor --
6 MR. REYNOLDS: -- as to when she was scheduled. 
7 MR. KENT: Timing is on the log. 
B THE COURT: I'm going to -- I'll admit it. When 
9 other procedures were scheduled of other patients isn't 
10 relevant. Buy if you want --
11 Go ahead. 
12 MR. REYNOLDS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
13 THE COURT: I'll overrule the objection. 
14 Q. BY MR. REYNOLDS: Dr. Schapira, what's been 
15 admitted as Exhibit'No. 28 is the Banner Medical Center 
16 Cath Lab lab schedule for Friday, March 12th, 2004. Do 
17 you see that? 
18 A. Yes, sir. 
19 Q. And the other patients' names have been taken 
20 out of this document for their protection. And I want 
21 to just show you the scheduling of this procedure was 
22 . at 1630. What time is that? 
23 A. 4:30 p.m. 
24 Q. And with respect to scheduling a procedure 
25 like this in the late -- in the afternoon, are there 
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1 any potential problems with scheduling something, a 
2 laser procedural like this, so late in the day? 
3 MR. SKELTON: Foundation, Your Honor, 
4 THE COURT: Counsel will you approach for just a 
5 second. 
6 (An off-the-record bench conference is held by 
7 Court and counsel.) 
8 THE COURT: I will allow the question to be asked 
9 and answered consistent with disclosures and 
10 information that would have been contained in 
11 deposition or other records here, but not about to 
12 paint a broad brush, we should be dealing with 
13 particular -- with a particular concern, 
14 Q. BY MR. REYNOLDS: Dr. Schapira, based upon 
15 your review of the discovery in this case, did you --
16 did you come to an understanding as to when the Echo 
17 Department would have shut down with respect to the 
18 hospital at a particular time? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. And what is that understanding? 
21 A. 5 p.m. 
22 Q. And after that, what would someone have to do 
23 in order to obtain an echo machine? 
24 A. They would have to unlock the echo room, go to 
25 the room where they're kept, and unlock and get a key 
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1 and unlock it. 
2 Q. Would there be also another procedure where 
3 they could call -- in other words, call a tech and have 
4 them come in. but again that would take some time to 
5 have happen? 
6 A. Yes, sir. A tech would have to be called in. 
7 They leave, it's my understanding, at 5:00 and a tech 
8 would need to be called in for an emergency. 
9 Q. Okay, thank you. 
10 A. They don't stay on the campus. 
11 Q. Okay. Now based upon your review of the 
12 procedure log, can you tell us as to whether or not 
13 any -- there was any reversal of the anticoagulants? 
14 A. No, sir, there was not any reversal of the 
15 anticoagulants in terms of medicines that could help to 
16 stop the bleeding. 
17 Q. Okay. And the reversal of the anticoagulants 
18 is to accomplish what? What are you trying to 
19 accomplish here? 
20 A. Well, sir, When there is a perforation of the 
21 coronary artery with a laser catheter, realize this is 
22 an or arterial -- artery bleeding under pressure, and 
23 the pressure in the artery was about .- over 200 write 
24 before the perforation occurred. So with a pressure of 
25 over 200 -- you see right here at 1710 a pressure of 
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212 over 92. And that's the last pressure that we see 
2 before the perforation. 
3 What we see is that blood squirts out. 
4 Literally it's what we call a "squirter", and the blood 
5 squirts out under pressure. And so the purpose is to 
6 stop the blood, bleeding. There's several ways we go 
7 about it, and one way is to reverse the anticoagulants. 
8 Anticoagulants are these powerful drugs 
9 that we use to stop the blood from clotting during the 
1 0 laser procedure, because otherwise the laser catheter 
11 can cause clotting inside the artery, and that's a bad 
12 thing. So we give these strong anticoagulants. 
13 But if there is a mishap like there is 
14 here, the bleeding needs to stop; and to get the blood 
15 to stop, get the blood to coagulate, you have to 
16 reverse the anticoagulants, and there's certain ways 
17 that we have to do that. 
18 Q. Okay. Dr. Schapira, when the perforation 
19 occurred around this 171211716 time frame, should that 
20 have been one of the first matters that should have 
21 occurred, a reversal of the anticoagulants? 
22 A. Yes, sir. To reverse the anticoagulants, not 
23 just to stop the two -- and that we see there at 1634, 
24 where Angiomax and Reopro were both discontinued -- but 
25 then to give blood factors, blood products to stop the 
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bleeding, to slow down the bleeding as much as 
2 possible, in addition to other things, to try to treat 
3 the problem. 
4 O. Should fluids have been given at that time as 
5 well? 
6 A. Yes, sir. Fluids need to be given, as well as 
7 other measures, like medicines to raise the blood 
8 pressure, called pressors, when we see the blood 
9 pressure go to 72 over 36. And those copious fluids I 
10 don't see begun here. It's not noted. High rates of 
11 flood, just turn up the IV wide open. Get another IV, 
12 gel the -- pour the fluids in to raise the blood 
13 pressure. 
14 And as far as the pressor medications to 
15 raise the blood pressure, like dopamine and 
16 epinephrine, those weren't started until 1737. So from 
17 1718, when the pressure is low, to 1737 is 
18 approximately 19 minutes. It should have been done 
19 immediately, 
20 O. Okay. Now there's been testimony in the case 
21 with respect to what occurred after the perforation. 
22 And can you explain to the Jury from the procedural eye 
23 what occurred next? 
24 A. From the procedure log there were a number of 
25 things that occurred, We see that the Speclranectics' 
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1 balloon -- Spectranectics' catheter that caused the 
2 perforation was removed at 1718.21. 
3 Q. It says "balloon" there. Do you believe that 
4 that's referring to the laser? 
5 A. Yes, it's the Spectranectics catheter. Yes. 
6 And a Maverick balloon was put in. Now a Maverick 
7 bal/oon--
8 May r draw a little picture, is that okay? 
9 Or I can draw in the air. 
10 MR REYNOLDS: Can he step over to the easel? 
11 THE COURT: Sure, if you want. 
12 If it needs to be moved out a little bit 
13 or counsel needs to move it to see what's being done, 
14 you can move. 
15 A. I'm just drawing a picture of just an artery. 
16 but here's just to show the principal where the artery 
17 is like this and the blood of course flows inside. 
18 Blood flows inside the artery. and suddenly now there's 
19 a hole inside of the artery, and now the blood is 
20 coming out. 
21 And to stop the blood coming out, of 
22 course we're talking about anticoagulants. And also a 
23 balloon can be inserted, and a balloon would interpose 
24 itself over the hole so as to plug the leak. And the 
25 purpose would be at the balloon to -- you have the 
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1 balloon in here. You inflate it -- and please imagine 
2 this three dimensions. It now stops the leak. And 
3 that's a good thing to do. 
4 That's the proper way to treat it is to 
5 occlude the hole with a balloon, and the Maverick 
6 balloon was put in for that purpose. It needs to be 
7 left up at least 5 to 10 minutes minimal so as to 
8 continue to plug the hole while other things are 
9 happening and you're stabilizing your patient. 
10 Q. And was the balloon inflated for that amount 
11 of time according to the procedure log? 
12 A. According to the procedure log, it was 
13 inflated for 112 seconds, and it was inflated for 40 
14 seconds. So 40 seconds at 1717.54 and 112 seconds at 
15 1718.52, and then it came down and then a profusion 
16 balloon was placed at 1723. 
17 So there was a gap ;n the inflation time 
18 of roughly from 1718 until 1723. So approximately 5 
19 minutes there was no occlusion of the hole. 
20 Q. And during that time what is occurring? 
21 A. Blood is pouring out the side just like in the 
22 little picture and it's leaking into the pericardial 
23 space, and the blood is accumulating under pressure and 
24 tamponade is occurring, cardiac tamponade; and the 
25 pressure of course is dropping. In fact it's already 
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dropped. You see at 1718 it was at 72 over 36, which 
2 is shock. 
3 a. And now was there a code called at some point 
4 in time during the procedure? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. And when was that? 
7 A. I believe that's about 1723. It's not on this 
8 sheet. I think it's on another sheet. It's called, I 
9 think. the "code sheet". 
10 Q. If you look at the entry for 1720:12. it says, 
11 "Dr. Stein Page d. Code called./I Do you see that? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 a. At some point Dr. Stein arrived? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. And J believe you testified to this, but you 
16 do have experience in a pericardiocentesis procedure? 
17 A. Yes, sir. 
18 Q. And you can perform them. correct? 
19 A. Yes, r do perform them. 
20 Q. And with respect to when Dr. Stein came in. 
21 what was his function at that point in time? 
22 A. Dr. Stein came in at about 1724, I believe. 
23 And his function, as it states here, was to perform a 
24 pericardiocentesis to relieve the fluid from the 
25 pericardial space by sticking a needle in and removing 
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it, do a pericardiocentesis. We also tall it "tap" 
2 sometimes. 
3 Q. Now with respect to Mary Blaha's case, was 
4 this a blind procedure? 
5 A. Well. no, it was not blind. i mean you had 
6 imaging in the room. You had fluoroscopy. We've been 
7 talking this morning about fluoro pedals and cine 
8 pedals. All that big equipment was right there. J 
9 mean it had been making pictures. We saw angiograms 
10 that had been made just minutes before and all that 
11 equipment was there, so this was not blind. You could 
12 certainly use that f1uoro imaging, and you can see the 
13 heart and you can see the needle and know where you're 
14 going. 
15 Q. I just want to make sure we're clear. Your 
16 testimony is that the standard of care would have 
17 required Dr. Stein to utilize the imaging equipment he 
18 had meaning, the fluoroscopy, to help position the 
19 pericardiocentesis needle when he was actually in the 
20 process of positioning the needle? 
21 MR. KENT: It's leading and multiple. 
22 THE COURT: It'll sustain the objection regarding 
23 the form of the question. Don't lead and break it up 
24 so it's only one question at a time. 
25 Q. BY MR. REYNOLDS: Doctor, should a doctor 
Judie Bryant - Certified Reporter 
!4J053/068 
187 
I4J 0541068 
03/25/2009 14:53 FAX 
. 
Page 17 
proceed with a blind procedure when there is guidance 
2 available? 
3 A. No, sir. A pericardiocentesis is best done 
4 with guidance, so that you can -- so the operator, the 
5 person doing the procedure. can see the heart, see the 
6 needle, and have an idea of guidance where to go. You 
7 can see the heart on the x-ray. We've been looking al 
8 it most of the morning, and you can see the needle. 
9 The needle is made out of steel and it's radio-opaque 
10 so (hat you see it on the x-ray and you see it on the 
11 f1uoro and you just have to guide the needle to the 
12 edge of the heart. which is where the pericardium is. 
13 It's on the leading edge of the heart silhouette. 
14 That's where the fluid is, so you just have to look at 
15 it and guide it in. 
16 Q. And this is all-- when you're talking about 
17 fluoroscopy. this is all in real time so you can see 
18 this as it's happening; correct? 
19 A. Yes, sir. 
20 Q. So is it your opinion Dr. Stein should have 
21 utilized that gUidance in this case? 
22 MR. KENT: Objection; leading. 
23 THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection. 
24 Q. BY MR REYNOLDS: What is your opinion with 
25 respect to Dr. Stein in this case and the 
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1 pericardiocentesis procedure? 
2 A. My opinion is that Dr. Stein, who has -- came 
3 to the room to do the pericardiocentesis and was doing 
4 it, should have utilized imaging techniques. We talked 
5 about the echo. The echo was not readily available. 
6 It was after 5; the echo was locked up elsewhere. But 
7 the imaging was there in terms at fluoroscopy. 
8 You could utilize that to do the 
9 pericardiocentesis, and it's a perfectly adequate way 
10 to do a pericardiocentesis. So that this was not a 
11 blind procedure, it was in fact a sighted procedure, 
12 because you courd rook at the heart and you could look 
13 at the needle to hit your target and to tap the fluid. 
14 Q. And do you know with respect to your review of 
15 the records what actually occurred with respect to Dr. 
16 Stein's procedure? 
17 A. Yes, sir. I believe that the needle went into 
18 the right ventricle. Then a pigtail catheter was 
19 exchanged over a wire, and the pigtail catheter was 
20 identified to be present in the right ventricle. So it 
21 had gone through the pericardium, through the space, 
22 and now was in the heart. I can draw that tor you if 
23 you want me to explain it, but the pericardium is a 
24 layer on the outside. 
25 Q. Okay. That's your understanding from the 
Judie Bryant - Certified Reporter 
!4J 055/068 
03/25/2009 14:53 FAX 
Page 19 
1 records as to what actually occurred? 
2 A Yes. 
3 Q. Once -- do you know if -- I'd like you to take 
4 it a step further as far as the pericardiocentesis 
5 procedure. Do you know if Dr. Stein actually went 
6 forward and inserted the catheter? 
7 A Yes, sir. He did insert a plastic catheter. 
B Yes, sir, he did. And he identified -- he injected 
9 some dye through it, and he used the fIuoro then and he 
10 identified it in the pulmonary artery. 
11 Q. Okay. But your opinion is related to the 
12 placement of the initial pOSitioning of the needle, 
13 correct? 
14 A. Yes, sir, exactly. You know, and to utilize 
15 that to hit the right spot on the heart. 
16 Q. Now after Dr. Stein had now inserted the 
17 catheter through the right ventricle and up into the 
18 pulmonary artery, what could he have done at that 
19 point? 
20 A Well, recognizing that he had gone through the 
21 pericardium and now was into the heart, he could simply 
22 take that catheter and pull it back until he entered 
23 the pericardial space and backed out on the way out. 
24 May I draw that just real quickly? 
25 Q. Sure. 
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1 A. Basically if this is the skin layer and we 
2 have a little bit of subcutaneous tissue, some fat, and 
3 then we have the heart right under that, and the heart 
4 has two layers of pericardium, and then inside the 
5 heart of course there is blood. And in sticking the 
6 needle into the right ventricle, which I marked "RV' _. 
7 and sticking the needle in there, which I'll mark down 
8 in orange, the catheter was put in there; and all you 
9 had to do then was pull it back until you enter (he 
10 pericardial space, which is filling with blood, and 
11 getting progressively bigger. So you have to go 
12 through the pericardium to get there so you just simply 
13 pull this needle back. 
14 Alternative NO.2 is to leave it where it 
15 is and get another needle and just stick it in and 
16 watch it under f1uoro this time as to where it is to 
17 ensure that you are stopping at the right moment. 
18 At the very edge of the heart, that's 
19 where the fluid is. the pericardial space. It's not 
20 outside, and it's all around the heart. So all you 
21 have to do is just stop the needle at the right time 
22 and aspirate it. 
23 Q. And what do you mean by "aspirate"? 
24 A. Pull back on the syringe, suck back on the 
25 syringe as you're going in with the needle. You 
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advance the needle, and you just pull back on the 
2 syringe until you hit it. 
3 And if you have any question about where 
4 you are, you're watching it on fluoro, you can take a 
5 little contrast and inject it through the needle as 
6 you're going in and see where you are. You can see if 
7 you're in the pericardium, in the right ventricle, in 
8 the pulmonary artery, or nowhere, sUbcutaneous tissue; 
9 but you can see where you're going. 
10 Q. Now, Dr. Schapira, can you tell us, was there 
11 kind of a critical point in time when the 
12 pericardiocentesis procedure would have to be 
13 accomplished by? 
14 A. Yes, sir. According to the records and her 
15 blood pressures, it looks like to me that after 1736, 
16 approximately, she would not have survived. But up to 
17 that point she could have survived to a reasonable 
18 medical probability, had the proper measures been 
19 carried oul. 
20 Q. Okay. And is it your opinion that Dr. Stein's 
21 failure to relieve the tamponade within that time frame 
22 was a contributing cause to Mary Blaha's death? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. Now I'd like to talk about --
25 Have you formulated an opinion with 
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respect to Mary Blaha's life expectancy? 
2 A Yes, sir, I have, 
3 Q. And what is that opinion? 
4 A My opinion is that with proper care and 
5 treatment, her fife expectancy courd have been extended 
6 for another 5 to 6 years. 
7 Q. Doctor, I did want to back up. I failed to 
8 ask you this at the beginning. But are you being paid 
9 for your services here today? 
10 A. Yes, sir, I am. 
11 Q. And can you teli us the amount of what you're 
12 being paid? 
13 A. Yes, sir. I'm being paid for the - the 
14 amount is the amount of loss to the office, for me not 
15 being there and working and for canceling the whole 
16 schedule and pay the overhead. My paycheck at the end 
17 of the month is the same regardless of whether "m here 
18 or at home, and I'm being paid $10,000 for the day. 
19 Q. And does any of that money go to a clinic that 
20 you volunteer your time to? 
21 A. Yes, sir. Part of the proceeds from the 
22 medical/legal work' give to the l.A. Free Clinic and 
23 we use that to support the patients we see at the LA 
24 Free Clinic. 
25 The LA Free Clinic is about 2 to 3 miles 
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east of Cedars on Beverly Boulevard. We see their 
2 patients, their indigent patients, their patients that 
3 don't have any Medi-Cal or Medicaid or any insurance. 
4 And we provide all the cardiology services for them for 
5 free because they can't afford to pay for it; they 
6 don't have a budget. So that's what we do with some of 
7 the money that we get. 
8 Q. There's one last thing that I just wanted to 
9 go back over, and that was in respect to when you gave 
10 your opinions earlier that Dr. Ganem should have had a 
11 physician with him during this procedure. Can you 
12 please tel/ the Jury what you base that opinion on. 
13 MR. SKELTON: Asked and answered, Your Honor, 
14 multiple times. 
15 THE COURT; 1'1/ overrule the objection. 
16 You may answer. 
17 Q. BY MR. REYNOLDS: Go ahead. 
18 A. A physician doing a procedure for the second 
19 time, a complex procedure, requires an experienced 
20 physician/operator to be with him tor both cognitive 
21 and technical skilfs, hands-on experience to tell the 
22 doctor how to handle the catheter, so as it doesn't 
23 jump, so as it doesn't perforate, so as you don't get 
24 tamponade. 
25 The purpose of thai is -- this is a 
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1 tactile learning experience. It's equipment, it's 
2 technical, and it's learning how to handle, how a 
3 doctor handles a catheter. It's like when a doctor 
4 handles an instrument, it's got to be done right. 
5 These things are powerful. They can do 
6 good; they can do bad. I know this because it is what 
7 my institution has taught me. It was the way I was 
8 trained. It is the way we require it at my hospital. 
9 It is what the American College of Cardiology 
10 recommends in their competence documents, their 
11 consensus documents and competence and proficiency. 
12 And I read some information from Banner 
13 that tells me they have very simjlar guidelines at 
14 their hospital. 
15 Q. Thank you. And is it your opinion that the 
16 failure of Or. Ganem to abide by the standard of care 
17 caused andlor contributed to the death of Mary Blaha in 
18 this case? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 MR. REYNOLDS: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. 
21 That's alii have. 
22 (Trial continues.) 
23 
24 
25 
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67. Falck CA Oepo LaFollette, Johnson 2005 ---.J 
68. Graham TX Depo Winckler & Harvey 2005 
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106. Bellamy KY Depo & Trial Fox, Wood, Fox, Estill 2006 .... "'" .,. 
107. Kleinhenz KY Oepo Kruger, Schwartz & Morreau 2006 = .. =<:J1 
108. Gipson AZ Depo & Trial Begam, lewis 2006 -.0 "" 
109. Schoonover CA Depo & Arb Michael Sutton 2006 "Il 
'-'-' ;>-
110. No rise III Depo Depo x2 2006 .. ~ WI 
111. Ross CA Depo & Arb Boudreau, Albert & Wohlfeil 2006 -"" 
"'0 
112. Biel AZ Depo Andrea Watters 2006 s 
113. Cromer KY Depo The lawrence Firm 2006 
114. Randolph CA Depo Edward Morris 2006 
115. Thomas, Barbara FL& WDC Depo & Trial The Cochran Firm & 2006 
116. Robins CA Depo & Trial Yoka & Smith 2006 
117. Lengennhager MO Oepo & Trial Gerritzen & Gerritzen 2006 
118. Mooney Fl Depo x2 Wilkins & FroIich 2006 = 
119. lac NV Depo Birardi & Grasso 2006 '" ,,;: 
120. Pupo Fl Oepo Zidell 2006 ~ co 
121. Cobb NC Depo Robert Grant 2006 
U> 
122. Wright KY Oepo Moore, Malone & Safreed 2006 
123. Finger MO Depo larry Finger 2006 
124. Robinson GA Depo Parks, Chesin & Wahlberg 2006 
125. Buttice CA GIC 857911 [Jepo Robert Vaage 2006 
126. Penner v Krueger CA 05CECG03085MBS Oepo McCormick, Barstow 2006 
127. Swezea CA Depo Lopez, Hodes 2007 
128. Cobb GA Depo Wayne Grant 2007 
129. Vanderhorst CA Depo Bruce Fagel & Assoc 2007 
130. Finger MO Depo larry Glenn 2007 
131. Sullivan LA Depo Orrill, Cordell 2007 
132. Roos v Kaiser CA Depo 2007 
133. Jurline Thomas CA Oepo & Trial Stanton Matthews 2007 
134. Ullman IA Depo & Trial Alfredo Parrish 2007 
135. Hallman MO Depo The Hershewe Firm 2007 
136. Kiswani OR Oepo 2007 
137. Reyes NM Depo Joel Newton 2007 
138. Cheit CA Depo 2007 
= 
139. Blaha AZ Depo Poli & Ball 2007 0 
140. Preston Il Oepo Rogich & Richardson 2007 ~ 
....". 
141. Tryon CA Oepo & Trial Stephen Belgum 2007 -..J 
142. Sorrentino Il Depo Leahy & Hoste 2007 
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69. Arbona FL Oepo Brian Hill 2005 f-' "-" ... 
70. Terio CONN Trial Silver, Golub 8. Teiteil 2005 c> .. =<:" 
71. Cady Depo Oepo Pray, Walker 2005 '-0 CJl 
72. Webb AZ Depo & Trial Keller, Roh rback 2005 "rj u.:J> 
73. Idlet CA Depo Manning & Marder 2005 .. H 
'-T1 
74. Mirisola CA Trial Thomas& Thomas 2005 .p. 
75. Smith. DDS TX Depo & Trial Banner, Briley & White 2005 
76. Miyashiro HI Depo Kuniyuki & Chang 2005 
77. Garrison TX Depo Janice Maloney 2005 
78. Keiter OH Oepo Finelli & Margolis 2005 
79. Williams v Overlake WA Depo Robert Gellatly 2005 
80. Plourde CONN Oepo Koskoff, Koskoff & Bieder 2005 
81. Bain GA Oepo Blasingame, Burch 2005 = 
82. Bieber AZ. Depo & Trial Waterfall, Economidis 2005 I'U 
"" 83. Adams CA Oepo & Trial Creason, Aarvig 2005 "'" CD 
84. Hamilton AZ. Depo Begam. Lewis 2005 V> 
85. Gipson AZ. Oepo Begam, Lewis 2005 
86. Strausser LA Depo Townsley L.aw Firm 2005 
87. Ulmer IL Trial Cirignani, Heller 2005 
88. Mulcahy IL Trial Corboy & Demetrio 2005 
89. Braden TX Depo Banner, Briley & White 2005 
90. Lindsay IL Depo Navigato & Salvato 2005 
91. Sikes AZ. Depo Art Lloyd 2005 
92. Lopez, Andres TX Depo Winckler & Harvey 2005 
93. Heath-Hall CA Depo Michelman & Robinson 2005 
94. Rex CA Depo McCurdy & Liebl 2005 
95. Weigand LA Depo Gainsburgh, Benjamin 2005 
96. Cole v Kern American CA S-1500-CV -25493(; Oepo & Trial Chain, Younger 2006 
97. Meredith v Mendoza, MD CA 99-575-CA-09-8 Trial Best & Anderson 2006 
98. Ortega v VIP Nail Spa CA SC044414 Depo & Trial Christopher Bagnaschi 2006 
99. Gilmore CA De·po & Arb' LaFoliete, Johnson 2006 
100. Patton AZ. Depo Gregory Patton 2006 
101. Hashim CA Oepo& Trial Chain, Younger 2006 
= 102. Monk TX De po Lyons & Rhodes 2006 0 
103. Navarro CA Depo Cheong, DeNove 2006 ~ ~ 
104. Cook Ml Oepo Giffels 2006 ---.J 
105. Bano ILL Depo Leahy & Hoste 2006 
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143. Talbot IL 
144. Terrell AI. 
145. Sitko lL 
146. Nozawa NV 
147. Chang HI 
148. Mcinerny IL 
149. Buttice CA 
150. Finn IL 
151. Brown v Kaiser CA 
152. Deveaugh FL 
153. Crawford MT 
154. Watson MO 
155. Harmon KS 
156. Bond TX 
157. Leudtke IA 
158. Fuller GA 
159. Sands AZ 
160. Soto AZ 
161. Duvall GA 
162. Dorton CA 
163. Branum AZ 
164. Lakos v Kaiser CA 
165. DeAngelo v West Hills CA LC075105 
166. Greenwood vs Kaiser Bakersfield, CA 
167. Bartlett V$ Delnitz CA 
168. Luedtke vs Catholic Health Iowa 
169. DeAngelis, Richard FL 48-Z006-ca-008465-0 
170. Davis v Rudisill N. Carolina 07-CVS 67'S 
N 
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Oepo & Trial Paul B. Episcope 2007 
Depo Burch & Cracchiolo 2007 
Depo Cirignani, Heller 2007 
Depo Gerry Gillock 2007 
Depo Park, Park & Remillard 2007 
Oepo Susan A Loggans 2007 
Oepo Robert Vaage 2007 
Depox3 Samuel Briones 2007 
Depo & Arb Jason Halpern 2007 
Depo Conroy, Simberg 2007 
Oepo Michael Meloy 2001 
Oepo The Hershewe Firm 2007 
Cepo Oliver & Reichel 2007 
Depo & Trial Michael Archuleta 2007 
Depo Gregory Garland 2007 
Depo Scherffius, Ballard 2007 
Depo Massey & Finley 2007 
Depo Paul Sacco 2007 
Depo Wayne Coppedge 2007 
Depo William Hewitt 2007 
Oepo Paul Sacco 2007 
Oepo Paul Johnson 2007 
Dapo Fredrickson, Mazeika 2007 
Depo & Arb James Noriega 2008 
Depo Frank Barbaro 2008 
Oepo Gregory Garland 2008 
Depo Morgan & Morgan 2008 
Oepo Grant & Richman 2008 
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STATE OF CALIFORNIA MEDICAL BOARD CASES 
Medical Board vs Yelamanchili 
Medical Board vs Maheshwari 
MedIcal Board vs Eisenstein 
Medical Board vs Jung 
Medical Board vs Cham 
Medical Board vs James liu, M.D. 
6 
"This case list was compiled from various attorney computer searches ancl also from our own archives for 2007. We do not retain records 
and are relying on information from other sources. 
168 depos 
38 arbitrations and trials 
6 medical board cases 
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